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It has been over twenty years since passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the bill commonly called welfare reform that
created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and ended Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). PRWORA represented one of the largest shifts in the Amer-
ican welfare state since the 1960s-era War on Poverty. In contrast to the New Deal and
the War on Poverty—both of which greatly expanded services to low-income individuals,
families, and communities—PRWORA was a retraction in supports for the poor. "Wel-
fare" was no longer an entitlement to cash benefits for eligible families. Instead, mate-
rial support was tied to work requirements and time limits. Beneficiaries in violation of
behavioral requirements were subject to sanctions. TANF also provided states with ex-
tensive discretion. In contrast to its predecessor programs, which had unlimited federal
matches of state expenses, TANF is structured as a federal block grant with a required
state Maintenance of E↵ort (MOE) contribution. This design allows states to, within
broad guidelines, set their own time limits, requirements, and non-compliance penal-
ties for cash assistance recipients. Unsurprisingly, welfare in the wake of reform received
much scrutiny from academics and other policy analysts, and a great deal of attention
was paid to state variation in TANF cash assistance program implementation. States also,
however, have flexibility over the use of TANF resources, and only approximately one-
1
quarter of all TANF expenditures are now directed to traditional cash assistance. Even
combining work supports, services, and child care with cash assistance—generally con-
sidered the core of the program—only accounts for approximately half of expenditures.
Further, resources that are directed to social services and child care need not be used in
support of cash assistance beneficiaries or former beneficiaries. There is, then, a mis-
match between knowledge about state TANF implementation and its current form.
TANF is is not a cash assistance program, but is rather a funding stream states partially
use for cash assistance and work supports (Falk, 2013). The distinction is not merely se-
mantic; understanding TANF’s true nature is important for identifying the consequences
of welfare reform. As shown in Figure 1.1, overall TANF spending has declined only
modestly since the early 2000s. The value of the federal grant, though, has fallen by ap-
proximately one-third due to the changing value of the dollar. States have contributed
additional MOE, in nominal dollars, over time, as doing so adjusts some of their other re-
quirements. Figure 1.2 presents the mix of federal and state funds spent under TANF in
constant dollars—while the general trend in the federal contribution to TANF is a decline
since the mid-2000s, state MOE spending has, with some comparatively small increases
and decreases, generally hovered around $15 billion in 2014 U.S. dollars. MOE need not
be new programming. The state can simply count existing e↵ort as MOE so long as it ad-
dresses TANF’s extremely broad goals in some way (Schott & Floyd, 2017). It is relatively
easy, then, for states to exceed their MOE requirement, and the rate of decline in overall
spending is therefore slower than would otherwise be expected.
The activities justified under the umbrella of TANF have changed dramatically since
the initial phase of reform. Figure 1.3 presents the proportion of TANF resources de-
voted to various expenditure categories since 1998. E↵ort directed to cash assistance,
in particular, has declined markedly. After an initial, sharp increase in the early years
of TANF, expenditures on work, supportive services, and childcare have also declined.
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Figure 1.2: Federal and state contributions to TANF, 1998-2013.
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in each state devoted to cash assistance in the year 2013. It ranges from as little as 7%
in Illinois to as much as 52% in Maine. Map 1.2 presents state di↵erences in change
in cash assistance e↵ort over time, from a 93% decrease in Illinois to a very slight in-
crease (3%) in Virginia from 1998 to 20131. Treating TANF as a funding stream presents
heretofore unaddressed questions in welfare scholarship. What explains state di↵erences
in cash assistance e↵ort and changes in cash assistance e↵ort? Do these trends matter
for low-income families? Considering these and related questions better aligns TANF
scholarship, which overwhelmingly examines cash assistance rules, requirements, and
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Figure 1.3: Categorical TANF allocations as proportion of overall spending, 1998-2013.
1Arizona is missing in both maps, as its reported expenditure on basic assistance in 2013 was a negative
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Map 1.2: Percentage decline in state use of TANF resources for basic assistance, 1998-
2013.
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Research Questions & Dissertation Structure
I address three distinct but related questions in this dissertation. First, what state-
level factors explain di↵erences in emphasis on cash assistance and movement away from
cash assistance under TANF? Second, what are the state-level correlates of alternative
uses of TANF funds? Finally, how has the movement away from cash assistance under
TANF a↵ected the well-being of low-income families? Each question is addressed in a
separate chapter. In Chapter 2 I use growth curve models to assess predictors of state
basic assistance expenditures and change in basic assistance expenditures under TANF.
Chapter 3 evaluates covariates of categorical state TANF spending from the year 2000 to
2013 using multilevel linear models and point-in-time logistic regression models. Finally,
in Chapter 4, I use Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS) data
to examine the relationship between the decline of cash assistance and two outcomes with
respect to the well-being of low-income families with children—food insecurity and em-
ployment. I conclude the dissertation with a chapter reiterating the main themes from
the three empirical studies, connect them into a set of common findings, and discuss im-
plications for social policy and social work. The three empirical chapters are structured
as stand-alone papers, but taken together address key implications of TANF treated as a
flexible funding stream.
The Centrality of Race
In Chapters 2 and 3, I pay particular attention to the role of racial politics in state
welfare policy, as race has long shaped the American response to economic hardship
(Lieberman, 1998; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011; Ward, 2005). The earliest attempts at
economic protection for economically vulnerable families were state-level mother’s pen-
sion programs, primarily targeted to widowed mothers; states generally excluded black
families from participation (Skocpol, 1992; Ward, 2005). The first federal "welfare" pro-
7
gram in the form of cash redistribution to poor families came through the Social Security
Act of 1935, which created Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) (Weaver, 2000). Under
ADC and its successor program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the
federal government partially matched state expenses in the administration of relief; the
programs were largely a state and local matter, however, and states, counties, and cities
again used their discretion to limit participation by non-whites (Lieberman, 1998). AFDC
expanded to a de facto categorical entitlement in the late 1960s through the welfare rights
and civil rights movements (Katz, 1989; Ward, 2005; Weaver, 2000), though states with
larger black populations continued to o↵er less generous benefits and less extensive eco-
nomic protections (Orr, 1976; Tropman & Gordon, 1978). The politics leading up to wel-
fare reform were also entangled with the politics of race. The stereotyped image of the
"welfare queen," implicitly identified as black, was often invoked in political rhetoric in
the latter years of AFDC (Hancock, 2004). Media images of poverty likewise dispropor-
tionately featured families of color (Clawson & Trice, 2000; Gilens, 1999). This trend has
continued even after reform (van Doorn, 2015), possibly explaining why negative opin-
ions of "welfare" have remained durable to the extensive policy changes of reform (Dyck
& Hussey, 2008; Soss & Schram, 2007).
Unsurprisingly given this context, the politics of race was evident in the implemen-
tation of reform, particularly at the state level. States in which racial/ethnic minori-
ties, particularly blacks, make up a larger proportion of the population or the welfare
caseload tended to design more stringent and punitive cash assistance programs (Fel-
lowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2011; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001). This
initial wave of scholarship also found a relationship between proportion of the popula-
tion or caseload identifying as Hispanic/Latino and state welfare policy choices, but less
consistently than for blacks. A second wave of studies added some nuance to these find-
ings, examining moderating factors such as representation by women and racial/ethnic
minorities in state legislatures (Preuhs, 2007; Reingold & Smith, 2012). While perhaps
8
expected, the demographics-policy choice connection presents some puzzles. Why, for
example, are race-based geographic patterns seen in some social welfare programs and
not others (e.g., there is no evidence that the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
follows a race-based pattern) (Howard, 2007)?
Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) propose that racism explains the seemingly
underdeveloped American welfare state, with majority group racial attitudes suppress-
ing the expected demand for redistribution2. Such explanations provide no insight into
state di↵erences, however, and again fail to explain why the influence of racial politics is
evident in some redistributive programs and not others3. Social constructionist theories
of social policy, which hold that policy designs are related to perceptions of the target
population and the political power of the target population (Schneider & Ingram, 1993),
provide a broad framework for understanding state policy variation but do not explain
why race matters so strongly to welfare. Finally, at the individual level attitudes toward
welfare and racial attitudes co-vary among whites (Dyck & Hussey, 2008; Gilens, 1999;
Kinder & Sanders, 1996). How these micro-level processes influence macro-level policy
making requires further explanation, though.
Soss et al. (2011) provide a theoretical framework, the Racial Classification Model
(RCM), that links several of these disparate streams of theory and scholarship. The RCM
posits that policymakers, whether federal elected o cials or street-level caseworkers, re-
quire shortcuts for decision-making. In the case of social policy, the shortcut is a percep-
tion of the target population. When race is a salient aspect of the policy area, stereotypes
of the racial group can serve as the heuristic device. Essentially, to borrow terminology
from Baumgartner and Jones (2009), racial stereotypes become part of the policy image,
or "how a policy is understood and discussed (p. 25)." The contrast between stereotyped
2Scholars such as Howard (2007), Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding (2010), and Mettler (2011) have
argued that the U.S. welfare state is not actually underdeveloped. Rather, it operates in ways—such as
through tax credits or services—that are more hidden than direct cash benefits. These alternative supports
also often benefit groups other than the seriously economically disadvantaged.
3Winter (2006) suggests it is not the case that such programs are not influenced by race-based politics.
Rather, their target populations are perceived as white.
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behaviors of the perceived target group and policy intent then influences the nature of the
policy solution, further conditioned on how deeply stereotypes are held. Applied to state
welfare policy, race becomes increasingly salient when a racial minority group makes up
a larger portion of the population/caseload in a state. Negative stereotypes of blacks in-
clude notions such as poor work ethic and lack of trustworthiness, thus producing more
punitive policy in states with large black populations.
Chapters 2 and 3 consider the implications of racial politics to TANF-as-funding
stream. Previous scholarship has demonstrated a relationship between overall TANF ef-
fort and population demographics, with states with larger proportions of blacks devoting
fewer financial resources to TANF (Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2011; Rodgers & Tedin, 2006),
but fails to examine patterns within TANF outlays. Even these studies of overall expen-
ditures are few in number, the bulk of TANF policy choice/race scholarship focusing on
cash assistance rules and requirements (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2011, 2001).
It is reasonable to expect that race-based politics might influence state TANF expendi-
tures, though. First, if cash assistance use is associated with negative racial stereotypes,
states in which race is salient to policymaking have the opportunity to de-emphasize cash
assistance, whether through more restrictive rules and less generous benefits or through
shifting of resources to other priorities. When race is salient to state welfare policymak-
ing, then, fewer resources should be devoted to cash assistance. These states might also
have moved away from cash assistance as a focus of TANFmore quickly than other states.
Beyond cash assistance, states also have the opportunity to use TANF resources for a va-
riety of purposes. States in which race is salient could use resources in distinct ways,
such as devoting more e↵ort to corrective social programming such as two-parent fam-
ily formation and out-of-wedlock pregnancy prevention. In addressing these questions,
I measure racial salience with respect to blacks using a measure of white racial attitudes
rather than caseload or population demographics. The logic underlying this choice and




The chief finding of this dissertation is that the politics of race still influences Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families even when treated as a funding stream. As demon-
strated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, states devote less financial e↵ort to traditional cash
assistance when a greater proportion of whites in that state express negative views of
blacks. Conversely, however, I find no evidence that the salience of race to politics is re-
lated to the rate at which states moved away from cash assistance. The influence of racial
politics in early state decision-making, however, is essentially path dependent, making it
more likely that the cross-sectional patterns with respect to race are durable across time.
In Chapter 2, I also find preliminary evidence of an interaction between racial salience
and government ideology; more liberal governments devote more e↵ort to cash assis-
tance, but only when negative racial views among whites are less common. When neg-
ative stereotypes of blacks are more common among whites, liberalism exerts no e↵ect
and even begins to have a negative relationship with basic assistance expenditures. The
empirical support for this proposition is inconsistent, however, and it should be taken as
suggestive only. Beyond the influence of racial politics, Chapter 2 also finds that states
under greater fiscal stress devote fewer resources to basic cash assistance. Chapter 3,
while reinforcing the race/basic assistance finding, does not generally find any distinct
and consistent patterns to alternative uses of TANF funds. Racial politics is related to
an increased probability of a state using TANF resources for pregnancy prevention and
two-parent family formation. When spending patterns are examined as dollar amounts
rather than as percentages, then the proportion of the population identifying as Evangel-
ical Christian is also related to several categories of spending. Other relationships appear
only sporadically.
In Chapter 4, I find that the decline of cash assistance since welfare reform has ad-
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versely a↵ected low-income families. Measuring state-year cash assistance coverage as
the ratio of families receiving cash benefits to families in poverty, I use a within-state
estimator to show that declines in coverage are related to increases in the probability of
a household experiencing food insecurity, a form of material hardship. This relationship
is particularly strong for households headed by a single female and with no other adults
present, the most economically vulnerable household configuration. It is, though, most
equivocal for similar households with other adults. Conversely, changes in state welfare
coverage generally bear no relationship to the probability of a household having an em-
ployed adult in the unit. The sole exception is, again, households headed by a single
female but with other adults present. The relationship was only found using one method
of operationalizing coverage (holding the denominator constant using an average of fam-
ilies in poverty across the study period), however.
Contributions to Social Science
This dissertation makes contributions to both social science and social work. Most im-
portantly, it is one of few studies to treat TANF as a funding stream rather than a cash as-
sistance program. A handful of inquiries have examined predictors of overall state TANF
e↵ort (Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2011; Rodgers & Tedin, 2006), but examining only overall
e↵ort ignores the di↵erences in distribution of resources both within states and over time.
TANF in the year 2000, for example, contained a very di↵erent package of programs com-
pared to TANF in 2013; in the earlier year, cash benefits still dominated TANF spending,
while by 2013 traditional "welfare" comprised a much smaller segment of overall state
e↵ort. These studies have additional limitations. Rodgers and Tedin (2006), for example,
consider only the year 2002 in their analyses, while Matsubayashi and Rocha (2011) pool
the initial years of TANF with the latter years of AFDC. While this procedure produces
a very large sample of state-year observations, it ignores the important structural di↵er-
ences between the two programs. Lambright and Allard (2004) do examine categorical
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TANF expenditures, but only for a single spending priority (transfers from TANF to the
Social Services Block Grant) and only in the initial years of TANF. Non-academic pol-
icy analysis organizations have investigated state TANF priorities beyond cash assistance
(Hahn, Golden, & Stanczyk, 2012; Schott, Pavetti, & Finch, 2012), but analysis is limited
to description. Finally, Allard (2009) considers the consequences of a transition from
cash benefits to services for low-income individuals and families, but does not examine
di↵erences across states in the package of services justified under TANF. This disserta-
tion, particularly Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, therefore provides an important corrective to
existing state welfare scholarship, which focuses overwhelmingly on state cash assistance
program design (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Soss et al., 2011, 2001),
and addresses gaps in those studies of TANF expenditures that have been conducted.
The dissertation also provides a methodological advance on previous methods for op-
erationalizing the salience of race to state politics. For the salience of blacks to state
welfare politics, I use a measure based on the estimated proportion of whites in a state
holding extremely negative stereotypes of blacks; this variable is created using multi-
level regression with post-stratification (MRP) and the 2008 National Annenberg Election
Survey online sample (Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2010)45. Most earlier studies use
demographics of either the state or the cash assistance caseload to measure racial salience
in policymaking (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Orr, 1976; Soss et al., 2011, 2001; Tropman &
Gordon, 1978). Within Soss et al.’s (2011) Racial Classification Model, racial attitudes are
central. The distance between the perceived behavior of a target population and desired
4The 2008 NAES telephone survey has an extremely large sample size su cient for directly disaggre-
gating by state (n=57,967). The online module, which contains the racial a↵ect items, has a smaller but
still quite large sample (n=20,052 in its largest wave). I use multi-level regression with post-stratification
rather than directly disaggregating because I am interested in a subgroup—non-Hispanic whites—and the
within-state samples for low-population states become considerably smaller. Results are similar using a
disaggregation-based rather than amodel-basedmeasure of attitudes, but the model-based procedure com-
pensates for small-state data issues and allows indirect inclusion of racial context in the state expenditure
studies.
5A comparable data source is not available for white non-Hispanic attitudes toward Hispanics. For
salience of Hispanics to state welfare politics, I use the proportion of the cash assistance caseload identify-
ing as Hispanic.
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policy outcomes is partly a product of racial group stereotypes. The more negative the
stereotypes of the assumed target population, when based on racialized images, the more
stringent and corrective the policy. However, other scholarship suggests the policy im-
age of "welfare" is typically constructed such that clients are perceived as black (Gilens,
1999; Hancock, 2004). If so, it is reasonable that the depth with which stereotypes are
held—particularly among whites—is an equally valid measure of racial salience6. The
only previous study to examine the link between welfare policy and white racial atti-
tudes was Johnson’s (2001) examination of benefit levels in the latter years of AFDC. The
author used structural equation modeling to simultaneously consider the relationships
between racial context, racial attitudes, and welfare policy. Similar approaches have not
been used to examine TANF, so I provide an update to this branch of welfare scholarship.
This study also provides insight into processes of social stratification. Social theorists
such as Massey (2007) and Tilly (1998) suggest that many of the most long-standing so-
cial and economic inequalities are grounded in group categorizations. In Tilly’s (1998)
view, social inequalities become institutionalized when a dominant social group gains
advantages from exploiting a paired social group (e.g., male/female; white/black). Suc-
cessful organizational adaptations of practices that extract value from the outgroup are
then replicated in other organizations7, reproducing and sustaining inequality. Massey
(2007), using a similar framework, further links individual-level psychology on stereo-
typing to macro-level social and political phenomena to better understand the process
of grouping. These concepts share much in common with social constructionism/policy
design theory (Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider & Sidney, 2009) and the Racial Clas-
sification Model (Soss et al., 2011). Indeed, such theories can be seen as providing ad-
6The argument here is not that the Racial Classification Model (Soss et al., 2011) is wrong. Rather, the
RCM provides a broad framework. Within it, when applied to state policymaking rather than, for example,
a caseworker dealing with an individual client, the target population image might be influenced not only
by within-state demographic considerations but also broader constructions of "welfare recipients."
7As a sociologist, Tilly (1998) refers to isomorphism as an organizational phenomenon, but considers
"organizations" to be a broad category. It includes governments, with Tilly stating "governments imitate
other governments’ forms (p. 195)." There is much overlap, then, between Tilly’s (1998) mechanism of
emulation and the study of policy di↵usion within political science.
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ditional causal description within the frameworks proposed by Massey (2007) and Tilly
(1998). Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation follow in a similar vein, and o↵er a view into
the means by which some groups are disadvantaged through social policy.
Finally, Chapter 4 contributes to the literature in economics, public policy, and re-
lated fields evaluating the consequences of welfare reform. The first decade of reform
understandably generated a large body of literature examining the e↵ectiveness of both
reform broadly and of specific state policy designs (see Grogger and Karoly (2005) for an
extensive review of this initial wave of studies placed into an overall economic model of
work and welfare participation). In many ways, reform can be viewed as a success, with
increases in single-mother employment and decreases in child poverty (R. Blank, 2002;
Lichter & Crowley, 2004; Rodgers, 2006). TANF at present, however, is a very di↵erent
program from its early years, and given the incentives for states to keep cash assistance
caseloads low with no inducement to respond to either household-level hardship or gen-
eral economic downturns, it is reasonable to question whether the deterioration of the
safety net has increased the risk of harm to vulnerable families.
While, as discussed in the forthcoming section, Chapter 4 can be seen as a straight-
forward policy evaluation, I also approach it from a perspective of social theory. TANF
is often considered, through its embodiment of "workfare," the hallmark of an increased
emphasis on market and market-like approaches to public functions8(Ridzi, 2009; Soss et
al., 2011; Steeger & Roy, 2010; Wacquant, 2009). This trend, sometimes termed neoliber-
alism9, is evident in TANF’s reliance on private labor markets for poverty relief and en-
forced work (the latter facet termed "neoliberal paternalism" by Soss et al. (2011)). Under
this framework, the availability of cash benefits is seen as devaluing labor by providing
an alternative to work participation. Reduced work e↵ort then increases the risk of hard-
8Welfare reform also indicated a turn toward the use of corrective and punitive tools in public policy,
though that movement is a secondary consideration in this study (Soss et al., 2011; Wacquant, 2009).
9The term "neoliberalism" has come under criticism as poorly defined and more a pejorative than a
description of a specific social phenomenon (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009). While I do not engage this debate
here, the trend toward market-based social policy and enforced participation in private labor markets is a
distinct break from the major expansions of anti-poverty policy in the 1930s and 1960s.
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ship10. I test these presumptions by modeling state-year TANF coverage as a predictor of
food insecurity and household employment, examining the implications of a dominant
trend in social welfare policymaking that shows little evidence of losing influence11.
Contributions to Social Work
Social work is unique among the helping professions in explicitly placing individual
and community problems in a broader social context. Social policy is so central to shap-
ing that context that social work has even been referred to as "the policy-based profession
(Popple & Leighninger, 2011, p. 10)". The Code of Ethics of the National Association
of Social Workers (2008) states that social workers "... should be aware of the impact
of the political arena on practice and should advocate for changes in policy and legisla-
tion to improve social conditions in order to meet basic human needs and promote social
justice." It further states that "social workers should act to prevent and eliminate domi-
nation of, exploitation of, and discrimination against any person, group, or class on the
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or
expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, or mental
or physical disability." TANF-as-funding-stream is relevant for both of these mandates.
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the decline of the cash safety net while Chapter 4 considers
its consequences; findings are directly related to economic well-being and the ability of
households to meet basic needs, particularly for vulnerable populations. Further, the
history of welfare in the U.S. is deeply entangled with both explicit and implicit dis-
crimination of racial/ethnic groups, particularly blacks (Lieberman, 1998; Ward, 2005).
TANF, long-removed from the Jim Crow era of overt discrimination, features cash assis-
tance rules that follow a race-based pattern at the state level (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004;
10The link between emphasis on work e↵ort and stereotypes of blacks may explain the seemingly incon-
gruent blend of laissez-faire and punitive policy under TANF (Soss et al., 2011).
11H. Luke Shaefer and Kathryn Edin contributed to Chapter 4 both conceptually and methodologically.
Reid Wilson also provided research assistance for this chapter.
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Soss et al., 2011, 2001). If such patterns are evident in TANF as a funding stream, it re-
lates to social work’s concern with regard to di↵erential treatment of social groups (e.g.,
if funding patterns follow state racial demographics, then just through geography mem-
bers of minority groups might have access to very di↵erent policies and programs under
the auspices of TANF).
If social work’s ultimate aim is to improve thematerial and social well-being of vulner-
able populations, then Chapter 4 is also a form of needs assessment, identifying service
gaps produced by state di↵erences in cash assistance accessibility. It indicates that in-
creases in household hardship brought on by the decline of the traditional cash safety net
are a legitimate cause for concern. This finding in turn suggests social workers should
advocate for changes to the welfare state to bolster supports for low-income families,
whether through cash or near-cash supports or improved services. While this suggestion
applies nationally, it is more imperative in some areas than others, as low-income indi-
viduals in di↵erent states also di↵er in the risk of food insecurity (Bartfeld & Dunifon,
2006). Finally, Chapter 4 also suggests that, at least in the current policy and economic
environment, cash assistance coverage is generally not related to employment. Employ-
ment, however, is strongly related to food security, so e↵orts to bolster the safety net
should not be independent from improved services to help adults in poor households ac-
cess and succeed in work, nor from e↵orts to improve working conditions, wages, and
employment supports such as childcare.
From a practice perspective, devolution of social policy such as under TANF presents
both opportunities and challenges for social workers. Social workers and other human
service professionals can intervene in state policymaking systems to advocate on behalf
of clients, though it is challenging to present a unified framework for practice given that
each state’s politics are unique (Hoefer, 2005). State government is more physically acces-
sible than the federal government for many social service professionals, and they are also
likely more comfortable intervening at this level. Further, state legislators turn to human
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service and grassroots organizations for policy information (Jackson-Elmoore, 2005)12.
Conversely, however, devolution of social policy by definition means that local political
ideology and beliefs influence policy design and implementation (Hasenfeld & Garrow,
2012). Such di↵erences and their overlap with state-level racial politics are the subject of
much of the existing TANF scholarship (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2011, 2001)
and further exploration of this theme is a major emphasis of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 in
this dissertation.
Many agencies and programs employing social workers might be supported by state
funds derived from or justified under TANF. Practically, it is valuable for social workers
and members of related professions to understand the politics of these funding streams.
Such information could prove useful in an era of strained public budgets. It also, though,
identifies an important, under-addressed ethical issue for social workers. Organizations
and their clients are essentially in competition for scarce resources under this struc-
ture—funds granted to an agency under a state contract are ostensibly moneys that could
have been used for direct support. Further, since much of the work justified under TANF
is implemented through third party providers, the role of the client shifts from citizen to
consumer; the burden is not on the government to provide e↵ective services, but on the
individual to find the best product available in the market for social services (Hasenfeld
& Garrow, 2012). Placing the impetus on the client to receive benefits via third-party
agencies disadvantages some clients, particularly clients of color, when providers are ge-
ographically removed from poor communities (Allard, 2009).
12The e↵ectiveness of advocacy e↵orts is almost certainly determined by the partisan and ideological
configuration of state government, but there are few, if any, studies that have examined how social workers
and other advocates for disadvantaged social groups respond under varying conditions. More practice
research is warranted in this area.
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Contributions to Social Policy
From the perspective of social policy design, the studies in the dissertation o↵er lessons
both for TANF specifically and for reform of other social welfare programs. In particular,
they highlight some of the disadvantages of TANF’s policy design, which disincentivizes
states from providing a robust safety net while encouraging use of "welfare" resources
for miscellaneous other expenses. Flexibility over resource use is not, in the abstract,
problematic; local conditions may di↵er and thus di↵erent types of programs may be
needed. Devolution can also encourage policy learning, ultimately leading to more ef-
ficient identification of solutions to complex problems (Kollman, Miller, & Page, 2000;
Shipan & Volden, 2012). TANF, however, contains few incentives for states to use funds
for e↵ective programs addressing poverty. For example, state incentives to facilitate em-
ployment are easily manipulated through other provisions, and there is no mechanism
to guarantee interventions are targeted to those most in need. Placing cash assistance in
competition with other programs for scarce resources, meanwhile, limits welfare’s abil-
ity to be counter-cyclically responsive. Finally, a response to local conditions can be a
negative aspect of devolution. Local social biases are themselves a part of the policy en-
vironment, and as shown in much existing scholarship and in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3
of this dissertation, the influence of racial politics is evident in state welfare policy. Pro-
posals for reforms to other programs, such as Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamps Program), have suggested TANF’s
replacement of AFDC as a model. The studies in this dissertation add to the evidence
suggesting caution in any such e↵orts. Rather than merely emulating PRWORA, they
should also take into account its cautionary lessons.
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on the evaluation of TANF as well as scholar-
ship on food security. Previous research linking food insecurity to state policy choices
has tended to focus on programs directly related to food, such as the Supplemental Nu-
trition Assistance Program (SNAP)/Food Stamps or the National School Lunch Program
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(Bartfeld & Dunifon, 2006; Ratcli↵e, McKernan, & Zhang, 2011). In Chapter 4, I show
that the availability of direct cash supports is related to the probability of a household ex-
periencing food hardship. During the debate over welfare reform, Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, himself previously an ardent critic of AFDC, dramatically warned that, in
the aftermath of the then-proposed changes, "you shall find children sleeping on grates
(Toner, 1995)."While perhaps not as visible asMoynihan feared, this study provides some
vindication for his view. The danger of hardship for vulnerable families has increased
as the cash safety net has declined and, while research has not attributed such trends
directly to welfare reform, there have been increases in both deep poverty (Edin & Shae-
fer, 2015) and public school student homelessness (Ingram, Bridgeland, Reed, & Atwell,
2016) in the TANF era. Chapter 4 also suggests that pitting welfare against work in public
policy may be misguided, that there is a place for both and a re-envisioning of the bal-
ance between the two is in order. Work is, for many reasons, superior to simply receiving
public support, but punitive and restrictive welfare policy is not necessarily the solution
to increased labor market participation.
It must be emphasized that, overall, the argument presented here is not that a return to
AFDC is desirable. Traditional "welfare" prior to reform had a host of very real problems.
Under AFDC, for instance, it was not uncommon for recipients to—in violation of pro-
gram rules—work under-the-table to supplement meager benefits (Edin & Lein, 1997).
Stigma around welfare use made participation problematic (R. Mo tt, 1981). AFDC
participation, through restrictive rules and supervisory bureaucracy, even undermined
participants’ sense of political e cacy, leading to questions of such a program’s role and
appropriateness in a democratic society (Soss, 1999). These practical shortcomings are in
addition to its dislike by actors in almost all political corners (Ellwood, 1988). Nonethe-
less, there are now two decades of lessons on the successes and the challenges of using
the welfare state to support work and of giving states extensive fiscal discretion over the
provision of aid and services. Some individuals and families have been left out of the
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gains celebrated at the outset of reform, and there are legitimate concerns about TANF’s
ability to act as a safety net (S. K. Danziger, Danziger, Seefeldt, & Shaefer, 2016). At the
very least, this dissertation and other research suggest updates based on learning from the
initial decades of reform could prove fruitful in bolstering the well-being of low-income
families.
Conclusion
Most Temporary Assistance for Needy Families research examines cash assistance
rules and requirements or activities and services supporting cash assistance participants.
This focus is understandable, as TANF, through welfare reform, replaced a straightfor-
ward cash assistance program in Aid to Families with Dependent Children. While not
immediately evident in its early years, however, TANF is not merely a more restric-
tive and devolved version of AFDC. At present, only around one-half of combined state
and federal TANF resources are devoted to cash assistance, child care, and work activi-
ties/supportive services. States have wide leeway over how program funds are used and
a set of incentives for movement away from the provision of cash benefits, and those
services that are provided do not have to be directed to cash assistance beneficiaries or
welfare leavers. TANF is therefore best thought of as a funding stream states partially use
for cash assistance (Falk, 2013). Given that the bulk of TANF resources are now directed
to other areas, there is a mismatch between the reality of the program and the academic
literature scrutinizing it.
This dissertation contains three studies intended to re-align scholarly examination of
welfare in the United States. The first examines state movement away from cash assis-
tance, the second correlates of state expenditure priorities, and the final study the conse-
quences for low-income families of the restricted availability of cash benefits. In the first
two studies, I find that the long-standing connection between race-oriented politics and
state welfare policy is evident under TANF when treated as a funding stream; states in
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which a larger proportion of whites hold negative views of blacks tend to devote fewer
resources to basic assistance and more to other priorities. Additionally, the first study in-
dicates that states in fiscal distress devote fewer resources to basic assistance, raising con-
cerns about TANF’s ability to be economically countercyclical. The third study indicates
that the erosion of cash assistance coverage has increased the risk of material hardship for
low-income households, particularly the most economically vulnerable (those headed by
a single female with no other adults present). Conversely, coverage declines are generally
not related to the probability of a household having an employed adult present.
In concert, the three studies identify a number of shortcomings of TANF. Findings
contribute to bodies of scholarship in political science, sociology, economics, social work,
and public policy. The investigations also provide guidance for action. The safety net
for the most economically disadvantaged Americans, as currently constituted, reinforces
rather than overcomes existing forms of stratification, discourages states from the provi-
sion of a safety net, and has increased the risk of harm to vulnerable families. Welfare
reform certainly had some successes, and an overhaul of AFDC was warranted. TANF’s
limitations, however, have become increasingly obvious with the passage of time. The
studies in this dissertation call for renewed TANF scholarship, policy advocacy by social
workers and other interested parties on behalf of the economically disadvantaged, and
action by policymakers to restructure the increasingly precarious support available to
disadvantaged families. These actions may prove vital in the changing world of low-wage
work, which is increasingly tenuous and unable to uphold the implied social contract of




States and the End of Cash Assistance: Race, Politics &
Policy Structure Under Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families
Abstract
I use multi-level growth models to examine determinants of state cash assistance fi-
nancial e↵ort under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("welfare") from 1998 to
2013, finding that the degree of racial stereotyping of blacks among whites in a state
is predictive of spending. Additionally, there is suggestive evidence more liberal gov-
ernment is associated with greater cash assistance e↵ort, but only when negative racial
a↵ect among whites is less common. This finding is inconsistent across models, how-
ever. Finally, states in fiscal distress direct more resources to priorities other than basic
assistance, calling TANF’s ability to act as a countercyclical safety net into question.
Introduction
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF; "welfare") program created by
the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA;
"welfare reform") provides state policymakers broad discretion over program design. This
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flexibility led to variation in cash assistance program rules across states, such as the
length of time limits imposed, benefit caps based on family size, and severity of sanctions
for rules violations. The program also a↵ords states flexibility over the use of program
resources. TANF funds can be directed to any purpose consistent with the broad goals of
welfare reform—ending dependence on public support through work and marriage, pro-
moting two-parent families, reducing out-of-wedlock births, and aiding care of children
in their own homes (Falk, 2013). Given these broad mandates, only about one-quarter of
state and federal TANF funds were, as of 2013, devoted to basic cash assistance, a near
inversion of spending early in the program’s history. TANF includes formal and informal
incentives for states to direct resources to alternative priorities, but emphasis on cash
assistance and the rate of decline in cash assistance vary widely.
Few studies of state TANF implementation have extended beyond the rules and re-
quirements for cash assistance beneficiaries, creating a mismatch between scholarly un-
derstanding of welfare and its current form. I address this gap by examining the determi-
nants of state emphasis on cash assistance as an expenditure priority under TANF (1998-
2013), estimating a series of multilevel growth curve models evaluating the relationship
between state cash assistance e↵ort and a number of political, social, and economic fac-
tors. I pay particular attention to the role of racial politics in welfare implementation. In
contrast to previous studies, which use state or caseload demographics to operationalize
the salience of race, I use a state level measure of the prevalence of negative stereotypes
of blacks among whites constructed using multi-level regression with post-stratification
(MRP) on the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey dataset (Annenberg Public Pol-
icy Center, 2010).
I find that states in which whites more commonly express negative stereotypes of
blacks devote fewer resources to basic cash assistance, both as a per-family-in-poverty
expenditure and as a percentage of total state TANF e↵ort. Racial politics may also mod-
erate the expected influence of government ideology. More liberal governments devote
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more resources to basic assistance, but the strength of this relationship declines as white
attitudes toward blacks become more negative. The evidence supporting this proposi-
tion, however, is inconsistent and fairly weak, and should be taken as suggestive only.
Prevailing white racial attitudes have not influenced the rate at which states moved away
from cash assistance. Rather, the highly racialized politics of welfare reform are essen-
tially path dependent, with early state decisions and federal policy design shaping cur-
rent implementation. Beyond the role of racial politics, states under budgetary stress
divert TANF funds away from cash assistance, providing evidence for a long-speculated
but untested relationship between fiscal health and welfare1. This study suggests propos-
als to reform other programs modeled on TANF merit caution, as the flexibility a↵orded
to states reinforces pre-existing inequalities and tempers counter-cyclical responsiveness.
Background
Welfare Reform & TANF Policy Structure
The 1996 Personal Responsibility andWorkOpportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
radically restructured economic relief for low-income families in the United States. It re-
placed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which had its
roots in the Social Security Act of 1935, with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
AFDC was administered by the states with the federal government partially matching
state expenses. It provided a direct cash benefit to low-income families, primarily those
headed by a single mother. Public and elite dissatisfaction with AFDC was high; it was
perceived as disincentivizing work, facilitating family breakdown and out-of-wedlock
birth, and fostering a culture of permissiveness that undermined development of proso-
cial behaviors (Ellwood, 1988; Lieberman, 1998; Mead, 1986; Teles, 1996; Weaver, 2000).
Welfare politics was also continually entangled with racial politics—the typical welfare
1See, however, analyses in Chapter 3 challenging this conclusion. Supplementary analyses in Appendix
D provide a preliminary attempt at rectifying discrepancies.
25
client was often perceived as a black single mother, influencing both political rhetoric
and policymaking (Gilens, 1999; Hancock, 2004).
Despite several earlier attempts, it was not until the mid-1990s that a window for
a comprehensive overhaul of AFDC emerged. Democratic president Bill Clinton, who
campaigned on a promise to "end welfare as we know it," and an ascendant Republican
Congress elected on a platform of government reform succeeded in passing PROWRA
in 1996. In contrast to AFDC, TANF applied time limits and work and other behavioral
requirements to cash benefit recipients (Weaver, 2000). TANF’s structure is also quite
di↵erent from AFDC. In its later years, states had control over AFDC benefit levels, but
other rules were set federally2. After reform, states were free, within broad guidelines,
to adopt their own time limits, work requirements, sanctions for rules violations, and
family caps (number of children in the household above which no additional benefit is
provided). Under AFDC, the federal government and the states shared expenditures with
no limit—whatever amount the state spent, the federal government matched at a pre-set
rate (the amount varied by specific uses of funds, but the bulk of the match used the
state’s Medicaid reimbursement rate). In contrast, TANF is administered as a fixed block
grant the states partially match through a "maintenance-of-e↵ort" (MOE) contribution.
The value of the federal grant is calculated as a percentage of state AFDC expenditures
in the early 1990s. This base grant amount has never been updated, nor has it ever been
adjusted for inflation. It also does not vary with economic conditions—a state receives
the same grant whether it is experiencing an economic boom or an economic downturn.
States with historically low levels of support for the economically disadvantaged or with
large population shifts are also eligible for supplemental grants, but these additional
funds have not been administered since 2011. A federal emergency fund is available to
bolster state expenditures during down economic times, adding up to 20% to a state’s
2In a prelude to reform, the Reagan administration waived federal guidelines for some states to encour-
age experimentation with alternative approaches to poverty relief, a trend that continued under the George
H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations (C. Harvey, Camasso, & Jagannathan, 2000; Teles, 1996).
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grant if triggered by economic conditions. The MOE requirement for a state is set at
75% of 1994 spending on AFDC and related programs; failure to meet this goal is subject
to a block grant reduction. While states may save unused block grant funds, the MOE
requirement must be met annually (Falk, 2013).
TANF funds do not have to be used for cash assistance, and can instead be applied
to any purpose consistent with the four goals of reform. Despite having the flexibility to
e↵ectively end cash assistance under TANF, every state still has some version of a basic
cash assistance program. Basic assistance’s centrality to overall TANF e↵ort, however, has
declined markedly since the late 1990s. As shown in Figure 2.1, beginning in 1999 total
TANF expenditures gradually decreased, excepting a peak in the aftermath of the Great
Recession of the late 2000s. In contrast, basic assistance expenditures declined sharply
and have generally continued to decline. Originally the bulk of TANF spending, basic
assistance now accounts for approximately one-quarter of expenditures. Even expanding
the definition of "core TANF" priorities to include work activities, supportive services,
and child care only increases the dollar value directed to the assumed foundation of the
program to roughly half of all expenditures3.
Both formal and informal incentives under TANF lead states to de-emphasize cash
benefits. First, federal TANF policy requires that each state meet a work participation
requirement—a proportion of the cash assistance caseload employed or participating in
employment-facilitating activities. The base work activity target for each state is 50% of
all families on the caseload per year. However, states receive a one percentage point re-
duction in the work activity target for each one percent reduction in the welfare caseload
compared to 20054. States can also reduce the work goal by contributing additional MOE
(Falk, 2013). There are reporting requirements for cash assistance beneficiaries, but not
for recipients of other TANF-funded services. The flexibility a↵orded by TANF might
also interact with tenuous state budgets (Schott, Pavetti, & Floyd, 2015). If a state has
3Even expenses in these categories do not have to be targeted to cash benefit recipients or welfare leavers.
























1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Year
Total TANF expenditures Basic assistance
Basic assistance, work supports/services, and child care
Data source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Combined State and Federal TANF Expenditures
Figure 2.1: Overall TANF expenditures & core priorities expenditures, 1997-2013 (2014
U.S. billions).
an Earned Income Tax Credit, for example, and providing a dedicated funding stream is
fiscally challenging, it can simply count the program as TANF e↵ort.
Though all responding to the same incentives, states range widely in emphasis on
cash assistance. In 2013, for instance, Maine directed 52% of its total TANF funds to
basic assistance. Illinois, in contrast, used 7% of all program resources on traditional
welfare benefits. The rate of decline has also been uneven across states. West Virginia’s
basic assistance expenditure in 2013 was 68% of its 1998 value. Indiana’s basic assistance
e↵ort in 2013, however, was 19% of the 1998 allocation.
State Politics &Welfare Policy
Even though TANF is now more a discretionary funding stream than a cash assistance
program, few studies address the uses of TANF resources. Rodgers and Tedin (2006)
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examined state e↵ort devoted to welfare reform, finding that states with proportionally
larger black populations, larger caseloads, and higher unemployment rates spent less
on TANF overall. The authors discuss the increasing emphasis on priorities other than
cash assistance, but do not empirically test any patterns in use of funds. The study also
only used a single year of data, 2002, in the early stages of TANF implementation. Mat-
subayashi and Rocha (2011) studied state welfare expenditures from 1980 to 2000 using
an indicator variables model ("fixed e↵ects" in the language of econometrics) to isolate
causal relationships, finding that racial demographics (proportion black and proportion
Latino in the population) are again related to state expenditures. The e↵ects are further
conditioned on factors such as degree of interracial economic inequality, socioeconomic
environment, and ease of voter registration. While year indicators should partly account
for the transition fromAFDC to TANF during this time period, pooling observations from
the two programs obscures the very di↵erent fiscal incentives of states under each policy.
The authors also make no distinction between basic assistance spending and other expen-
ditures, and their time series ends just as basic assistance was de-emphasized. Finally,
Lambright and Allard (2004) find that state propensity toward innovation (as evidenced
by timing of section 1115 waiver adoption under AFDC) and degree of caseload decline
predict transfers to the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG). SSBG transfers, though, are
only one potential use of TANF funds.
While the existing body of work has under-examined state use of TANF resources, re-
search has identified a number of state-level factors related to welfare policy design. Rele-
vant political characteristics include prevailing government and citizen political ideology,
party control of government, size of the cash assistance caseload, and competitiveness of
elections (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Gais & Weaver, 2002; Soss et al., 2001). A "race to the
bottom" in welfare policy produced by interstate competition has long been theorized to
influence welfare, though evidence is mixed (Albert & Catlin, 2002; Allard & Danziger,
2000; Brueckner, 2000). Socially, prevalence of problems such as out-of-wedlock births
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relates to policy design (Soss et al., 2001). Finally, economic factors such as gross state
product shape the approach to welfare (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Gais & Weaver, 2002).
Perhaps the most examined influence on state welfare policy, however, is race. Since its
earliest days, economic relief for low-income families has had some relationship to racial
politics, with attempts at all levels of implementation to restrict access to minority bene-
ficiaries (Lieberman, 1998; Ward, 2005). Even after expansion to a pseudo-entitlement in
the late 1960s, states with larger populations of African Americans provided less gener-
ous AFDC benefits and less extensive benefits coverage (Orr, 1976; Tropman & Gordon,
1978).
The influence of racial politics continued through reform. States with larger popula-
tions of color or larger proportions of people of color on the welfare caseload, particularly
blacks, tended to implement programs with stricter rules compared to other states (Fel-
lowes & Rowe, 2004; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Soss et al., 2011, 2001). The relationships
vary by particular policy area, however. Soss et al. (2001) find that a larger proportion
of the welfare caseload identifying as black is associated with an increased probability of
a state adopting strict sanctions, strict time limits, and family caps. Proportion Latino
on the caseload also had a relationship, albeit weaker than that for proportion black, to
adoption of strict time limits and family caps. States with larger proportions of African
Americans and Latinos on the caseload also generally moved policy in a stricter direc-
tion compared to their peer states (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004). Once again, the relationship
with proportion Latino was noticeably weaker than proportion black. Finally, caseload
racial demographics were predictive of the extent of coverage (proportion of children in
poverty receiving benefits) decline following reform (Bentele & Nicoli, 2012).
Despite the general convergence of demographically similar states on particular pol-
icy approaches, the relationship between racial politics and welfare has limits. Volden
(2016) finds no connection between demographics and policy learning in welfare imple-
mentation. Voter registration laws, economic parity between blacks and whites, higher
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low-income voter turnout, and representation by people of color and women in state gov-
ernment temper the role of race in policy (Avery & Pe✏ey, 2005; Matsubayashi & Rocha,
2011; Preuhs, 2006; Reingold & Smith, 2012)5. Spillover e↵ects from other, more directly
race-related policy conflicts such as controversy over the Confederate flag may also influ-
ence the role of racial context (H. E. Brown, 2013). Again relevant for the present study,
Bentele and Nicoli (2012) find that racial demographics were not predictive of welfare
coverage decline after 2000. The link between welfare policy and race, then, appears
frequently, but is also conditional.
Mass attitudes toward welfare are also shaped by race. A common image associated
with welfare is the "welfare queen" abusing cash benefits, stereotypically perceived as
black (Gilens, 1999; Hancock, 2004; Soss et al., 2011). In turn, whites holding neg-
ative racial views are less supportive of welfare (Federico, 2004; Gilens, 1999; Kinder
& Sanders, 1996). The link between racial attitudes and welfare opposition has been
durable to the policy changes engendered by reform, despite TANF including such fea-
tures as time limits and work requirements that address the perceived problems of AFDC
(Dyck &Hussey, 2008; Soss & Schram, 2007). Soss et al. (2011) tie the attitudinal and pol-
icy design findings together in a theoretical framework, the Racial Classification Model
(RCM). The RCM is rooted in three tenets: 1) in a complex social world, decision-makers
require cognitive shortcuts, 2) when racial/ethnic minorities are relevant to a policy is-
sue, stereotypes can serve as such a shortcut, and 3) a contrast between stereotypes and
policy goals produces punitive policy.
Research Questions & Hypotheses
Movement away from cash assistance as a program emphasis has been a defining fea-
ture of TANF following reform, but most studies examine state cash assistance rules.
Given the fiscal discretion provided by TANF, how much e↵ort a state devotes to cash as-
5Several of these studies rely on data from AFDC or some combination of AFDC and TANF.
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sistance is a product of politics. What state-level factors, then, are related to di↵erences
in emphasis on cash assistance? What factors explain di↵erences in the rate of movement
away from cash assistance? Five hypotheses follow from existing scholarship on welfare
policy and analysis of the incentives built into TANF’s structure. First, race is central to
the policy image associated with cash assistance (Gilens, 1999; Hancock, 2004; Soss et al.,
2011). Following an RCM-type process, states in which racial politics is salient could use
the flexibility of TANF to de-emphasize cash benefits. This proposition leads to the first
two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1, Racial Politics & Cash Assistance Expenditures: States in which racial pol-
itics is salient will devote fewer resources to cash assistance.
and
Hypothesis 2, Racial Politics & Movement from Cash Assistance: States in which racial
politics is salient will move away from cash assistance more quickly than other states.
Consistent with existing scholarship, the relationship between cash assistance empha-
sis and racial politics may be strongest when blacks are the relevant racial group, being
weaker or non-existent with respect to Latinos. Beyond racial politics, other political fac-
tors also likely influence cash assistance e↵ort. In particular, the flexibility a↵orded by
TANF allows the ideological and partisan orientation of state government to shape the
approach to welfare.
Hypothesis 3, Political Ideology & Cash Assistance Expenditures: Conservative state gov-
ernments will devote fewer resources to cash assistance, liberal governments will devote more.
The e↵ect of ideology could itself be shaped by racial salience. Racial conservatism
among whites in states with large minority populations is high, while minority voters
tend to maintain more liberal ideological preferences (Fowler, 2016; Norrander & Man-
zano, 2010). Parties in these states polarize generally, and it is reasonable that they do
so on welfare policy specifically. Left-leaning government could attenuate the influence
of racial politics while right-leaning government could respond by strongly restricting
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welfare.
Hypothesis 4, Political Ideology & Racial Politics: The e↵ects of racial salience and gov-
ernment ideology will interact, with a more pronounced e↵ect of racial politics under more
conservative government and a weaker e↵ect under more liberal government.
Finally, considering TANF’s policy structure, state fiscal health could be related to
cash assistance emphasis. A state under fiscal stress could use the flexibility a↵orded by
TANF to direct funds to other priorities or to meet the MOE obligation with programs
only tangentially related to poverty relief (Schott et al., 2015).
Hypothesis 5, Fiscal Health & Cash Assistance Expenditures: States under fiscal stress will
devote fewer resources to basic assistance.
Methods
Models & Sample
I test the hypotheses using multi-level growth curve models predicting basic assis-
tance e↵ort with a sample of all states from 1998 to 2013 (n=798)6. Growth curve mod-
els are a special case of the multi-level model framework, also known as hierarchical or
mixed modeling, used to handle clustered data. Under multi-level modeling, the group
disturbance of a cluster from the population grand mean is modeled as following a dis-
tribution with mean zero and variance  2. In a growth curve model, the grouping is by
unit (here, the state) and time enters the model as a continuous variable whose e↵ect also
varies by unit (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). For each state s and occasion j:
6Two observations include reports of negative or zero spending on basic assistance and are treated as
missing. The reported values are likely a result of accounting practices. States are allowed to make cor-
rections to previous spending reports by including the value of the correction in a current report. This
process produces under- and over-reports of actual fiscal e↵ort. It is impossible, however, to link a cor-
rection to a specific previous report, so there is no reasonable way to compensate for this added noise in
the data. Negative values are obvious corrections for any expenditure category, as are zero values for basic
assistance. Given that there are only two such observations in the time period studied here, it is reasonable
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 0s =  00 + 01Zs +u0s
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where t is a continuous measure of time at occasion j, X
sj
is a time-varying predictor, and
Z
s
is a time-invariant predictor.  0s is the state-specific intercept, modeled as a function
of a grand intercept  00, time invariant predictor Z , and random error u0s. The state-
varying coe cient on time,  1s, is a function of a mean e↵ect  10 and additional error u1j .
e
sj
represents random state-year error.
This model form presents a number of important advantages over other types of longi-
tudinal models, such as a "fixed e↵ects" model using indicator variables7, for the present
study. Most importantly, the multilevel growth curve model can incorporate both time-
invariant and time-varying predictors. The e↵ect of a time-invariant predictor is simply
interpreted as explaining a portion of the unit-specific intercept. A key independent vari-
able—prevailing white racial a↵ect—is here treated as time-invariant due to data restric-
tions discussed subsequently. Second, as an extension, the model allows for examination
of moderating e↵ects between time-varying and time-invariant variables through interac-
tions. Finally, since unit-specific variations in the time trend are explicitly incorporated
in the model, it is possible to test hypotheses regarding the relationship between that
trend and other covariates through interactions with the time variable (e.g., is the rate of
change over time for unit s related to some other variable in the model?).
A key assumption of all mixed models is the independence of the lowest-level pre-
dictors from the group-level error. In the case of a growth curve model, the values of
a time-varying variable should not correlate with state error, a somewhat unrealistic as-
sumption. Presence of such a relationship can produce misleading statistical tests by
underestimating uncertainty. I relax the assumption of independence for time-varying
7The terminology of fixed e↵ects could be confusing in the present study. In econometrics, "fixed ef-
fects" tends to refer to an indicator variables model to control for group e↵ects and/or common shocks.
In multilevel modeling, however, "fixed e↵ects" generally refers to the population-averaged portion of the
model about which group deviations ("random e↵ects") are distributed.
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variables by including the within-state mean as a time-invariant predictor (Gelman, 2006;
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). This procedure incorporates the within-state mean as a com-
ponent of the state intercept and its e↵ect can itself be interpreted. All variables other
than time are grand mean centered to simplify interpretation of interaction terms. With
grand mean centering, the coe cient on the within-state mean variable is a composite
of e↵ects from both the time-invariant and time-varying components of the variable (the
interpretation of the time-varying coe cient is unchanged). Recovering the unique e↵ect
of the time-invariant, or contextual, e↵ect is, however, relatively simple—it is the sum of
the coe cients on the time-varying and time-invariant elements (Raudenbush & Bryk,
2002).
Dependent Variables
States report their spending, both out of the TANF block grant and through MOE,
quarterly to the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) (2014). The Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities (2015) collapses the TANF expenditure data into a set of
summary categories, and this analysis adopts CBPP’s data. Values were converted to 2014
dollars and expressed in thousands. I scale in two ways to account for variation in state
size: creating a new variable, e↵ort-to-need, indexed to the count of families in poverty,
and expressing basic assistance as a percentage of overall TANF expenditures8(Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2015). The denominator in the e↵ort-to-need variable is
the averaged estimate of families in poverty from 1997 to 2013; fixing this value allows
scaling while ensuring only one of the two quantities in the calculation varies over time.
Applying a logarithmic transformation to the e↵ort-to-need variable further improves
model fit. Raw and transformed dependent variable descriptive statistics are shown in
8Percentage data are bounded and often follow a non-normal distribution. In the case of basic assis-
tance—and only in the case of basic assistance among all TANF expenditure categories—the distribution of
percentages is actually fairly normal. Further, expressing the variable as a proportion and applying a logit
transformation, then estimating the models produces substantively identical results to the linear analysis.
In combination with the estimation of robust standard errors to account for model misspecification, then,
the linear model is reasonable for analyzing basic assistance expenditures as a percentage.
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Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Basic assistance dependent variable descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Basic assistance e↵ort-to-need 1.925 overall 1.750
between 1.509
within 0.908
Log(basic assistance e↵ort-to-need) 0.275 overall 0.912
between 0.826
within 0.400
Percentage basic assistance 32.721 overall 14.832
between 9.821
within 11.189
n=798; 50 states in 16 years.
Two observations treated as missing.
"E↵ort to need" denominator is average count of families in poverty, 1998-2013.
Measuring Racial Salience: Subnational White Racial Attitudes
To operationalize the salience of racial politics, I created a state-level measure of the
prevalence of negative stereotypes of blacks among whites. Earlier studies examined the
salience of race to welfare politics using a measure of racial context, such as caseload
demographics. It is not just racial context that influences racial salience, however. If
the target population for cash assistance is stereotyped as black, variation in the degree
to which negative racial views are held could also influence policy. Only Johnson (2001)
incorporates both racial context and racial attitudes as explanatory factors, but that study
was limited to the latter years of AFDC. This inquiry provides an opportunity to examine
the durability of the racial a↵ect/welfare link.
There are two alternatives for producing state estimates of public attitudes using
national survey data, disaggregation and multi-level regression with post-stratification
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(MRP). Disaggregation estimates subnational opinion through cross-tabulation. MRP
uses the data to empirically model individual-level opinion based on demographic and
geographic characteristics (e.g., a white highly educated female between 25 and 36 years
old living in Kentucky has a particular probability of holding a certain opinion). Pre-
dictions of the probability of each demographic-geographic "type" holding the opinion of
interest are calculated. The predictions are then weighted with Census data to produce
state-level estimates of opinion prevalence. Comparisons of disaggregation and MRP
suggest MRP produces superior estimates even with large samples, particularly for small
states (Lax & Phillips, 2009b).
The individual-level predictive model is a multi-level logit model with respondents
nested within states. Data are drawn from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Sur-
vey (NAES) online sample9, which included a racial attitudes battery given the salience
of race to the 2008 Presidential election (Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2010). Un-
fortunately, whites were only asked about attitudes toward blacks, so it cannot be used
to gauge a↵ect toward other racial or ethnic groups (e.g., Latinos). To estimate the pre-
dictive model, the sample is restricted to white non-Hispanic respondents (n=15,372).
The NAES included six "feeling thermometer" racial attitudes items scored 0 to 100, with
100 indicating perfect agreement with a statement and 0 perfect disagreement. White
respondents were asked whether their own racial group is hardworking, intelligent, and
trustworthy, then whether the respondent agreed with these statements applied to blacks.
I construct the stereotyping scale by taking the di↵erence between the two responses,
then summing the di↵erences. MRP requires a binary variable, so I then use the scale
to produce a summary indicator coded 1 if the respondent scored in the top quartile
9The NAES telephone sample is massive, nearly 60,000 respondents, and therefore particularly appro-
priate for direct disaggregation. The online sample, which includes the racial attitudes battery, is smaller,
approximately 20,000 respondents, but still quite large. Reducing the sample to whites only drops it still
further to 15,372, which is still substantial and could allow for disaggregation. MRP has been selected,
however, because the subsample in some states is small after applying restrictions and therefore poten-
tially unreliable even with the large overall sample. It further allows the inclusion of racial context as a
predictor of white racial attitudes, allowing empirical modeling to follow theoretical assumptions (i.e., that
racial context simultaneously influences both caseload demographics and white racial attitudes).
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in-sample. These procedures are similar to those employed by Elmendorf and Spencer
(2014) in their consideration of the consequences of Supreme Court-ordered changes to
Voting Rights Act enforcement in Shelby County v. Holder.
Both demographic and state predictor variables are included in the models. Predic-
tors at the individual level include gender, age, and educational attainment. At the state
level, I nest states within geographic region and include group-level predictors of racial
attitudes. First, whites located near larger populations of blacks tend to express more
negative racial views (Glaser, 1994; Taylor, 1998). Proportion of the state population
identifying as black is therefore included as a covariate. This relationship is tempered
by degree of integration, with whites in more diverse but less segregated areas expressing
more positive views (Rocha & Espino, 2009; Zingher & Steen Thomas, 2014). White/black
segregation is measured with a dissimilarity index based on American Community Sur-
vey data from 2005 to 2009 (University of Michigan Population Studies Center, 2016).
Finally, whites in diverse but higher-status areas are less likely to express negative racial
views (Branton & Jones, 2005; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000). I operationalize prevailing
socioeconomic status using the proportion of the working-age population (25-64) holding
a bachelor’s degree or greater. Predictions were weighted with U.S. Census data from the
year 2000 public use file (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). State-level estimates produced us-
ing MRP are shown in Table 2.2 while the map in Figure 2.1 shows the general geographic
trend. Results are roughly as might be expected; negative racial views among whites are
most deeply held in the south, somewhat less common in the midwest, and least common
in the northeast and the west. Additional methodological detail is provided in Appendix
A.
Other Independent Variables
Other key independent variables are time, salience of Hispanics to welfare politics,
government political ideology, and state fiscal stress. Time is expressed in years with
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Table 2.2: MRP estimates of percentage of whites holding extremely negative stereotypes
of blacks.
State Estimate State Estimate
AL 38.68 MT 21.20
AK 20.63 NE 27.23
AZ 21.55 NV 23.75
AR 34.07 NH 19.38
CA 21.41 NJ 28.42
CO 18.26 NM 20.71
CT 23.83 NY 21.12
DE 32.96 NC 30.38
FL 32.07 ND 24.95
GA 34.77 OH 30.60
HI 18.95 OK 27.94
ID 20.11 OR 20.23
IL 29.50 PA 30.87
IN 28.91 RI 23.98
IA 27.93 SC 35.97
KS 25.17 SD 25.99
KY 29.63 TN 33.69
LA 42.96 TX 27.68
ME 22.32 UT 18.61
MD 30.85 VT 19.37
MA 21.86 VA 26.65
MI 29.36 WA 18.05
MN 26.14 WV 27.82
MS 43.79 WI 29.40
MO 31.41 WY 22.00
Multi-level regression with post-stratification
estimates produced using 2008 National
Annenberg Election Survey and 2000













Author's calculation using multi-level regression and post-stratification. Data sources: 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey and 2000 U.S. Census public use file.
MRP Results, Prevalence of Negative Attitudes Toward Blacks Among Whites
Map 2.1: Map of estimated prevalence of extremely negative stereotyping of blacks by
whites within each state.
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1998 as the baseline year (e.g., 2000 is year 2). Salience of Hispanics to welfare is included
using proportion of the cash assistance caseload identifying as Hispanic (Administration
for Children and Families, 2015). I gauge government political ideology using W. Berry,
Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner’s (2010) government ideology scores scaled to
the [0,10] interval, with larger values indicating more liberal government. Fiscal stress
is measured by subtracting state revenue from state expenditures, then dividing by ex-
penditures, a variation on the procedure employed by F. Berry and Berry (1990). Higher
values indicate more tenuous state finances. Controls include citizen ideology, coded
identically to the government ideology measure (W. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Han-
son, 1998), state-year unemployment rate, state-year poverty rate10 and unmarried birth
rate. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.3.
Results
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 graphically present the estimated population averaged ("fixed
e↵ects") parameters of the e↵ort-to-need growth curve models. These coe cients are in-
terpreted identically to linear regression coe cients. Complete model results, includ-
ing the random components, are presented in Table 2.4 and Table 2.6. The random
components describe the estimated distribution of state deviations from the population-
averaged intercept and time coe cient. Predictors, other than time, are grand mean cen-
tered to simplify interpretation of the interactions (i.e., the coe cient on an interacted
variable is its e↵ect when the other variable is held at its mean). As noted previously,
the magnitude of the coe cient on a within-state mean variable must be interpreted in
combination with the coe cient on its time-varying counterpart. Analysis of the resid-
ual structure indicates the residual at each occasion is correlated with residuals at each
previous occasion. The strength of the correlation declines with increasing temporal dis-
10Poverty rate is not included in the e↵ort-to-need models since it is related to the dependent variable,
through the count of poor families in the denominator, by construction.
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Table 2.3: Basic assistance growth model independent variable descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Hispanic caseload % 13.935 overall 16.072
between 15.971
within 2.976
Government ideology 4.882 overall 2.518
between 1.942
within 1.625
Citizen ideology 5.130 overall 1.564
between 1.442
within 0.640
Unemployment rate 5.675 overall 2.075
between 1.051
within 1.795
Poverty rate 12.428 overall 3.364
between 2.900
within 1.751
Unmarried birth rate 36.396 overall 6.878
between 6.080
within 3.318
Fiscal stress -0.055 overall 0.172
between 0.056
within 0.163
n=798; 50 states in 16 years.
Two observations treated as missing.
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tance (the correlation with the residual at time t is much stronger for the residual at
time t+1 than at time t+10). I therefore specify an autoregressive AR(1) process that ac-
counts both for the existence of the correlation and its decline over time (Rabe-Hesketh
& Skrondal, 2012). Reported standard errors are cluster-robust errors that account both
for interrelationships within states over time and heteroskedasticity arising from model
misspecification.
Models 1 to 3 use log-transformed e↵ort-to-need as the outcome variable. As a rule of
thumb, the coe cients in a model with a log-transformed dependent variable represent
a proportional change in the untransformed outcome variable per unit of the predictor
(e.g., a coe cient of 0.05 indicates a five percent change in the untransformed outcome).
The base model, Model 1, contains no interactions. As expected under Hypothesis 1, the
white racial attitudes variable is negatively signed and statistically significant; states in
which whites express more negative racial views expend less e↵ort on basic assistance
than other states. Specifically, a one percentage point change in the prevalence of whites
expressing extremely negative stereotypes of blacks is associated with 5% less in expen-
ditures on basic assistance. There is also support for Hypothesis 3, as government liberal-
ism is positively signed and significant (at ↵ = 0.10). Finally, consistent with Hypothesis
5, fiscal stress is associated with decreased basic assistance e↵ort. Time remains a sig-
nificant predictor of spending even after accounting for factors that vary longitudinally.
Each additional year, on average, results in a 6% decline in basic assistance spending
(since the e↵ect of time has been allowed to vary by state, the e↵ects within individual
states are distributed around this value, some smaller and some larger; these results rep-
resent the mean trend). Proportion of the TANF caseload identifying as Hispanic, unmar-
ried birthrate, and citizen ideology fail to achieve statistical significance. Unemployment
rate, however, is statistically significant and associated with increased basic assistance
spending.
Models 2 and 3 add interactions to the base model. In Model 2, time is interacted
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with the prevailing white racial attitudes measure. While the negative e↵ect of time is
stronger at higher values of the white racial attitudes variable, the interaction term is not
statistically significant. These results fail to provide support for Hypothesis 2. Model 3
interacts racial attitudes with government ideology. The interaction term is negatively
signed and not statistically significant. Further investigation demonstrates that there is a
relationship between ideology and white racial attitudes at some values. As shown in Fig-
ure 2.4, the e↵ect of government liberalism on spending is greatest at low prevalence of
white stereotyping of blacks. Estimated simple slopes of government ideology at di↵erent
values of negative racial a↵ect among whites are presented in Table 2.5. When negative
stereotypes are more common, the slope of liberalism is indistinguishable from zero at
conventional levels of significance or even negatively signed. It is statistically significant,
though, at lower values of stereotype prevalence. These findings are suggestive of a re-
lationship between ideology and majority group racial attitudes, but di↵erent than that
proposed under Hypothesis 4. It would be inappropriate, however, to draw definitive
conclusions from this relatively weak evidence.
Models 4 through 6 (Figure 2.3) use percentage of TANF e↵ort devoted to basic assis-
tance as an outcome variable. The relationship between time and basic assistance here
is curvilinear. Including the squared value of time accounts for this trend. In Model
4, the prevalence of negative attitudes toward blacks among whites and fiscal stress are
associated with decreased emphasis on basic assistance, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 5
and paralleling results of the e↵ort-to-need analysis. Government liberalism, as expected
under Hypothesis 3, is associated with greater basic assistance emphasis, but it is not sta-
tistically significant (nor is its time-invariant counterpart). The percentage of TANF spent
on basic assistance is also positively related to the unemployment, poverty (at ↵ = 0.10),
and unmarried birth rates. Model 5 interacts time and attitudes, and again there is no
relationship between racial politics and the rate of basic assistance decline. In Model 6,
the ideology/white racial a↵ect interaction is, as shown in Figure 2.4, consistent with the
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Dots represent coefficient point estimates. Bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Fiscal stress rescaled for comparability with other coefficients.
Coefficient Plot, Effort-to-Need Models
Figure 2.2: Plot of select coe cients and 95% confidence intervals, basic assistance e↵ort-
to-need growth curve models.
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Table 2.4: Complete results, basic assistance e↵ort-to-need growth curve models.




Years -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.066***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Hispanic caseload % 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Gov’t liberalism 0.018+ 0.017+ 0.019+
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Citizen liberalism -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Fiscal stress -0.018* -0.018* -0.018*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Unemployment 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Unmarried births -0.009 -0.007 -0.009
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Time invariant
White stereotyping of blacks -0.050** -0.046* -0.049**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Hispanic caseload % mean -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Gov’t liberalism mean 0.039 0.040 0.038
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Citizen liberalism mean 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.307***
(0.062) (0.063) (0.062)
Fiscal stress mean 0.737 0.741 0.680
(1.297) (1.297) (1.305)
Unemployment rate mean -0.057 -0.057 -0.058
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092)





Gov’t liberalism* attitudes -0.002
(0.001)
Random component
Variance(Years) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Variance(Cons.) 0.247 0.246 0.242
(0.063) (0.062) (0.062)
Covariance(Years,Cons) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
AR(1) Residual
⇢ 0.324 0.324 0.322
(0.094) (0.094) (0.093)
Variance 0.070 0.070 0.070
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Log likelihood -151.455 -151.037 -150.710
BIC 436.551 442.398 441.745
N=798 (50 states in 16 years. Two observations treated as missing.)
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable log transformed.
All variables other than time grand mean centered.
Fiscal stress rescaled by multiplying by 10.
+p < 0.01,⇤p < 0.05 ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01 ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.001
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Table 2.5: Relationship between government ideology and basic assistance e↵ort at vari-
ous values of prevalence of negative stereotypes of blacks among whites.
Calculated Slope of Ideology
















+p < 0.10 ⇤p < 0.05 ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
White stereotyping of blacks is mean-centered percentage of whites
in state expressing extremely negative views of blacks.
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relationship in the e↵ort-to-need analysis. However, the interaction coe cient is not sta-
tistically significant and the slope of government ideology is not statistically significant
at any values of white stereotyping of blacks.
Years










-6 -4 -2 0 2 -6 -4 -2 0 2 -6 -4 -2 0 2
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dots represent coefficient point estimates. Bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Fiscal stress rescaled for comparability with other coefficients.
Coefficient Plot, Percentage Models
Figure 2.3: Plot of select coe cients and 95% confidence intervals, growth models of per-
centage total TANF spending directed to basic assistance.
Discussion
Racial Politics & Cash Assistance
Under TANF, states in which prevailing white attitudes toward blacks are more nega-
tive direct fewer resources to basic cash assistance, the portion of the program generally
thought of as "welfare." This finding holds regardless of whether basic assistance is spec-
ified as a per-poor-family expenditure or as a proportion of a state’s overall TANF e↵ort.
It places this study in a long line of scholarship connecting traditional welfare to racial
politics. Earlier studies, however, used measures of racial context, such as state demo-
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Table 2.6: Complete results, growth models of percentage total TANF spending directed
to basic assistance.




Years -5.180*** -5.199*** -5.142***
(0.435) (0.437) (0.435)
Years2 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.178***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Hispanic caseload % -0.042 -0.049 -0.048
(0.175) (0.175) (0.175)
Gov’t liberalism 0.177 0.162 0.234
(0.282) (0.285) (0.288)
Citizen liberalism 0.058 0.052 0.073
(0.410) (0.410) (0.409)
Fiscal stress -0.501*** -0.503*** -0.512***
(0.124) (0.123) (0.126)
Unemployment 0.751*** 0.757*** 0.771***
(0.211) (0.214) (0.210)
Poverty 0.295+ 0.298+ 0.287+
(0.161) (0.163) (0.162)
Unmarried births 0.686** 0.710** 0.672**
(0.256) (0.272) (0.249)
Time invariant
White stereotyping of blacks -1.250*** -1.187*** -1.210***
(0.231) (0.271) (0.238)
Hispanic caseload % mean -0.056 -0.050 -0.040
(0.203) (0.202) (0.202)
Gov’t liberalism mean 0.742 0.753 0.716
(0.771) (0.770) (0.770)
Citizen liberalism mean 0.489 0.499 0.298
(1.286) (1.287) (1.295)
Fiscal stress mean 15.882 15.915 13.729
(18.611) (18.612) (18.887)
Unemployment mean -1.662 -1.666 -1.754
(1.202) (1.203) (1.194)
Poverty mean -0.350 -0.354 -0.349
(0.557) (0.559) (0.542)








Variance(Years) 0.273 0.267 0.313
(0.331) (0.333) (0.313)
Variance(Cons.) 16.421 16.071 18.069
(30.674) (30.662) (28.146)
Covariance(Years,Cons) -0.230 -0.196 -0.410
(2.540) (2.537) (2.404)
AR(1) Residual
⇢ 0.670 0.701 0.687
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094)
Variance 84.855 85.104 81.257
(16.778) (26.882) (24.480)
Log likelihood -2679.765 -2679.649 -2678.358
BIC 5513.218 5519.670 5517.087
N=798 (50 states in 16 years. Two observations treated as missing.)
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable is percent of TANF spending devoted to basic assistance.
Fiscal stress rescaled by multiplying by 10.
All variables other than time grand mean centered.
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Figure 2.4: Slope of government liberalism at di↵erent values of white racial attitudes.
graphics, to operationalize racial salience. Incorporating racial salience with an attitudi-
nal measure better matches the relevant social problem—racism—to empirical analysis.
Racial context still enters the study through the MRP predictive model, as proportion of
the state population identifying as black is included as a predictor of white racial atti-
tudes. This study, then, updates Johnson (2001)—which showed that both racial context
and racial attitudes play a role in welfare policy formulation—but extends it to contem-
porary policy.
There are limits to the influence of racial politics. The analyses provide no evidence
that over time change in basic assistance is related to white stereotypes of blacks. This
finding reinforces those of Bentele and Nicoli (2012), who found that caseload racial de-
mographics were predictive of the rate of cash assistance coverage decline during the
transition from AFDC to TANF (1995 to 2000), but not later. Together, Bentele and Nicoli
(2012) and the present inquiry indicate racial politics has not played a constant role in
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the continued evolution of TANF. In this study, the strongest force predicting change in
basic assistance emphasis is simply time itself. Benefit levels have rarely been adjusted
to account for inflation, and combined with the incentives toward caseload decline, basic
assistance as an emphasis of TANF could erode without any change in programming or
policy. Policy structure could also explain how racial politics still influences basic as-
sistance spending levels. Early decisions of the states, influenced by race-based politics,
set the starting point for all subsequent state expenditures. In the models, this is evi-
dent in the white racial a↵ect variable’s contribution to the state intercepts. Even if racial
politics has not contributed to the declining emphasis on cash assistance, PRWORA and
subsequent state TANF programs e↵ectively locked in historical inter-state disparities.
Additionally, it is possible, if not likely, that race-oriented politics influences TANF on a
case-by-case basis when made salient to state politics through other events (H. E. Brown,
2013). Such a pattern would not be detectable in this type of analysis.
Government Ideology & Racial Politics
Government ideology acts in the expected way—more liberal governments devote
more resources to traditional cash assistance—but is only statistically significant in the
e↵ort-to-need model. Further, racial salience may temper this relationship. The influence
of government liberalismweakens as the salience of white stereotypes of blacks increases.
When negative racial a↵ect among whites is fairly common, there is no measurable e↵ect
(or, in some cases, a negative e↵ect) of government liberalism on basic assistance em-
phasis. When such attitudes are less common, government liberalism is significantly
and positively associated with cash assistance. This result is opposite that anticipated by
Hypothesis 4, which posited more conservative government would reinforce the e↵ects
of racial politics. A possible explanation for this paradox is that racial politics acts as
a constraint on welfare politics, but only when concerned with expansion. When neg-
ative racial a↵ect is less relevant, liberal governments can, to some degree, direct more
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resources to basic assistance. When racial salience is high, expansion of basic assistance
would be widely unpopular. Under such conditions, it is even possible more liberal gov-
ernments would redirect resources to preferred but less controversial priorities, such as
tax credits. Given that the result was only found using one version of the dependent
variable, however, and is only marginally significant when present, this finding should
be taken as suggestive only. Perhaps the most striking aspect of these models taken to-
gether, then, is the relatively weak relationship between ideology and basic assistance ex-
penditures; traditional partisan politics may play only a limited role in the use of TANF
resources for basic assistance11.
TANF & Economic Conditions
Economic conditions influence basic assistance spending, although the evidence for
the direction of the relationship is mixed. States in fiscal distress devote fewer resources
to basic assistance, both per-family-in-poverty and as a percentage of overall TANF spend-
ing. The fiscal health finding is consistent with the notion that states in challenging fiscal
periods use the flexibility a↵orded by TANF to cover other state priorities, a relationship
that has been the subject of speculation (Schott et al., 2015). This study provides direct
evidence that state fiscal politics are a major influence on TANF basic assistance. It brings
TANF’s role as a cash safety net into question, indicating the program is no longer eco-
nomically countercyclical. A higher unemployment rate (and, in the percentage model,
a higher poverty rate), however, is associated with greater spending on basic assistance
in some specifications, suggesting responsiveness. It is surprising that the results of the
economic variables lead to conflicting conclusions, as high unemployment would also be
associated with declines in state revenue12.
A possible explanation for the discrepancy between the fiscal health and unemploy-
11Soss et al. (2011) o↵er a parallel finding with respect to TANF rules, with government political ideology
playing a surprisingly limited role in the ongoing evolution of formal cash assistance policy.
12The fiscal stress and unemployment variables are moderately and positively correlated in the data
(⇢ = 0.341).
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ment results is federal policy. Contingency funds, triggered by unemployment, are avail-
able to states during down economic times, and during the "Great Recession" of the late
2000s additional support was available through the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act. These federal streams allow states to increase spending on basic assistance in
response to unemployment independent of their own fiscal health. Absent these addi-
tional funds, TANF could be unresponsive to changes in unemployment. Additionally,
fiscal health is more directly a product of state politics than unemployment rate; declin-
ing revenues through tax cuts, for example, are results of policy decisions rather than
economic conditions. Regardless, the relationship between fiscal health and TANF basic
assistance suggests its safety net function is constrained by other forces.
Conclusion
TANF is often thought of as a cash assistance program with accompanying supportive
services, work activities, and behavioral requirements. Once the program’s focus, though,
expenditures on these areas have declined markedly since the early years of welfare re-
form. Basic cash assistance now accounts for only about one quarter of all spending, but
most studies of state TANF policy are limited to examining cash assistance rules. This
study fills an important gap in welfare scholarship, investigating the state-level politics
of cash assistance, but treating it as only one possible use of program resources. I find
that racial politics, as it has been throughout the history of welfare, is an influence on
cash assistance emphasis, with states in which whites express more negative racial views
exerting less e↵ort. Racial politics, though, is not related to the rate of decline in cash
assistance. Instead, the highly racialized politics of the mid-1990s may structure the on-
going behavior of states, with early decisions shaping current policy. I also find suggestive
evidence that racial politics constrain the expected e↵ect of government ideology on cash
assistance. Government liberalism is associated with greater emphasis on cash assistance,
but only when lower proportions of whites express negative racial views; the finding is
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inconsistent, however, and only weakly supported when present, so further investigation
is warranted.
Beyond the politics of race, states under fiscal stress use TANF’s flexibility to de-
emphasize cash assistance. The reduced availability of cash benefits during adverse fiscal
periods suggests TANF is not counter-cyclically responsive, and may even grow weaker
as a safety net as economic conditions deteriorate. Conversely, however, cash assistance
spending is responsive to changes in unemployment rate, though this relationship is
modest and may be the product of additional federal funding streams. Absent federal
support state politics may limit TANF’s ability to provide an economic cushion for low-
income families. At the very least, fiscal politics unrelated to economic hardship shapes
state TANF implementation. Findings from this study suggest reform e↵orts directed
at other anti-poverty programs warrant caution. While federalism may encourage pol-
icy experimentation, the degree of flexibility provided by TANF has also subjected it to
influences unrelated to poverty relief.
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CHAPTER III
Beyond Cash Assistance: State Politics & Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families as a Flexible Funding
Stream
Abstract
This paper investigates state uses of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families finan-
cial resources. Though often thought of as a cash assistance program with work supports
and behavioral requirements for low-income families with children, since passage of the
1996 welfare reform law an increasing portion of program resources have been directed
to other areas. TANF funds are used for such diverse activities as childcare, refundable
tax credits, and two-parent family formation initiatives. TANF is not a cash assistance
program, but is instead better considered as a funding stream. Using quantitative data
on state TANF expenditures, I estimate a series of models examining predictors of state
categorical TANF spending. I find, consistent with other studies of state welfare policy,
that the salience of race to state politics is related to expenditures. States in which whites
express more negative attitudes toward blacks tend to devote fewer resources to tradi-
tional basic assistance while being more likely to use funds for pregnancy prevention
and/or two parent family formation. Other factors, such as state government ideology,
proportion of the population identifying as Evangelical Christian, and state fiscal distress
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are relevant for some priorities, but there is little consistent structure to TANF expendi-
tures. Limitations in the data may also mask any actual patterns, however, suggesting
caution in interpreting results.
Introduction
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), commonly called "welfare" in the
United States, is often viewed as a cash assistance program with accompanying work ac-
tivities and services for low-income families. The structure of the TANF program, how-
ever, a↵ords states extensive flexibility over the use of program resources. As of 2013, tra-
ditional cash benefits, work activities, supportive services, and childcare—the assumed
core of TANF—combined to account for approximately one-half of all program expen-
ditures; basic assistance itself accounted for only approximately one-quarter of overall
spending (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2015). The remainder of program re-
sources are directed to other areas, including such diverse priorities as refundable tax
credits and pregnancy prevention and two-parent family formation initiatives. Contem-
porary welfare in the form of TANF is not a cash assistance program for low-income
families. Rather, it is best understood as a flexible funding stream that states partially
use to support cash assistance and work activities (Falk, 2013). While TANF is now more
a funding stream than a cash assistance program, most scholarship on TANF implemen-
tation—both on state-level policy choices and the e↵ects of policy choices—examines the
rules and activities associated with traditional cash benefits. Only a handful of studies
have considered TANF as a funding stream, yet examining how TANF funds are used
is key to understanding welfare in the modern era. There have been recent propos-
als to model reforms to other programs, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP; "Food Stamps") and the public health insurance program Medicaid on
TANF. Deeper scrutiny of TANF as a funding stream is therefore useful for evaluating the
potential consequences of such changes.
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In this paper, I update state TANF scholarship to better reflect its status as a funding
stream rather than as a cash assistance program. I estimate a set of models of state-year
TANF expenditures from 2000 to 2013, with categorical spending modeled as a func-
tion of a variety of political, social, and economic factors. I pay particular attention to
the salience of race to state politics. The politics of race has long been found to be re-
lated to welfare implementation in the United States, but it is unclear whether this pat-
tern is evident under TANF as a funding stream. In contrast to previous studies, which
generally used demographic measures of racial salience, I partially operationalize racial
salience using a measure of the prevalence of extremely negative stereotypes of blacks
among whites constructed with multi-level regression with post-stratification (MRP) and
the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) (Annenberg Public Policy Center,
2010). For categories of spending, such as traditional basic assistance, in which almost
all states expend resources in almost all years, I estimate multi-level linear models of
expenditures nesting state-years in states. Expenditures are expressed as a per-family-in-
poverty value and as a percentage of total state-year TANF spending. There are several
categories, such as pregnancy prevention and two-parent family formation, in which a
relatively large number of states expend no e↵ort, sometimes in all sampled years. For
these categories, I estimate a set of logistic regression models of the probability of a state
devoting any TANF resources to the category.
Consistent with earlier scholarship on welfare in the United States, I find a relation-
ship between TANF expenditures and the relevance of race to state politics. States in
which negative views of blacks are more prevalent among whites devote fewer resources
to traditional cash assistance. These states are also more likely to use TANF resources for
pregnancy prevention and two-parent family formation initiatives, and there is sugges-
tive evidence of a relationship between white attitudes toward blacks and expenditures
on refundable tax credits. The study also provides an opportunity to explore the rele-
vance of other political, social, and economic characteristics to state TANF e↵ort, though
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there are no consistent predictors across categories. In particular, the proportion of the
state population identifying as Evangelical Christian is relevant for several categories,
particularly when TANF e↵ort is measured in dollars. Additionally, state fiscal stress is
related to expenditures on Social Services Block Grant transfers. I conclude by discussing
the implications of TANF as a flexible funding stream, both for TANF itself and for other
programs being considered for parallel reforms.
Background
Race & State Welfare Flexibility Over Time
Welfare as cash support to low-income families in the United States has varied widely
over time in the degree of flexibility a↵orded to states. Its history actually begins with
decisions by the states during the Progressive era. A majority of states, in response to
organized political action by women’s groups, created pension programs for widowed
mothers to facilitate care of children in the home in the absence of a male breadwinner
(Allard, 2004; Skocpol, 1992; Weaver, 2000). These pension programs provided eligible
mothers with a direct cash benefit, in theory allowing them to forgo work and focus on
childrearing. In a prelude to the implementation of welfare throughout its history, these
programs were generally underfunded and included behavioral and other rules opera-
tionalizing notions of deservingness (Skocpol, 1992). Though tied to a national political
movement, the pension programs were entirely a state a↵air, and states naturally had
leeway over funding and administration. From the outset, redistribution to poor families
in the United States was influenced by the politics of race. State and local governments
restricted participation by black families; while white mothers were expected to focus on
childrearing, black mothers were expected to work (Noble, 1997; Ward, 2005).
Though the seeds of the American welfare state were planted prior to the Great De-
pression, the New Deal legislation of the 1930s vastly expanded the scope of American
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social policy. Key social insurance and social welfare programs, such as Social Security
and the Food Stamps Program (now the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program)
were established during this period. Among these, contained in the Social Security Act
of 1935, was Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), the first federal program typically con-
sidered "welfare." ADC was essentially a continuation of the state pension programs, but
now with a partial federal match of state expenses. States maintained extensive discre-
tion over program administration and frequently devolved control to lower levels of gov-
ernment. As with the pension programs, ADC was generally considered a program for
"deserving" white mothers, with both formal program rules and informal administrative
practice limiting participation by black families (Lieberman, 1998; Ward, 2005).
The 1960s were a period of change in welfare. ADC was renamed Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962. The change was largely symbolic, intended
to address the perception that the availability of cash benefits for low-income mothers
disincentivized marriage, and there were no systematic changes to state authority over
welfare as a result (S. W. Blank & Blum, 1997). Less symbolic change, however, soon fol-
lowed. The civil rights movement and, later, the welfare rights movement brought polit-
ical pressure to bear on racial di↵erences in treatment by the welfare system (Lieberman,
1998). In particular, Supreme Court cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s struck down
many of the policy tools states used to selectively administer aid (Katz, 1989). AFDC be-
came a de facto categorical entitlement to low-income families with children (especially
single-mother headed families). States retained control over benefit levels but lost their
discretion over eligibility criteria, and caseloads rapidly expanded1 (Katz, 1989; Weaver,
2000). Even if more challenging for states to exclude particular racial or ethnic groups
from participation in AFDC, race-patterned di↵erences remained. In particular, states
with larger populations of blacks tended to o↵er less generous welfare benefits (Johnson,
2001; Orr, 1976; Soss et al., 2011; Tropman & Gordon, 1978).
1While the late 1960s is often believed to be the beginning of a major expansion of AFDC rolls, Lieber-
man (1998) traces the overall trend of rising caseloads to the early 1950s.
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A degree of state discretion returned to AFDC beginning in the 1980s. The Reagan
administration granted fourteen states waivers of federal AFDC requirements, called sec-
tion 1115 waivers, to allow them to experiment with alternative approaches to economic
relief (C. Harvey et al., 2000; Teles, 1996; Weaver, 2000). These experiments continued
into the George H.W. Bush administration (twelve states) and greatly expanded in the
initial years of the Clinton administration (forty-three states)2(C. Harvey et al., 2000). In
particular, states were encouraged to evaluate programs that moved beneficiaries o↵ of
the welfare rolls and into the labor market. In contrast to previous forms of welfare dis-
cretion, states granted waivers had flexibility over the uses of program funds; resources
were no longer devoted just to cash assistance, but to other types of interventions such
as job readiness training. The welfare waivers era pointed toward the ultimate form of a
revised cash assistance system, one oriented to the low-wage labor market.
"Welfare" had never been a popular policy. It was believed by many to encourage
adverse behaviors, such as engendering dependency, disincentivizing work, and facilitat-
ing family breakdown (Ellwood, 1988; Mead, 1986; Noble, 1997). Some on the political
left disliked welfare because of its meager benefits and demeaning rules (Ellwood, 1988)
while more radical observers maintained that the welfare system was a means of social
control, providing government with a tool to manage political unrest (Piven & Cloward,
1971). There were multiple attempts to reform AFDC. The Nixon administration, for
instance, proposed replacing AFDC and other transfer programs for poor families with
children with a limited form of guaranteed income, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP)
(Quadagno, 1990; Steensland, 2006). Less extreme attempts at reform similarly failed,
subject to gridlock despite widespread dissatisfaction with AFDC (Weaver, 2000).
In the early 1990s, Presidential candidate Bill Clinton partly campaigned on a promise
to "end welfare as we know it." Despite some skepticism, a window had opened for sub-
2Some of these states had only just begun implementing changes to AFDC at the passage of PRWORA,
and though granted waivers had not truly altered their AFDC programs prior to the transition to TANF
(C. Harvey et al., 2000).
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stantial change to the provision of welfare. Clinton’s promise to alter welfare was shortly
followed by the 1994 ascendancy of a Republican-controlled Congress seeking govern-
ment reform. Thus, the issue was on the policy agenda, and the major players were all
amenable to change. There were substantial di↵erences of opinion between the Clin-
ton administration and Congress over the substance of reform. While both sides, for
instance, agreed that work should be central to reform e↵orts, some administration re-
form plans guaranteed work while plans favored by majority party leadership enforced
private-sector work (Noble, 1997). The Clinton administration vetoed two bills passed by
Congress before finally signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act3, ending Aid to Families with Dependent Children and replacing it with
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (Weaver, 2000).
State Flexibility Under TANF
TANF Structure
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families returned a great deal of authority over wel-
fare policy to the states. Broadly, TANF is structured as a federal block grant with a
partial state "maintenance of e↵ort" (MOE) contribution. In contrast, under AFDC the
federal government partially matched state spending, with no limit, at pre-set rates. The
base TANF grant amount is based on state expenditures on AFDC (and some related
programs to accommodate states experimenting with alternative approaches to relief un-
der waivers) in the early 1990s. This base grant amount has never been adjusted for
inflation, nor does it vary with economic conditions4. Thus, the value of the federal
grant has, over time, declined by approximately one-third simply through the changing
3These vetoes were driven in large part by provisions related to alteration of Medicaid disfavored by the
administration, not by preferences with respect to AFDC (Weaver, 2000).
4Supplemental funds are available to states that historically devoted less e↵ort toward poverty allevia-
tion and to states experiencing population shifts.
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value of the dollar5. Both the block grant and maintenance-of-e↵ort contribution can be
used for purposes other than cash assistance and work and, as will be discussed shortly,
TANF’s structure contains incentives for states to use program resources for other activi-
ties. While unused block grant funds can be carried over, the MOE requirement must be
met annually (Falk, 2013).
The federal grant with partial statematch structure appears straightforward, but there
are several enumerated provisions and informal incentives built into TANF that are im-
portant for understanding the program’s status as a funding stream rather than a distinct
program. States can use TANF resources for any purpose consistent with the four goals of
reform: ending dependence on public support through work and marriage, encouraging
the formation and maintenance of two-parent families, reducing the incidence of out-of-
wedlock births, and facilitating care of children in their own homes6. As "welfare-to-
work" was a key purpose of reform, states must meet a work activity target, a proportion
of the cash assistance caseload participating in work or work-related activities. However,
this target can be reduced by one percentage point for each one percentage point decline
in the caseload or by providing an MOE contribution greater than the baseline require-
ment (Falk, 2013). The overall incentive, then, is for states to maintain or even increase
their overall levels of spending, at least in nominal dollars, but to direct resources to ar-
eas other than basic assistance, thereby meeting spending requirements while reducing
the state’s work activity burden.
Race & State TANF Implementation
With respect to cash assistance, states have broad discretion over program design.
There are overarching federal guidelines (e.g., a five year time limit on benefit receipt, a
5Overall TANF spending has declinedmuchmore slowly as states have usedmore of their own resources
toward MOE. However, additional MOE does not indicate new programming has been created. A state can
count existing e↵orts as MOE, and receives benefits (e.g., reduced work activity targets) for doing so (Schott
& Floyd, 2017).
6I.e., avoiding engagement with the child welfare/foster care system.
62
requirement that the adult beneficiary engage in work activities within two years), but
states are free to enact stricter rules than the federal baseline and may add their own
requirements. A number of studies in the wake of welfare reform considered, given
state flexibility over policy implementation, the correlates of particular policy approaches
(e.g., generosity of benefits, strictness of rules). Factors such as legislative ideology (Shor,
Berry, & McCarty, 2010), labor market conditions (De Jong, Graefe, Irving, & St. Pierre,
2006), business interest group power (Klarner, Mao, & Buchanan, 2007), representation
by women and racial/ethnic minorities in state government (Preuhs, 2006; Reingold &
Smith, 2012), and institutional characteristics such as multi-member electoral districts
(Larimer, 2005) were found to be related to cash assistance generosity and strictness of
program rules. In particular, however, several of these works consider the relationship
between race and policy design. States with proportionally larger black populations or
cash assistance caseloads tended to design more restrictive and punitive cash assistance
programs (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Gais & Weaver, 2002; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Soss et
al., 2011, 2001). This connection may also be subject to spillover e↵ects from other, more
overtly race-related policy conflicts (e.g., display of the Confederate flag) that make race
salient to politics at a given point in time (H. E. Brown, 2013).
Soss et al. (2011) propose a framework, the Racial Classification Model (RCM), to
explain the connection between elite-level policymaking and individual-level racial at-
titudes. It maintains that, with respect to social policy, 1) decision-makers require cog-
nitive shortcuts for evaluating target populations, 2) when race is a salient element of a
policy, stereotypes can serve as a shortcut, and 3) when stereotypes are used as a shortcut,
the size of the gap between perceptions of the target population and desired behavior in-
fluences the nature of the preferred policy approach. The RCM is an outgrowth of the
social construction or policy design approach for understanding social policy proposed
by Schneider and Ingram (1993), though it advances on earlier theories by considering
social-psychological microfoundations that then aggregate into policy outcomes. The au-
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thors apply the theory to multiple levels of welfare policymaking, from broad national
and macro-historical trends to the decisions of street-level bureaucrats.
State TANF Expenditures
The studies discussed previously deal exclusively with TANF as a cash assistance pro-
gram, considering the rules and requirements associated with participation in traditional
basic assistance. Research approaches range from examination of single policies, such as
adoption of a family cap or a strict time limit (Soss et al., 2001), to simple researcher-
constructed scales (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2001), to complex measures gen-
erated using latent variable modeling (De Jong et al., 2006). While important and en-
lightening for understanding the decisions of states post-welfare reform, examining cash
assistance requirements does not accurately reflect the fact that TANF is no longer pri-
marily a traditional cash assistance program. As shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2,
cash assistance as a use of combined state and federal TANF resources has declined dra-
matically over time. In contrast, expenditures on alternative priorities have, in several
categories, risen (tax credits, short-term benefits, pregnancy prevention/two-parent fam-
ily formation, and most especially miscellaneous, poorly defined categories labeled here
as "Other"). Work activities and supportive services have, after an uptick in the early
years of TANF, undergone a slight decline, while child care spiked quickly after TANF
phase-in, then also began a gradual decline. Expenditures on transfers from TANF to
the Social Services Block Grant and administration have remained roughly constant in
adjusted dollars. Most TANF implementation research, then, focuses on a receding area
of the program; alternative expenditure areas, not basic assistance, now account for the
bulk of resources used under the umbrella of TANF.
A handful of studies have treated TANF as a funding stream rather than a cash assis-
tance program. Two—Rodgers and Tedin (2006) andMatsubayashi and Rocha (2011)—ex-
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Data source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Combined State and Federal Basic Assistance Expenditures
Figure 3.1: National expenditures on basic assistance, 1998-2013 (2014 U.S. billions).
and TANF spending from 1980 to 2000. Notably, both found an inverse relationship be-
tween proportion of the state population identifying as black and state welfare e↵ort.
These studies, however, concern only overall financial e↵ort, not how funds are used.
Lambright and Allard’s (2004) examination of transfers from the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families grant to the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) o↵ers the sole peer-
reviewed study of categorical TANF spending. They did not find a relationship between
race and SSBG transfers, but did find that state propensity toward innovation (as mea-
sured by timing of waiver adoption under AFDC) and degree of cash assistance caseload
decline were related to transfer amounts. Policy analysis groups such as the Urban In-
stitute (Hahn et al., 2012) and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Schott et al.,
2015) have examined state categorical TANF spending. These studies, however, are de-
scriptions of how states use TANF funds, and do not evaluate correlates and determinants
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Data source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Combined State & Federal Alternative TANF Expenditures
Figure 3.2: National expenditures on alternative TANF activities, 1998-2013 (2014 U.S.
billions).
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a service-based rather than a cash-based welfare system for low-income populations, but
also did not scrutinize interstate variation in priorities justified under TANF.
Research Questions & Expectations
Given that TANF is more a funding stream than a cash assistance program, there is
a mismatch between its current form and state TANF scholarship. Research on TANF
implementation focuses almost entirely on cash assistance and the rules associated with
cash assistance. Those studies of TANF expenditures that have been conducted are lim-
ited in many ways, either only examining total TANF expenditures, a single category of
expenditures, or merely providing description without analysis of underlying patterns.
What state-level factors, then, explain di↵erences in categorical TANF spending? In par-
ticular, is there a relationship between state-level racial politics and state use of TANF
resources? Consistent with existing scholarship, I expect to find a relationship between
the salience of race to state politics and patterns in the use of TANF as a flexible funding
stream. The politics of anti-poverty policy in states where race is more salient to policy-
making are qualitatively di↵erent from other states with respect to poverty policy. There
is extensive existing evidence for such a relationship, stretching from early mother’s pen-
sions (Ward, 2005), to post-entitlement expansion AFDC benefits (Orr, 1976; Tropman
& Gordon, 1978), and to TANF cash assistance rules (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et
al., 2001). It has not, however, been extensively examined in the context of TANF as a
funding stream.
The notion that race-oriented politics should influence TANF expenditures follows
from two key propositions. First, TANF provides states with extensive flexibility over
program resources and includes incentives, such as the work activity requirements and
caseload reduction credits, for diverting resources to areas other than cash assistance.
Subnational politics should then influence the ways in which states respond to these in-
centives. Second, following from the RCM and related theories, the "policy image" with
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respect to target population influences policy design; when race is relevant to the policy
area, racial stereotypes become part of the image (Soss et al., 2011). In conjunction, these
two tenets suggest that the relevance of race to policymaking will influence state decision-
making with respect to TANF fund uses. States in which race is more salient to welfare
politics can use resources in ways consistent with stereotypes. Most obviously, racial
salience should be related to basic assistance expenditures. While all states should, over
time, de-emphasize basic assistance, states in which race is salient to politics should use
the flexibility a↵orded by TANF tomove away from traditional welfare to a greater degree
than other states. In any given year, then, states in which race is salient to politics will
devote fewer resources to basic assistance compared to other states. This proposition fol-
lows naturally from earlier scholarship, as these states tend to have lower benefit levels,
adopted more stringent cash assistance rules, and experienced sharper initial caseload
declines compared to peer states (Bentele & Nicoli, 2012; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et
al., 2011, 2001). There is already evidence, then, of these states deliberately choosing to
limit the role of cash assistance in the TANF era, and basic assistance expenditures are
simply one more area where such a pattern should be detectable.
If states in which race is more salient to politics devote fewer resources to basic as-
sistance but total TANF spending remains relatively steady, then these states should also
spend proportionally more on alternative priorities using TANF funds. The flexibility
to make particular choices regarding the use of TANF funds, then, could also lead to
patterns in alternative uses of TANF resources. How this relationship might manifest,
though, is less clear than for basic assistance. A few propositions can be reasonably for-
warded, however. First, states in which race is more salient might simply seek to maintain
spending levels in the least intrusive way possible, with no particular structure, while de-
emphasizing cash assistance. Evidence of this proposition would take the form of greater
spending in miscellaneous categories ("Authorized Under Prior Law"/Other, described
under Methods). Alternatively, these states could direct funds toward socially correc-
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tive programs, such as two-parent family formation/maintenance initiatives and out-of-
wedlock birth prevention. Nuclear family breakdown was a much-discussed problem
during the debate over welfare reform, and the dialogue surrounding issues associated
with single-mother families often reflected racial stereotypes (Hancock, 2004). States
where race is more salient, then, might use TANF to support initiatives to correct the per-
ceived adverse behaviors of the target population7. Finally, these states might be more
willing to use the flexibility a↵orded by TANF to supplement or supplant streams of
funds directed toward pre-existing programs. While it is not possible to identify whether
funds are used for existing programs or for programs created specifically under TANF,
evidence could be found in Social Services Block Grant transfers. These propositions also
need not be mutually exclusive, though if multiple patterns with the same root cause
exist it could make them di cult to detect in empirical models. As has been shown in
earlier studies, I expect any relationships to be particularly noticeable with respect to the
salience of blacks to politics and weaker or not present with respect to Hispanics.
This study is primarily an empirical contribution to welfare scholarship, examining
whether and how existing theory on the role of race in the welfare state applies to an
important but under-studied aspect of TANF. However, as discussed under "Methods," I
approach measurement of racial salience slightly di↵erently than the majority of previ-
ous studies. My general theoretical approach is essentially an outgrowth of Soss et al.’s
(2011) Racial Classification Model, but I focus on the depths with which stereotypes are
held rather than the presence of racial/ethnic minorities in the target population to op-
erationalize racial salience. Race is central to the policy image of "welfare," and at the
individual level racial attitudes and welfare attitudes covary among whites (Federico,
2004; Gilens, 1999; Hancock, 2004; Kinder & Sanders, 1996). The depth with which
racial stereotypes are held, then, should be an equally valid measure of racial salience as
7Note the perceived behaviors of the target population need not be equivalent to the actual behaviors of
the target population. State governments are not rationally responding to a genuine local problem. Rather,
they are, if the general theoretical approach is correct, responding to assumed problems based in racial
stereotypes.
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caseload or population demographics.
Methods
Models
TANF has been in place for nearly twenty years, so observations of state spending
are available for all fifty states over a significant period of time. The drop in basic as-
sistance and rise in alternative priorities truly began in the early 2000s, so my dataset
commences with observations in the year 2000 and concludes in 2013 (N = 700, n = 50,
t = 14). For categories in which almost all states expended resources in almost all years
(basic assistance, work activities/supportive services/childcare, administration, and the
catch-all category authorized under prior law (APL)/other) I estimate a set of multi-level
linear models8 with each state-year observation nested within a state (i). Time is treated
categorically using indicator variables for each year (t). State-specific intercepts are mod-
eled through random e↵ects—group deviations from a population grand mean. These
deviations are assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean zero and variance  2.
Predictor variables can be at the individual state-year observation level or at the state
level (that is, time invariant within state) (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Raudenbush & Bryk,
2002). Time invariant variables explain a portion of the state-specific random intercepts.
A concern with this type of model is violation of the assumption of independence be-
tween the lowest-level variables and the grouping variables (i.e., the random e↵ects). A
systematic relationship between a state-year predictor and the state error could result in
smaller-than-appropriate standard errors and, in turn, misleading inferences. Including
the group (state) mean of the time-varying predictor as a time-invariant variable ade-
quately addresses this issue by using the mean to explain a portion of the unit-specific
8Models of this form have a variety of names that di↵er by academic field, including random e↵ects
models, multilevel models, hierarchical models, and error-components models. These terms are equivalent,
each describing a model in which group disturbances within a population are modeled as following a
distribution, and di↵er only due to disciplinary conventions.
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intercept (Gelman, 2006; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002)9. The "fixed e↵ects"10 (population-
averaged) portion of the model is of greatest interest in this analysis, with the random
component controlling for clustering within states. The fixed e↵ects parameters in these
models are interpreted identically to coe cients in a standard linear model—the amount
of change in the dependent variable for a one-unit change in the predictor variable hold-
ing all else constant. Reports of zero value expenditures are treated as true zeroes in these
models11.
As shown in Table 3.1, for expenditure categories such as pregnancy prevention and
two-parent family formation, zero reports are quite common in some years (particularly
early in TANF’s history) and/or some states, with a few states never expending e↵ort in a
given category. The preponderance of zero values severely biases linear model estimates
downward, and the structure of the data prohibits implementation of a selection model
accounting for both the decision to expend resources in a category and the amount of
resources used in non-zero state-years. I therefore treat the expenditure of resources by
a state in these categories as a discrete, binary choice rather than a dollar value. The
outcome variable is a simple indicator coded 1 if the state expended resources in the
category in the given year. I model these choices with cross-sectional logit models and
present results from a subset of years—2001, 2006, and 2012 (n=50 for each model). The
distributions of the continuous outcome variables, discussed in a forthcoming section,
are unusual even after applying a transformation to more closely approximate normal-
ity. Violation of regression assumptions is a distinct possibility, and so I estimate robust
standard errors for all models12.
9Note that the interpretation of the group-mean coe cient is not intuitive. The unique influence of the
group mean on the outcome is easily derived, however, by simply summing the coe cient on the state-year
variable and the coe cient on the state mean variable (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002)
10In the multilevel modeling context, "fixed e↵ects" refer to the parameters of the population-averaged
portion of the model, not, as is common in econometrics, to an indicator variables approach to panel data.
11That is, they are treated identically to any other value of the dependent variable.
12The properties of robust standard errors in small samples are suspect (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Given
that fewer coe cients are statistically significant using the robust standard errors, however, they are pre-
sented here as the more conservative option.
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700 state-years; 50 states in 14 years.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are constructed from categorical state-year TANF expendi-
tures as reported to the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) (2014). The
raw ACF data are divided into multiple categories further split by funding stream (e.g.,
federal block grant funds, state MOE, supplemental federal funds). The Center on Bud-
get and Policy Priorities (2015) (CBPP) cleans and distills this data into a set of sum-
mary categories and is, in turn, the source of the spending information used to construct
the dependent variables. The categories of expenditures used in this study are basic
assistance, work activities/supportive services/child care, tax credits, short-term bene-
fits, pregnancy prevention and two-parent family formation, Social Services Block Grant
transfers, administration, and Authorized Under Prior Law (APL)/other. With the ex-
ception of work activities/supportive services/child care, these categories are identical to
those constructed by CBPP.
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Basic assistance captures traditional cash benefits for low-income families. Work, ser-
vices, and child care includes those additional activities typically thought to be the core of
TANF—subsidized work, transportation assistance, job training, and child care (includ-
ing transfers to the Child Care and Development Fund, another federal grant program)13.
This category is the sum of CBPP’s work-related activities/social services and child care
categories. Tax credits are funds used on refundable tax credits, such as state Earned
Income Tax Credits, while short-term benefits are extremely time-limited or lump sum
cash or cash-equivalent transfers (also referred to as diversion payments) provided in
lieu of formal participation in cash assistance. Pregnancy prevention/two-parent fam-
ily formation and maintenance and Social Services Block Grant transfers are fairly self-
explanatory. Authorized under prior law(APL)/other is a catch-all category for otherwise
uncategorized expenditures, reported to the federal government as expenses on programs
authorized prior to passage of PRWORA and miscellaneous but allowable expenses14.
Some cleaning and transformation procedures are required before the expenditure
data can be meaningfully used. First, state accounting practices result in occasional
reports of negative expenditures in a category, a seemingly non-sensical value. These
reports are a product of states being able to correct previous reports by including the
value of the correction in a later report (e.g., if a state retroactively determines it over-
reported in a given year or years, it can correct the over-report by subtracting the value
from the category in the current year). As it is not possible to determine to which years
corrections apply, I treat these negative reports as zeroes15. Next, to account for varia-
tion in state size I scale expenditures in two ways. First, I create a set of variables I term
13Importantly, even these activities do not have to be directed toward cash assistance beneficiaries, those
at risk of requiring benefits, or those who have left the cash assistance rolls.
14Opacity is a distinct problem with the TANF expenditure data. While these broad categories, with the
exception of APL/other, appear self-explanatory, states report little information to the federal government
beyond dollar values with respect to TANF-funded activities. The state of Michigan, as an example, reports
college scholarships for middle class students as a pregnancy prevention activity under TANF (Wilkinson,
2016). Given existing reporting procedures, however, there is no way to re-categorize such expenses. They
are simply pooled with other activities more intuitively associated with the topical category.
15Negative corrections not resulting in values less than zero and positive corrections are also possible,
but are undetectable. These over- and under-reports likely add substantial noise to the data.
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"e↵ort-to-need," scaling expenditures expressed in constant dollars (2014 thousands) to
the estimated count of families in poverty in a state (Center on Budget and Policy Pri-
orities, 2015). To ensure only a single value varies over time, I hold the denominator
constant by using the 2000 to 2013 average count. For modeling purposes, I apply an
inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation to the e↵ort-to-need variables to improve
fit. The IHS transformation is similar to a logarithmic transformation, frequently applied
to skewed data. Unlike the logarithmic transformation, however, the IHS transformation
can accommodate zero and negative values (Burbidge, Magee, & Robb, 1988; Friedline,
Masa, & Chowa, 2015). It is interpreted analogously to a logarithmic transformation, with
the coe cient approximately representing a proportional change in the untransformed
outcome per unit of the predictor. In addition to e↵ort-to-need, I also create a set of vari-
ables expressing categorical state-year TANF expenditures as a percentage of total TANF
expenditures. Finally, I generate 0/1 indicator variables for expenditure categories with
very large numbers of state-year reports of zero, with a 1 indicating the state reported any
expenditures in the category in a given year. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.2
and Table 3.3.
Key Independent Variables
The primary predictor of interest is the salience of race to state-level politics. I ap-
proach measurement of this concept di↵erently from most previous studies, however,
with respect to the salience of blacks to state welfare politics. Typically, studies of state
welfare policy implementation take race into account using demographic measures, such
as the racial/ethnic composition of the cash assistance caseload (Soss et al., 2001, e.g.) or
the state population (Rodgers & Tedin, 2006, e.g.). Instead, I operationalize black racial
salience using a measure of prevailing white a↵ect toward blacks. Using multi-level re-
gression with post-stratification (MRP) and the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey
(Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2010), I create a variable estimating the proportion of
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Table 3.2: Dependent variable descriptive statistics, expenditures expressed as per-
family-in-poverty value ("e↵ort-to-need").
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Basic Assistance 1.747 overall 1.505
between 1.369
within 0.653
Work/services/child care 1.642 overall 1.312
between 1.150
within 0.653
APL/Other 0.826 overall 0.917
between 0.765
within 0.515
Administration 0.446 overall 0.314
between 0.284
within 0.140
700 state-years; 50 states in 14 years.
Descriptive statistics calculated from raw values.
Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation applied before analysis.
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities calculations based
on Administration for Children & Families data.
Table 3.3: Dependent variable descriptive statistics, expenditures expressed as percent-
age of total state-year TANF e↵ort.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Basic assistance 30.173 overall 13.029
between 9.967
within 8.501
Work/services/child care 30.453 overall 13.589
between 11.743
within 7.023
APL/Other 17.745 overall 15.809
between 13.820
within 7.906
Administration 8.632 overall 4.325
between 3.110
within 3.036
700 state-years; 50 states in 14 years.
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities calculations based
on Administration for Children & Families data.
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whites in a state expressing extremely negative stereotypes of blacks, here defined as the
respondent scoring in the top quartile in-sample on a scaled measure of stereotyping.
The battery consists of six questions. A respondent rates, on a scale of 0 to 100, whether
he or she feels his or her own racial group is trustworthy, intelligent, and hardworking,
then whether a di↵erent racial group is trustworthy, intelligent, and hardworking. For
white respondents, blacks are the racial reference group.
To implement MRP, survey data are used to model the probability that an individual
holds a particular opinion given demographic and geographic (e.g., state) characteristics.
Predicted probabilities are generated for each possible "type" of person based on combi-
nations of these factors. Finally, using Census data on the prevalence of each "type" in the
population, the probabilities are used to calculate estimated counts of the number of in-
dividuals holding the given view within each state (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Kastellec, Lax,
& Phillips, 2010; Lax & Phillips, 2009b). I model negative racial views among white re-
spondents as a function of respondent gender, age, and education; state and geographic
region; and the proportion of the state population identifying as black, state segrega-
tion, and proportion of the state working-age population holding a bachelor’s degree or
greater. Additional detail on implementation of the MRP procedure for this study can be
found in Chapter 2 and Appendix A. Unfortunately, the NAES does not include a paral-
lel set of questions for attitudes with respect to Hispanics or Latinos. I therefore include
proportion of the TANF cash assistance caseload identifying as Hispanic to capture the
salience of Hispanic ethnicity to welfare policymaking.
Other Independent Variables
Beyond the salience of race to state politics, I include a number of other relevant
political, social, and economic variables. With respect to political factors, government
ideology is measured using W. Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner’s (2013)
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NOMINATE-based measure rescaled to the [0 10] interval16. The measure uses the ideol-
ogy scores of the state’s federal Congressional delegation to infer party ideology and, in
turn, overall state government ideology given party control. Smaller values indicate more
conservative government, larger values more liberal government. A similar measure of
citizen ideology is also included (W. Berry et al., 1998). Economically, state-year unem-
ployment rate and fiscal stress account for di↵erent aspects of state fiscal conditions. The
former is self-explanatory, while the latter is a variation on the fiscal health measure used
by W. Berry et al. (1998) in their study of state lottery di↵usion. It is calculated by sub-
tracting state-year revenue from expenditures, then dividing by expenditures17. Larger
values indicate greater fiscal stress. Poverty rate is also included in the percentage mod-
els18. Each of these variables is time varying.
A major use of TANF funds, and one that is impossible to isolate given state reporting
procedures, is support for state child welfare systems (Falk, 2013). States tend to re-
port child welfare-related expenses under a miscellaneous category, such as "APL/other."
I measure need for child welfare support through the ratio of foster care cases to total
number of children in the state (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2017). Finally, religiosity
could be related to state TANF spending. Most obviously, TANF’s flexibility allows states
to devote resources to issues, such as two-parent family formation and maintenance, per-
ceived as moral concerns and promoted by conservative Christian organizations during
the national debate over reform (Reese, 2007; Weaver, 2000). There is also evidence that
identifying as an Evangelical Christian is associated with more negative views of cash
assistance recipients (J. M. Wilson, 1999). The relevance of religious conservatism to
politics, then, could also be associated with state basic assistance e↵ort. This factor is
measured using percentage of the population identifying as Evangelical Christian (Pew
16In raw form, the measure is scaled 0 to 100.
17In the original measure, expenditures are subtracted from revenue in the numerator. I use its opposite
so that it is more easily interpreted as a measure of fiscal distress.
18Poverty rate is not included in the e↵ort-to-need models due to the count of families in poverty being
used to scale the dependent variable.
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Research Center, 2015). The data for this variable are only available for 201419, so it
is treated as a time-invariant predictor. I also include state-year unmarried birthrate to
capture a relevant social problem. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are
shown in Table 3.4. All variables were grand mean centered prior to model estimation.
Table 3.4: Independent variable descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Time Invariant
White stereotyping of blacks 27.021 6.177
% Evangelical 26.080 10.975
Time Varying
Caseload % Hispanic 14.369 overall 16.233
between 16.154
within 2.723
Government Ideology 4.895 overall 2.554
between 2.007
within 1.603
Fiscal stress -0.001 overall 0.252
between 0.060
within 0.245
Unemployment rate (%) 5.891 overall 2.099
between 1.131
within 1.775
Poverty rate (%) 12.524 overall 3.380
between 2.927
within 1.736
Foster care ratio 0.006 overall 0.002
between 0.002
within 0.001
700 state-years; 50 states in 14 years.
19Pew Research Center (2015) also fielded the survey producing these estimates in 2007, but the sample




Results from themulti-level models examining expenditures on basic assistance; work,
supportive services, and child care; APL/other; and administration are shown in Table 3.5
(IHS transformed e↵ort-to-need) and Table 3.6 (percentage). As the main predictors of
interest, coe cient estimates for the racial salience variables are presented visually in
Figure 3.3 for the IHS transformed e↵ort-to-need models and Figure 3.4 for the percent-
age models (the symbols represent the point estimate of the coe cient while the bars
are 95% confidence intervals). The white racial attitudes variable is statistically signif-
icant and negatively signed in both the e↵ort-to-need and percentage models of basic
assistance e↵ort. Fewer resources are directed toward traditional cash assistance in states
where negative stereotypes of blacks are more common among whites. In the e↵ort-to-
need model, a one percentage point increase in whites expressing negative stereotypes
of blacks is associated with an approximately 3% decrease in resources devoted to basic
assistance. In the percentage model, the same one percentage point increase in white
stereotyping is associated with a slightly more than three-quarters of a percentage point
decrease in basic assistance as a percentage of overall TANF e↵ort. It is not statistically
significant in any other of the four e↵ort-to-need models, but is significant at ↵ = 0.10 in
the percentage model for administration. A one percentage point increase in whites ex-
pressing negative views of blacks is concurrent with a 0.190 percentage point reduction
in administrative spending.
As anticipated, there are relationships between expenditures and proportion of the
cash assistance caseload identifying as Hispanic, but they are relatively fleeting. Neither
the time-varying or time-invariant components are statistically significant in either of the
basic assistance models. In the e↵ort-to-need model for work, services, and child care,




















Basic cash assistance Work/services/childcare
Administration APL/Other
Category
Symbol represents point estimate. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
White Racial Attitudes Coefficient Plot, Effort-to-need
Figure 3.3: Plot of coe cient estimates and 95% confidence intervals, relationship be-
tween prevalence of white stereotypes of blacks and categorical TANF spend-






















Basic cash assistance Work/services/childcare
Administration APL/Other
Category
Symbol represents point estimate. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
White Racial Attitudes Coefficient Plot, Percentage
Figure 3.4: Plot of coe cient estimates and 95% confidence intervals, relationship be-
tween prevalence of white stereotypes of blacks and categorical TANF spend-
ing (expenditures expressed as percentage of total TANF spending).
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invariant component is negatively signed and significant (-0.0249). The time varying
component indicates that a one percentage point increase in the fraction of the cash as-
sistance caseload identifying as Hispanic coincides with a 1.5% increase in e↵ort devoted
to work, services, and child care. However, in general, states with larger proportions of
the caseload composed of Hispanics tend to devote fewer resources to these priorities, at
least initially. As noted previously, the time-invariant component is a composite e↵ect
that must interpreted in concert with the time-varying component. The actual "contex-
tual e↵ect" within state across time is -0.0095, considerably lower in magnitude than
might be expected through direct interpretation of the coe cient on the time-invariant
component.
Socially, a larger proportion of the state population identifying as Evangelical Chris-
tian is also associated with reduced e↵ort on basic assistance, work/services/child care,
and administration in the e↵ort-to-need models. It is also negative, but not statistically
significant, for basic assistance and work/services/child care when examined as percent-
ages. It is positively signed for APL/Other in both model forms, but is only significant
in the percentage model. While the time-varying component of foster care ratio is not
statistically significant in any model, the time-invariant element for basic assistance and
work, services, and child care is significant in the e↵ort-to-need specification. Increases
in government liberalism are associated with increased basic assistance spending, but
the coe cient is only significant (at ↵ = 0.10) in the e↵ort-to-need model. Citizen ideol-
ogy is also periodically statistically significant in either its time-varying or time-invariant
forms. With respect to economic conditions, increases in unemployment are negatively
associated with expenditures on work/services/child care; a parallel result also appears
for poverty in the percentage model. Fiscal stress is associated with increased expen-
ditures on work/services/childcare but only achieves significance in the e↵ort-to-need
specification.
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Table 3.5: Parameter estimates of multilevel models of IHS transformed state categorical
TANF expenditures (expenditures scaled to count of families in poverty), 2000-
2013.




% Hispanic 0.00729 0.0154⇤⇤⇤ -0.00653 -0.00181
(0.00763) (0.00458) (0.00787) (0.00231)
Gov’t ideology 0.0139+ 0.0160⇤ 0.00540 -0.00707⇤
(0.00812) (0.00743) (0.00989) (0.00308)
Cit. ideology -0.0142 0.0186 -0.0450+ -0.0137
(0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0271) (0.0141)
Unemployment 0.0177 -0.0470⇤ 0.0597⇤⇤ -0.00217
(0.0182) (0.0187) (0.0207) (0.00782)
Foster care ratio 0.00716 -0.0251 -0.00967 0.00203
(0.0131) (0.0311) (0.0349) (0.00665)
Fiscal stress 0.102 0.160⇤ 0.151 0.0256
(0.0972) (0.0696) (0.105) (0.0494)
Time invariant
White stereotyping of blacks -0.0251⇤ -0.00709 -0.00716 -0.00854+
(0.00987) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.00507)
% Evangelical -0.0197⇤⇤ -0.0235⇤⇤⇤ 0.000652 -0.00878⇤⇤
(0.00721) (0.00690) (0.00731) (0.00332)
% Hispanic (state mean) -0.0109 -0.0249⇤⇤⇤ 0.0137 -0.000890
(0.00838) (0.00568) (0.00916) (0.00308)
Gov’t ideology (state mean) 0.0469 0.0818⇤ -0.0672+ 0.0188
(0.0326) (0.0396) (0.0388) (0.0161)
Cit. ideology (state mean) 0.0910 -0.0343 0.169⇤ 0.0586⇤
(0.0596) (0.0630) (0.0801) (0.0271)
Foster care ratio (state mean) 0.0718⇤⇤ 0.0827⇤ 0.0277 0.00685
(0.0271) (0.0333) (0.0471) (0.0132)
Unemployment (state mean) -0.00671 0.0678 0.0457 0.0117
(0.0558) (0.0596) (0.0669) (0.0197)
Fiscal stress (state mean) 1.556⇤ 1.625 -1.575 0.205
(0.717) (1.017) (1.577) (0.253)
Random Component
Var (constant) 0.096 0.126 0.150 0.026
(0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.006)
Var (residual) 0.036 0.044 0.078 0.011
(0.006) (0.012) (0.018) (0.002)
Log likelihood 78.638 10.327 -182.359 490.484
BIC 39.256 175.879 561.251 -784.435
N 700 700 700 700
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year indicator variables included but not presented.
Expenditures scaled by average count of families in poverty, 2000-2013.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 3.6: Parameter estimates of multilevel models of state categorical TANF spending
expressed as percentage of overall TANF spending, 2000-2013.




% Hispanic -0.00240 0.426⇤⇤ -0.367 -0.190+
(0.330) (0.153) (0.268) (0.101)
Gov’t ideology 0.380 0.524+ -0.472 -0.210⇤
(0.277) (0.276) (0.407) (0.0926)
Cit. ideology 0.320 2.102⇤ -1.634⇤ 0.0248
(0.881) (0.884) (0.684) (0.257)
Unemployment 0.318 -1.499⇤⇤ 2.388⇤⇤ -0.421
(0.756) (0.534) (0.757) (0.303)
Poverty 0.118 -0.429⇤ 0.362 0.0130
(0.244) (0.218) (0.262) (0.0971)
Foster care ratio 0.349 -0.714 0.734 -0.0560
(0.847) (0.701) (0.679) (0.191)
Fiscal stress -0.941 1.111 -0.605 -0.0674
(3.239) (2.760) (3.028) (1.333)
Time invariant
White stereotyping of blacks -0.807⇤⇤ 0.143 -0.129 -0.195⇤
(0.272) (0.396) (0.298) (0.0829)
% Evangelical -0.0636 -0.222 0.687⇤ 0.0165
(0.207) (0.300) (0.277) (0.0609)
% Hispanic (state mean) -0.0801 -0.707⇤⇤⇤ 0.695⇤ 0.154
(0.350) (0.175) (0.290) (0.108)
Gov’t ideology (state mean) -0.0949 2.020 -3.667⇤⇤⇤ -0.183
(0.827) (1.296) (1.112) (0.296)
Cit. ideology (state mean) 0.473 -5.887⇤⇤ 6.210⇤⇤ 0.328
(1.644) (2.223) (2.099) (0.548)
Foster care ratio (state mean) 0.710 0.724 -1.810+ -0.385+
(1.084) (1.003) (1.096) (0.231)
Poverty rate (state mean) 0.549 0.898 -1.223 0.109
(0.765) (0.929) (0.870) (0.276)
Unemployment (state mean) -0.935 1.670 0.280 0.483
(1.670) (1.278) (1.751) (0.651)
Fiscal stress (state mean) 23.99 22.43 -68.84+ -12.06
(20.07) (25.70) (35.83) (10.78)
Random Component
Var(constant) 61.543 97.132 105.837 6.984
(12.212) (17.018) (21.517) (1.608)
Var(residual) 50.165 44.951 49.269 8.673
(8.562) (5.932) (7.387) (2.543)
Log likelihood -2436.123 -2411.262 -2443.222 -1812.036
BIC 5081.880 5032.158 5096.079 3833.706
N 700 700 700 700
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year indicator variables included but not presented.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Cross-sectional Discrete Choice Models
The multi-level models examine spending categories in which almost all states report
spending in almost all years. Logistic regression models were estimated using data from
2001, 2006, and 2012 for the categories of pregnancy prevention/two-parent family for-
mation, tax credits, short-term benefits, and Social Services Block Grant transfers. Com-
plete model results are presented in Tables 3.7 through 3.10 as mean marginal e↵ects.
The values in the tables can be interpreted analogously to linear regression coe cients,
representing a change in the probability of the outcome per unit of the predictor.
Neither white stereotyping of blacks nor the percentage of the cash assistance caseload
identifying as Hispanic are statistically significant in any year for short-term benefits or
SSBG transfers. Increased negative attitudes toward blacks among whites, however, is
associated with an elevated probability of the state directing resources to pregnancy pre-
vention and two-parent family formation, at least in the two earlier years. In both 2001
and 2006, a one-percentage point increase in the number of whites expressing negative
views of blacks was associated with approximately an 0.04 greater probability of the state
devoting any resources to pregnancy prevention and/or two-parent family formation.
White attitudes toward blacks are also marginally significant in 2012 for the probability
of using TANF resources on tax credits. Proportion of the TANF caseload identifying as
Hispanic is not statistically significant in any of the discrete choice models. There are few
other significant predictors in any model. Fiscal stress is associated with an increased
probability of expending resources on SSBG transfers in 2001 and 2006, a relationship
not found in Lambright and Allard’s (2004) earlier study of SSBG transfers. Poverty rate
is negatively associated with SSBG transfers in those same years. Fiscal stress is a sig-
nificant predictor of the probability of a state using resources on tax credits in 2012, as
is the foster care ratio. There are no significant predictors of short-term benefit use in
any year with the sole exception of foster care rate in 2012, which is negatively signed
and marginally significant. Percent of the state population identifying as Evangelical
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Christian is sporadically significant (positively associated with SSBG transfers in 2001,
negatively associated with pregnancy prevention/two-parent family formation in 2006).
In general, there appears to be very little structure explaining state spending in these
less-common expenditure categories.
Table 3.7: Parameter estimates of discrete choice models of probability state expended
resources on pregnancy prevention/two-parent family formation.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks 0.041** 0.039** 0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
% Evangelical Christian -0.010 -0.022* 0.002
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
% Hispanic -0.003 0.003 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Gov’t liberalism 0.043 -0.043 0.013
(0.035) (0.030) (0.027)
Cit. liberalism -0.073 -0.097+ -0.055
(0.049) (0.057) (0.075)
Unemployment 0.060 0.006 -0.046
(0.057) (0.061) (0.036)
Foster care rate -0.034 0.003 -0.070*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.030)
Fiscal stress -0.360 0.474 -0.400
(0.499) (0.799) (0.778)
Poverty 0.019 0.004 -0.026
(0.025) (0.034) (0.031)
N 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.271 0.333 0.257
Values are mean marginal e↵ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 3.8: Parameter estimates of discrete choice models of probability state expended
resources on tax credits.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks 0.010 0.006 0.024+
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
% Evangelical Christian -0.009 -0.007 -0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
% Hispanic 0.001 -0.000 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Gov’t liberalism -0.028 0.001 -0.021
(0.027) (0.030) (0.032)
Cit. liberalism 0.057 0.067 0.079
(0.047) (0.060) (0.074)
Unemployment 0.005 0.058 -0.010
(0.065) (0.060) (0.041)
Foster care rate -0.003 -0.010 0.068*
(0.025) (0.034) (0.031)
Fiscal stress 0.718 -0.564 1.628+
(0.463) (1.092) (0.870)
Poverty -0.019 -0.026 -0.029
(0.023) (0.034) (0.030)
N 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.262 0.172 0.224
Values are mean marginal e↵ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 3.9: Parameter estimates of discrete choice models of probability state expended
resources on short-term benefits.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks -0.013 -0.003 -0.004
(0.013) (0.017) (0.016)
% Evangelical Christian -0.004 -0.011 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
% Hispanic 0.003 -0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Gov’t liberalism -0.024 -0.007 0.015
(0.034) (0.035) (0.028)
Cit. liberalism 0.021 0.043 0.030
(0.060) (0.061) (0.072)
Unemployment 0.063 0.001 -0.045
(0.084) (0.071) (0.041)
Foster care rate 0.003 -0.017 -0.058+
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031)
Fiscal stress 0.849 -0.287 -1.403
(0.611) (1.022) (1.000)
Poverty -0.020 0.029 -0.032
(0.029) (0.038) (0.030)
N 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.064 0.218
Values are mean marginal e↵ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 3.10: Parameter estimates of discrete choice models of probability state expended
resources on SSBG transfers.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks 0.006 0.015 0.011
(0.008) (0.014) (0.015)
% Evangelical Christian 0.013* -0.002 -0.009
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
% Hispanic 0.002 0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Gov’t liberalism -0.023 0.028 -0.007
(0.029) (0.026) (0.030)
Cit. liberalism 0.044 -0.027 -0.017
(0.043) (0.039) (0.072)
Unemployment 0.041 0.035 -0.004
(0.060) (0.048) (0.042)
Foster care rate -0.024 -0.027 0.009
(0.018) (0.020) (0.033)
Fiscal stress 1.156* 1.028* -0.040
(0.578) (0.459) (0.915)
Poverty -0.044* -0.059+ -0.025
(0.019) (0.032) (0.031)
N 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.396 0.085
Values are mean marginal e↵ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+




Scholars have, for nearly two decades, mischaracterized the nature of Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families. It is not a cash assistance program with work supports and
services attached. Rather, it is a funding stream states partially use for cash assistance
and work activities. Funded activities need not even serve cash assistance-receiving or
cash assistance-eligible families. Properly defining TANF is not merely pedantic—it is
important for understanding the true consequences of welfare reform. In both the pop-
ular press and the scholarly literature, the most-discussed changes in the transition from
AFDC to TANF concern cash assistance participation. TANF, in this view, is a cash as-
sistance program but, unlike its immediate predecessor, is not an entitlement, including
time limits and behavioral requirements. While not incorrect with respect to cash as-
sistance specifically, comparatively few families nationally now receive traditional cash
benefits (Bentele & Nicoli, 2012). Considering TANF as a funding stream aids, through
analysis of state incentives, in understanding the decline in cash assistance over time. Fis-
cal incentives for movement away from cash assistance are central to TANF’s structure.
States may vary in the means by and rate at which they de-emphasize cash assistance,
but all have genuine formal and informal incentives to do so while maintaining relatively
steady levels of overall e↵ort.
Beyond helping to understand how overall TANF funding has declined only very
slowly in constant dollars while cash assistance caseloads have plummeted, treating TANF
as a funding stream rather than a cash assistance program facilitates more complete
consideration of contemporary poverty relief. Allard (2009), for instance, describes the
American social safety net for the economically disadvantaged as one composed less of
cash- and near-cash supports and more of services. TANF as a funding stream is the
embodiment of this shift, valuing services over direct cash provision. Flexible funding
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streams supporting social services, however, make for a weak economic backstop. Neigh-
borhoods with concentrations of individuals and families in need may be geographically
distant from the service providers receiving funding. Often, these geographic di↵erences
coincide with racial di↵erences, making it more di cult for low-income families from
racial and ethnic minorities to access services. Flexible funding streams also limit the
countercyclical responsiveness of relief. An economic downturn, for instance, reduces a
government’s potential resources for supporting social service agencies at precisely the
moment additional services are demanded (Allard, 2009). Further, poverty in the United
States is gradually shifting to the suburbs (Howell & Timberlake, 2014). These commu-
nities are often service-poor compared to their urban counterparts, with fewer organi-
zations dedicated to assisting the economically disadvantaged and a particular dearth of
organizations intended to aid economic advancement (Murphy & Wallace, 2010).
Race & TANF as a Funding Stream
Basic Assistance
The major finding in this study is that the race-based pattern observed elsewhere in
the implementation of welfare also emerges when viewing TANF as a funding stream.
States in which whites express more negative views of blacks also tend to devote fewer
resources to traditional cash assistance. In turn, they are also more likely to devote re-
sources to pregnancy prevention/two parent family formation and, possibly, tax credits.
The relationship between basic assistance expenditures and racial politics is not surpris-
ing. States in which race is salient to welfare policymaking adopted stricter cash assis-
tance policies post-PRWORA (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2011, 2001) and experi-
enced sharper caseload declines (Bentele & Nicoli, 2012). Basic assistance spending could
be viewed as an additional way of examining cash assistance coverage, particularly when
measured indexed to a count of families in poverty.
No relationship between salience of Hispanics to state politics, as measured by de-
91
mographics of the cash assistance caseload, and basic assistance e↵ort was found. There
could be a more complex process at work. Perhaps the salience of Hispanics as a tar-
get population image varies over time, consistent with H. E. Brown’s (2013) notion that
the relevance of race/ethnicity-oriented issues in welfare policy fluctuates with external
events (e.g., an immigration-related debate could activate stereotypes that are then made
manifest in welfare politics). Xu (2017) also demonstrates that the relationship between
immigration and the welfare state in the U.S. is complex, and predicated on additional
factors such as labor market conditions and state-level policy with respect to immigrant
inclusion in social welfare programs. While not all Hispanics are immigrants and vice
versa, there is a close link between the two in political dialogue. The more-complex pro-
cesses described by Xu (2017) were not modeled here, which may mask such patterns.
Alternative Priorities
The relationship between racial politics and expenditures on pregnancy prevention
and two-parent family formation is consistent with the idea that racial stereotypes in-
fluence welfare policy design even outside of cash assistance. The racialized image of
the "welfare queen" is entangled with out-of-wedlock child birth (Hancock, 2004). States,
then, are a↵orded the opportunity through TANF’s flexibility to direct resources toward
an issue related to the racial stereotype. A key limitation here, however, is that it is not
possible to identify the exact activities considered pregnancy prevention and two-parent
family formation by the states, qualitative information that would strengthen or chal-
lenge the case for a relationship between stereotyping and policy. The federal government
does not currently collect more granular data in this regard.
There is also evidence, albeit weak, for a relationship between state racial politics and
tax credits. Using TANF resources for tax credits for low-income workers rather than
cash assistance is consistent with theories such as the RCM or social constructionism.
A perceived problem of the extremely poor in the United States is over-dependence on
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government supports, an assumption made explicit in the goals of TANF itself (Falk,
2013). Tax credits, even refundable tax credits, are not generally viewed as "govern-
ment programs" in the same way as, for example, vouchers or direct cash benefits, even
if economically equivalent (Mettler, 2011). Using TANF resources for tax credits, then,
essentially shifts benefits from a group perceived as undeserving ("welfare recipients") to
a group perceived as deserving ("workers"), even when there might be substantial overlap
between the two. Applying an RCM-like theory, it is not merely the case that racialized
policy images shape the nature of cash assistance policy (i.e., how punitive its provisions
are). Rather, racialization of policy in a flexible funding stream-type structure influences
the selection of interventions. Instead of remaking cash assistance to respond to the per-
ceived behaviors of a target population, the problematic target population can simply be
avoided.
Other Factors
Though racial politics is the major focus of this study, as the first to systematically ex-
amine TANF as a funding stream it also a↵ords an opportunity to consider whether other
state-level characteristics are relevant. There are no factors consistent across expenditure
categories, though a few do emerge as relevant in more than one category. In particular,
proportion of the population identifying as Evangelical Christian is predictive of sev-
eral TANF expenditure priorities. States with larger Evangelical Christian populations
devote fewer resources to basic assistance, work/services/childcare, and administration
expressed as e↵ort-to-need andmore to APL/other expressed as a percentage. These find-
ings are consistent with the proposition that Evangelical Christians generally hold di↵er-
ent views, compared to their peers, with respect to social welfare program participation
(J. M. Wilson, 1999) and that, when their population is large enough to exert political
influence, these opinions shape state policy. The variable could also serve as a proxy for
state political culture, which is closely related to prevailing religious a liation (Morgan
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& Watson, 1991). Regardless of exact mechanism, however, these findings indicate at the
very least that state religiosity is predictive of state policy choices.
With TANF now a flexible funding stream rather than a cash assistance program, ex-
posure to prevailing economic conditions is a concern (Allard, 2009). The relationship
between fiscal health and Social Services Block Grant transfers identifies a pattern not
evident in earlier work. Whereas Lambright and Allard (2004) did not find a relation-
ship between fiscal conditions and TANF-to-SSBG transfers, in this study states under
higher fiscal stress are more likely to transfer resources to SSBG. There are two possible
explanations for this di↵erence. First, it could be a measurement issue. I not only express
the dependent variable—SSBG transfers—di↵erently from Lambright and Allard (2004),
I also operationalize fiscal conditions di↵erently. I measure fiscal stress using a variation
on F. Berry and Berry’s (1990) procedure scaling yearly surplus or shortfall to expendi-
tures. Lambright and Allard (2004), in contrast, use a measure of potential tax base.
While related, the two measures are operationalizing slightly di↵erent concepts. Addi-
tionally, Lambright and Allard (2004) examined year 2000 spending, whereas I examine
2001, 2006, and 2012. SSBG transfer patterns could di↵er over time, and it is possible
my sample captures years where fiscal conditions were relevant while the earlier authors’
data did not.
Outside of SSBG transfers, the lack of influence of state fiscal health on TANF ex-
penditure patterns is surprising. Policy observers have speculated that fiscally stressed
states would use the flexibility of TANF to cover other, possibly only tenuously related,
priorities (Pavetti, Trisi, & Schott, 2011). In the current study, a relationship between
fiscal stress and the miscellaneous category Authorized Under Prior Law/other might es-
pecially be expected. No relationship was detected for any expenditure area other than
SSBG transfers, however. This result is particularly unexpected given the relationship
between basic assistance expenditures and fiscal stress found in the growth curve models
presented elsewhere in this dissertation. It is possible that the relationship uncovered
94
in the growth curve models was merely due to chance—a false positive. Alternatively,
the relationship could be genuine but is obscured with the di↵erent methods used here.
Fiscal stress could, for example, be more relevant later in TANF’s history than in its ear-
lier years. Accounting for time continuously, as in the growth models, might allow for
detection of such a relationship while it is absorbed by the year indicators in the models
treating time categorically. Given the two possibilities, more investigation is needed.
Implications
A. L. Campbell (2014) characterizes the American social safety net as one of incredible
complexity, a complexity driven in part by interstate di↵erences in policy. She further de-
scribes it as one that fails to provide adequate economic protection and, indeed, that traps
individuals and families in poverty. It is not merely themyriad of programs that produces
this challenging structure, however. TANF itself, seemingly a singular program, is a mi-
crocosm of this broader phenomenon when viewed as a funding stream. Two identical
families in two di↵erent states will have access to quite di↵erent programs and supports
justified under the umbrella of TANF. Further, given that funding priorities can change
and are subject to fluctuating economic conditions (Allard, 2009), the same family in one
state in di↵erent years might also have access to very di↵erent supports. While outside
of this study to explicitly address, it is reasonable to question whether an economically
disadvantaged family can successfully navigate such a system. It also raises normative
issues of equity–is it just for families in one state to have access to refundable tax credits
while in another state TANF funds are instead used for family formation or pregnancy
prevention programs? In addition to complexity, the opacity of activities funded under
TANF is striking. A remarkable proportion of TANF resources are devoted to categories
such as "Authorized Under Prior Law" and other miscellaneous areas with no state obliga-
tion to describe those activities. States can also justify seemingly-unrelated programs in
explicit expenditure categories, such as Michigan’s college scholarship program reported
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as pregnancy prevention (Wilkinson, 2016).
Importantly, there is no evidence that states that devote fewer resources to cash as-
sistance in turn devote more to activities, such as work supports or child care, that aid
in actually reducing the need for a cash-based safety net. It suggests these states are not
actually using TANF funds to reduce the need for economic support by facilitating labor
force participation. Instead, they are funding a host of activities, some of which are only
loosely related to poverty relief. State di↵erences in policy are not necessarily problem-
atic, as local conditions, such as di↵erences in the labor market or accessibility of services,
may require di↵erent solutions. "Local conditions," though, can also include the salience
of disadvantaged social groups to policymaking. Instead of policy reflecting actual prob-
lems, it can reflect perceived problems based on group stereotypes. Social welfare policy
in these cases can actually reinforce and reflect disadvantage rather than alleviate it.
A further strength of devolution is that state flexibility can lead to policy entrepreneur-
ship and, in turn, di↵usion of successful practices and improved interventions nation-
wide. There is some evidence states did learn from one another, at least initially, in TANF
implementation (Volden, 2016)20. TANF also demonstrates the limitations of devolution,
however. The incentive structure of states does not directly include poverty relief or even,
despite being listed among TANF’s goals (Falk, 2013), development of self-su ciency.
Rather, TANF’s incentives are built around cash assistance caseload reduction and work
activity participation. Even the work participation requirement itself contains perverse
incentives, as states can reduce their work targets through cash assistance caseload reduc-
tion or contribution of additional MOE (Falk, 2013). In sum, then, states have no reason
to truly alleviate economic hardship and build self-su ciency, but do have an incentive to
continue expending resources under the umbrella of TANF. The appropriateness of this
structure, including the definition of "success" and the incentives of state governments,
20Volden’s (2016) definition of a "successful" policy includes policies that reduce caseloads; this defini-
tion of success may be problematic, as caseload reduction without improved self-su ciency may severely




The uncertainty associated with this analysis must be underscored. Many manipula-
tions of the data were required, and even these procedures left skewed distributions for
some spending categories. It is encouraging that findings with respect to basic assistance
are consistent with theoretical expectations, but the noise inherent in the data through ac-
counting procedures remains a concern, one that cannot be addressed through statistical
technique. Intuitively, it would seem identifying a statistically significant pattern despite
noisy data provides stronger evidence in favor of a hypothesis. That view is not necessar-
ily correct, however, as noise can produce misleading results in either direction (Loken &
Gelman, 2017). There are, then, substantial concerns with respect to the reliability and
validity of state expenditure reports, but they remain the sole source comparable across
states on activities justified under the umbrella of TANF. Primarily, however, the data
limitations speak to the need for better, more consistent reporting with respect to state
uses of federal resources—what activities, precisely, are states using funds for, who par-
ticipates in these activities, and how well do these activities achieve the stated aims of the
broad federal program?
Conclusion
Welfare scholarship has, to a large degree, mischaracterized the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families program created by the 1996 welfare reform law. Much like the public
image of the program, most academic studies of TANF focus on cash assistance and the
rules, requirements, and work activities associated with cash assistance receipt. TANF,
though, is no longer primarily a cash assistance and work support program. It is instead
best thought of as a flexible funding stream states partially use for cash assistance and
work supports for low-income families. A natural question, then, is what state charac-
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teristics are associated with particular uses of TANF resources. Given both the racialized
history of "welfare" in the United States and contemporary theory with respect to the
relationship between racial politics and public policy, it is particularly valuable to under-
stand whether and how the politics of race is related to state TANF expenditure priorities.
Using data on categorical TANF expenditures from all states in the years 2000 to 2013,
I examine the relationship between the salience of race to state politics and TANF spend-
ing patterns. I estimate a series of multi-level models controlling for state and year ef-
fects to evaluate spending categories in which almost all states use resources in almost
all years and discrete choice models of the probability of the state devoting resources to
the category for areas with less consistent spending. For politics with respect to blacks,
I generate a measure of the prevalence of negative stereotypes of blacks by whites at the
state level using multi-level regression with post-stratification, while for politics with
respect to Hispanics I use cash assistance caseload demographics. I find evidence for
a relationship between race-oriented politics and state TANF expenditure patterns. As
measured by the prevalence of negative a↵ect among whites with respect to blacks in a
state, salience of blacks to subnational politics is associated with reduced expenditures on
basic cash assistance. It is also associated with a greater likelihood of a state using TANF
resources for pregnancy prevention/two parent family formation and, possibly, tax cred-
its. Relationships were also found, albeit inconsistently, with TANF expenditure patterns
and proportion of the cash assistance caseload identifying as Hispanic. As with welfare
throughout its history, TANF as a funding stream is influenced by the politics of race.
TANF as a funding stream rather than a cash assistance program reflects several na-
tional trends, including the emphasis on services over transfers and a complex system
of support exacerbated by interstate policy di↵erences. The transition away from cash
benefits is particularly relevant for socially disadvantaged groups. If states in which the
economically disadvantaged are more likely to be families of color are also those using
TANF resources for purposes other than cash transfers, the two issues interact to create
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a particularly challenging environment for poor families. Services raise issues about the
geographic location and accessibility of providers, which often overlaps with racial dis-
parities (Allard, 2009). More broadly, this study raises questions about the appropriate
role of devolution in social welfare. Federalism has many advantages, including o↵ering
the opportunity for states to experiment and identify novel solutions to complex prob-
lems. Future reform e↵orts could consider ways to emphasize the positive aspects of
devolution while better managing the propensity to reinforce existing social disparities.
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CHAPTER IV
Without a Net: Neoliberalism, Welfare & the Well-Being of
Low-Income Families in the United States
Note
This chapter is the product of a collaboration with H. Luke Shaefer, who proposed
the TANF coverage/food insecurity analysis, and Kathryn Edin. Reid Wilson also pro-
vided valuable research assistance, including conducting preliminary versions of some
analyses.
Abstract
Under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF; "welfare"), the program cre-
ated by the 1996 welfare reform law, economic relief for low-income families is no longer
an entitlement. Instead, it is time-limited and tied to work requirements. State govern-
ments also have both formal and informal incentives to keep traditional cash assistance
caseloads low. Welfare reform, by linking welfare participation to the low-wage labor
market, has been seen by some commentators as emblematic of a larger shift in pub-
lic policy toward market-based solutions to social problems and the use of social pol-
icy to service markets ("neoliberalism"). In this paper, I test the logic underlying this
market-based paradigm—that restricted access to cash benefits improves the well-being
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of low-income households by incentivizing labor market participation. Using quantita-
tive models of the relationship between household food insecurity and state cash assis-
tance coverage from 2001 to 2013, I find that the decline in the accessibility of traditional
welfare is associated with an increased risk of material hardship in low-income house-
holds with children, particularly those headed by a single female. I generally fail to find
evidence that changes in welfare coverage are associated with changes in the probability
of a household having an employed adult present, however. In concert, these findings call
into question the logic of welfare reform specifically and the blanket implementation of
market-based solutions to social problems generally.
Introduction
The American welfare state underwent a dramatic transformation in the mid-1990s.
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA,
popularly known as "welfare reform") ended Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), a cash entitlement to low-income families with children, and created Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). In contrast to AFDC, TANF benefits were in-
tended to be time-limited and tied to required work activities. Also unlike AFDC, TANF
was implemented as a block grant from the federal government to the states with a state
contribution requirement ("Maintenance of E↵ort"), giving subnational governments con-
siderable flexibility over program design (Falk, 2013; Weaver, 2000). Welfare reform was
a manifestation both of renewed federalism in policy design and the application of a ne-
oliberal governing philosophy in which state functions, in this case economic relief, were
tied to markets and, further, in which market participation was enforced (S. F. Schram,
Soss, Houser, & Fording, 2010). Reform followed on the heels of a large expansion of the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a refundable tax credit for low-income workers, espe-
cially those with children. Together, economic supports for poor families were no longer
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a safety net, but instead were tools to incentivize and reward labor market participation1.
Cash assistance caseloads fell precipitously followingwelfare reform (Bentele &Nicoli,
2012; Rodgers, 2006; Scholz, Mo tt, & Cowan, 2009). These declines, however, varied
widely by state (Bentele & Nicoli, 2012; Rodgers, 2006). I leverage di↵erences in within-
state changes over time to test two key assumptions of the neoliberal philosophy of social
welfare. First, that the availability of an alternative to labor market participation is a bar-
rier to material wellbeing and not a safety net. Second, that the increased availability of
a cash safety net is a deterrent to labor market attachment. I measure TANF access using
an indicator of coverage, the TANF-to-poverty ratio, defined as the number of families
receiving cash benefits as a proportion of all families in poverty in a state. I construct
a sample of low-income households with children across the United States from 2001 to
2013 using the Current Population Survey (CPS), a large, continually administered survey
intended to provide a representative sample of the non-institutionalized U.S. population
(Flood, King, Ruggles, & Warren, 2015). The two key outcome measures are household
material hardship as indicated by food insecurity and household labor market participa-
tion operationalized as the household having at least one employed adult. I model these
two outcomes using logistic regression models. Controls include household character-
istics, state unemployment rate to account for economic conditions, and state and year
indicator variables to control for time-invariant state characteristics and common shocks.
The analyses indicate that decreased access to cash benefits is associated with an in-
creased probability of low-income households experiencing hardship, particularly those
headed by a single female without other adults present. Restricting access to welfare
reduces the cash assistance caseload, but it does so to the detriment of the most disad-
vantaged families with children. Requiring labor market participation under any cir-
cumstances has increased, not eased, economic risk for the most vulnerable households.
1Commentators such as Piven and Cloward (1971) maintain that welfare serves a social control function
rather than purely a safety net function; economic relief is ancillary to tamping social unrest brought
on by economic distress. TANF can be seen as a re-direction of welfare from management of conflict to
management of labor market behavior (Soss et al., 2011).
102
I also generally fail to find a relationship between welfare coverage and household em-
ployment. In only one household configuration, households headed by a single female
with other adults present, is there evidence of a work participation disincentive, and even
then the relationship only appears using one of two ways of specifying welfare coverage.
In concert, these findings suggest that the logic underlying welfare reform—that market
participation is the only path to material wellbeing and that it must be enforced—is mis-
placed. While welfare reform may be the signature e↵ort of the neoliberal turn in policy,
enforced market participation and the use of policy to service markets rather than indi-
viduals underlies initiatives in fields as diverse as education, criminal justice, and health
care. Findings therefore have implications both for anti-poverty policy specifically and
for social policy more broadly. Market-based reforms have utility but are not a panacea,
and caution and nuance are warranted in their application.
Background
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Between 1935 and 1996 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and its pre-
decessor, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), provided traditional welfare in the form of
cash benefits to low-income households with children. Though authorized under the So-
cial Security Act of 1935, implementation of ADC/AFDC was largely a state matter—the
federal government simply matched state expenses at a pre-set rate. States and locali-
ties often used both formal policy and informal administrative mechanisms to exclude
certain types of households from welfare participation, particularly black single-mother
headed households (Lieberman, 1998; Ward, 2005). Legislative change and legal action
in the 1960s eventually removed these restrictions, creating an entitlement to cash bene-
fits for categorically eligible households (Katz, 1989; Weaver, 2000). AFDC, particularly
after expansion, was politically contentious. It was unpopular with groups of political
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elites and broad swaths of the mass public (Ellwood, 1988; Teles, 1996; Weaver, 2000).
Dissatisfaction with AFDC hinged on several factors, including notions of deserving-
ness (e.g., does an able-bodied adult deserve public support, even with children) (Steens-
land, 2006); concern over waste, fraud, and abuse in government (Guetzkow, 2010); con-
flation of racial politics and welfare politics (Gilens, 1999; Hancock, 2004; Soss et al.,
2011); and perceptions that welfare disincentivized work, sustained other social prob-
lems (e.g., nuclear family breakdown) (Ellwood, 1988; Teles, 1996), and created a cul-
ture of permissiveness that undermined self-su ciency and violated social norms (Mead,
1986). Several attempts were made to reform AFDC, including major initiatives by the
Nixon and Carter administrations, but were unable to garner broad enough support to
succeed (Noble, 1997; Weaver, 2000). The Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton ad-
ministrations o↵ered states the opportunity to experiment with changes to AFDC through
executive waivers, but comprehensive reform remained elusive (C. Harvey et al., 2000;
Teles, 1996).
A window for substantial change emerged in the 1990s with the election of a centrist
Democratic president, Bill Clinton, and subsequent takeover of Congress by Republicans
largely running on a platform of government reform. The bill that ultimately passed,
the Personal Responsibility andWork Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), ended
AFDC and created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Under TANF, cash ben-
efits are no longer an entitlement, being subject to work requirements and time limits.
TANF also returned a great deal of control over welfare policy to the states. Rather than
a federal match of state expenditures, TANF is structured as a block grant to the states
with a state "maintenance of e↵ort" (MOE) contribution. States are free to set their own
rules and requirements, such as length of time limit and severity of sanctions for rules
violations, within broad federal guidelines. Additionally, states do not have to use pro-
gram resources exclusively for cash assistance. Rather, resources can be used for any pur-
pose consistent with the four goals of PRWORA: ending dependence on public support
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through work and marriage, facilitating care of children in their own homes, reducing
out-of-wedlock births, and aiding the formation and maintenance of two-parent fami-
lies. States vary considerably both in rules for cash assistance beneficiaries and the uses
of state and federal funds (Falk, 2013, 2016; Huber, Cohen, Briggs, & Kassabian, 2015;
Schott et al., 2015).
By some metrics, welfare reform was a success. In particular, a chief aim of reform
was to reduce dependence on public economic supports. Cash assistance caseloads de-
clined dramatically in the decade following passage of PRWORA (Bentele & Nicoli, 2012;
S. K. Danziger, 2010; Scholz et al., 2009). A sharp increase in labor force participation
among low-income single mothers paralleled decreasing welfare participation (R. Blank,
2002; Rodgers, 2006). There are, however, confounding factors that make it di cult to
precisely identify the causal e↵ect of welfare reform on single-mother employment. The
roll-out of welfare reform in the late 1990s coincided with an economic boom featur-
ing nearly full employment and was immediately preceded by a large expansion of the
Earned Income Tax Credit. There was, and remains, much debate among analysts on the
respective influence of each of these forces on the observed changes in work (R. Blank,
2002). Explanations range from attributing labor market shifts primarily to TANF (Snarr,
2013), to the boom economy (Fang & Keane, 2004), and to the EITC (Grogger, 2003). All
agree, however, that the EITC, TANF, and the economy played at least some role, and
economic conditions and the policy changes of the 1990s also likely interacted—welfare
reform and the Earned Income Tax Credit incentivize work, but labor market partici-
pation is most pronounced when the economy is strong (Herbst, 2008; Noonan, Smith,
& Corcoran, 2007). Work inevitably pays more than welfare, and the transition from
cash assistance to fuller participation in the labor market was associated with a general
increase in household income and a reduction in child poverty (S. Danziger, Heflin, Cor-
coran, Oltmans, & Wang, 2002; Lichter & Crowley, 2004).
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Neoliberalism &Welfare Reform
Welfare reform is one of the more visible aspects of a turn toward neoliberal gover-
nance in the United States. Under neoliberalism, markets are considered fundamental to
a functioning society. Policy fields not traditionally associated with markets are replaced
by markets or re-organized around market-like principles of competition, and govern-
ment intervention creates and services markets (W. Brown, 2006; Davies, 2014; D. Har-
vey, 2007). As an intellectual movement, neoliberalism is an outgrowth of the work of
economists such as Friederich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Gary Becker, particu-
larly in the extension of microeconomic thinking to traditionally non-market subjects. As
a political movement, neoliberalismwas brought to the mainstream by politicians such as
Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, both
of whom emphasized de-regulation of markets (Davies, 2014). While there is no univer-
sally accepted definition of neoliberalism, Wacquant (2009) ascribes four characteristics:
deregulation of markets and the use of market logics as an organizing principle of society
(that is, market fundamentalism), erosion of the welfare state through retrenchment and
devolution, a focus on individual, rather than state or societal, responsibility for social
problems, and the extensive use of punitive tools to manage social disorder. The latter
element is perhaps most inconsistent with the otherwise laissez-faire components of ne-
oliberalism, and Soss et al. (2011) consider the merger of market fundamentalism and
punishment to be a new governing philosophy, neoliberal paternalism.
Regardless of the specific definitional boundary of neoliberalism, welfare reform em-
bodies its common elements. Rather than treating poverty as a social or even an economic
problem, the logic of welfare reform assumes individual behavior is the foundation of
poverty. The labor market is the ultimate and only legitimate source of economic sup-
port, but those in poverty lack the work ethic and soft skills (e.g., interpersonal commu-
nication, respect for hierarchy) needed to participate in the labor force. The availability
of an economic safety net exacerbates the problem by providing an alternative to work
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and leads to dependence on public economic support (Somers & Block, 2005). The so-
lution to poverty, then, is to limit economic protection and institute a corrective policy
approach for those who do receive benefits (Mead, 1986). Ridzi (2009) considers the shift
in discourse around welfare from one of social protection to one of enforced work, now
so dominant that it is considered common sense, the fruit of a decades-long process to
embed market-based thinking in economic relief. Wacquant (2009) and Soss et al. (2011)
also see welfare reform’s emphasis on employment as part of a larger societal shift, though
both also emphasize the more punitive aspects of reform and draw parallels to trends in
criminal justice policy.
The term "neoliberalism" has come under criticism as poorly defined and little more
than a pejorative used in opposition to market-oriented public policy (Boas & Gans-
Morse, 2009). The intention in the use of the term here is not to summarily dismiss
market-based approaches to public problems. The Earned Income Tax Credit, for in-
stance, has been found to be a very e↵ective anti-poverty policy in a number of respects
(Eamon, Wu, & Zhang, 2009; Hamad & Rehkopf, 2016; Shaefer, Song, & Shanks, 2013;
Simpson, Tiefenthaler, & Hyde, 2010)2. The term is used here simply to highlight that
markets and market-like institutions are increasingly accepted as the only valid means
of implementing social policy. In some contexts and for some problems such approaches
may be e↵ective, in other circumstances they may be less appropriate.
Caseload Reduction as Outcome
As welfare dependence is viewed as the problem in the logic of reform, caseload re-
duction, not poverty alleviation, is its o cial metric of success. It is facilitated by both
formal and informal policy elements. Formally, federal TANF policy imposes time limits
2Despite the generally positive evidence in favor of the EITC, it has limitations, including serving as a
work disincentive in certain earnings ranges, penalizing marriage, and not adequately o↵setting the cost of
working. Importantly for the argument forwarded in this paper, receipt and subsequent value of the EITC
are contingent on the ability of an individual to find and maintain adequate employment (Eamon et al.,
2009).
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and requires work activities for beneficiaries. States do have discretion, though, over
the strictness of these policies, providing an opportunity to examine their e↵ects on
caseloads. Stricter time limits are associated with a reduced probability of cash benefit
take-up (Teitler, Reichman, & Nepomnyaschy, 2007). There are at least two mechanisms
underlying this relationship—a direct, mechanical e↵ect as households are dropped from
the rolls after exceeding eligibility and an indirect banking e↵ect in which potential ben-
eficiaries choose not to participate or limit participation to maintain an economic fall-
back (Duncan, Harris, & Boisjoly, 2000; Grogger, 2002; Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Mazzo-
lari, 2007). Strictness of sanctions for violation of behavioral requirements also varies
by state, ranging from docking a portion of the adult benefit to complete elimination of
household benefits (Huber et al., 2015). Though a deterrent e↵ect might be expected as
the severity of sanctions increases, there does not appear to be a relationship between
sanctions strength and TANF take up (Teitler et al., 2007)3. There is, however, a relation-
ship between sanctions and welfare exit, so there may be a mechanical e↵ect on caseloads
as clients are dropped or voluntarily withdraw in response to sanction (Wu, Cancian, &
Wallace, 2014). States can even adopt alternative forms of benefits to reduce caseloads.
Upon application, the client may be o↵ered the opportunity to participate in a short-term
benefit program, which may consist of a one-time or briefly recurring cash benefit, direct
payments to third parties, services, or some combination thereof. Clients receiving diver-
sion benefits are not considered part of the TANF caseload, and such programs therefore
a↵ord an opportunity for a state to provide aid to low-income families while o cially
keeping caseloads low (Gonzales, Hudson, & Acker, 2007; Ridzi & London, 2006).
In addition to these formal policy tools, there are also informal mechanisms by which
caseloads are reduced. Administrative burden, the hassle associated with program ap-
plication and maintenance of eligibility (e.g., paperwork, required meetings, required
records), can deter participation or increase the chances a potential client fails to success-
3At the individual level being sanctioned is, however, associated with increases in material hardship
(Reichman, Teitler, & Curtis, 2005; Wu, 2008).
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fully complete all pre-enrollment requirements (Brodkin & Majmundar, 2010; Ridzi &
London, 2006). Caseworkers, as street-level bureaucrats, have considerable discretion in
the application process, in the use of sanctions, and in administration of diversion pay-
ments (Keiser, Mueser, & Choi, 2004; Lens, 2008; Ridzi & London, 2006; S. Schram, Soss,
Fording, & Houser, 2009; Soss et al., 2011). Whether a client enters or remains on the
cash assistance rolls, then, is dependent on the practices of the lowest-level administra-
tors. As with many other aspects of welfare, race appears to be central to bureaucratic
behavior with respect to clients and potential clients (Keiser et al., 2004; S. Schram et
al., 2009; Soss et al., 2011; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). Bureaucratic culture within TANF-
administering agencies might also influence the propensity of caseworkers to make de-
cisions that remove clients from the welfare rolls or prevent clients from enrolling. For
example, a cultural emphasis on rule compliance over self-su ciency may result in sanc-
tions for procedural violations, such as missed appointments, even when sanctions are
intended as a tool to compel work-related behavior (Lens, 2008).
While caseload reduction is accomplished through multiple means, many of which
vary across states, all states have incentives for reducing the cash benefit rolls. At risk of
penalizing a portion of the block grant, states must meet work requirements for a pro-
portion of the TANF caseload (50% of cash benefit-receiving families overall and 90% of
two-parent families). These targets can be lowered, however, through caseload reduction
credits—the more a state reduces its cash assistance caseload, the lower its work activity
target. Restricting the caseload, then, means that states not only have to provide benefits
to fewer families, but also have their own administrative burdens reduced (Falk, 2016).
States also have considerable flexibility over the use of TANF funds; a variety of alter-
native programs, including tax credits, childcare, and two-parent family formation and
pregnancy prevention initiatives, are justified under the umbrella of TANF (Hahn et al.,
2012; Schott et al., 2015). Particularly in an era of retrenchment and tenuous state bud-
gets, then, funds that must be spent to maintain compliance with federal requirements
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can be used to cover priorities other than basic cash assistance. States can even count
e↵ort by third party providers, such as non-profit agencies, as MOE following articula-
tion of new administrative rules in 2004 and 2005. As few as three states (2007) and
as many as twenty-four states (2010) have reported third-party spending as MOE since
2007, though the number has generally been sixteen or seventeen since 2012 (United
States Government Accountability O ce, 2016).
Caseload reduction is usually framed as a positive e↵ect of TANF, and the evidence
suggests that, for at least some households, it is—increased work leads to increased in-
come and correlated positive outcomes. Other evidence, however, brings pause to sweep-
ing declarations of success. The post-reform period has seen a marked rise in extreme
poverty—households with less than $2 per person per day in income (Edin & Shae-
fer, 2015). Similarly, homelessness, a di↵erent type of material hardship, among public
school students has increased during the same time frame (Ingram et al., 2016). While
not possible to attribute directly to the end of traditional welfare given current research,
the timing between the decline of cash assistance and the rise of deep economic adversity
is consistent. Additionally, many of the studies of positive TANF employment outcomes
were conducted during or shortly after the late-1990s economic boom, when jobs were
plentiful. Whether the TANF-work connection held during, for example, the "Great Re-
cession," is unclear, and it is possible that the low-wage labor market has a steadying
e↵ect on hardship primarily during economic high points. Finally, recent work by Herbst
(2017), exploiting state variation in employment exemptions based on child age, indi-
cates that more immediate work participation requirements may, while increasing em-
ployment, negatively a↵ect maternal and child well-being during the first years of life.
Research Questions & Hypotheses
The logic of welfare reform suggests that ready accessibility of cash benefits reduces
labor market participation and, in turn, exacerbates hardship. My organizing research
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questions test these assumptions. First, is benefits accessibility related hardship? If so,
what is the nature of the relationship (i.e., positive or negative)? Second, is benefits acces-
sibility related to employment? Again, if so, what is the nature of the relationship? Some
features of the contemporary low-wage labor market counter the assertion that it alone
is su cient for alleviating hardship, even among households with routinely employed
adults. Low-wage employment, particularly for less-skilled and less-educated workers,
may include inadequate or unpredictable hours, no or limited fringe benefits, few op-
portunities for advancement, and di cult working conditions (Lambert, 2008; Lambert,
Haley-Lock, & Henly, 2012; Newman, 2006). It may, then, not adequately or consistently
meet household economic needs even if a household is attached to the labor force. Cash
assistance could cushion against adversity brought on by these conditions. If so, ease of
benefits access should be inversely related to material hardship, particularly for the most
vulnerable households:
Hypothesis 1: As access to cash benefits decreases, the probability of a vulnerable household
experiencing material hardship will increase.
Conversely, if the neoliberal view is correct, households in states with higher benefits
coverage should be at greater risk for material hardship, as it would lead them to engage
in economically disadvantageous behaviors. A counter-hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 2: As access to cash benefits increases, the probability of a vulnerable household
experiencing material hardship will increase.
Both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are tested against a null hypothesis of no rela-
tionship between cash benefits access and material hardship. If a statistically significant
relationship between benefits coverage and hardship is found, the direction of the re-
lationship (positive or negative) distinguishes between the two propositions. The final
hypothesis considers the relationship between employment and ease of access to cash as-
sistance as posited by the neoliberal approach. Readily available cash benefits should
disincentivize work by providing an alternative means of support.
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Hypothesis 3: As access to cash benefits increases, the probability of a vulnerable household
being engaged with the labor force will decrease.
If Hypotheses 2 and 3 are sustained, it provides evidence in favor of the neoliberal ap-
proach to social welfare policy. Conversely, support for Hypothesis 1 and lack of evidence
for Hypotheses 2 and 3 challenge the neoliberal view.
Methods
Models
I test the hypotheses quantitatively using two sets of models including both household-
level and state-level characteristics. One set of models uses food insecurity, a measure of
hardship, as the dependent variable to evaluate Hypotheses 1 and 2. The second set uses
household employment as the outcome measure to examine Hypothesis 3. In both cases,
the dependent variable is binary, so I model the probability of a household having the
characteristic using logistic regression ("logit") models in the following form:
P(y
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Here, y is the binary indicator of the outcome of interest. The index i references
the individual household, j indexes the state, and t indexes the year. The probability of
the outcome, either food insecurity or employment, is a function of TANF coverage (u),
a vector of household controls X, and a vector of state-year controls S . I include state
(j) and year (t) indicator variables to account for between-group variation and common
shocks, while the error term ✏ represents the remaining unexplained variation. The logit
link ensures that predictions remain bounded by 0 and 1. Household controls include
household head race/ethnicity, age, and student status; highest educational attainment in
the household; number of children in the household; and whether the household includes
at least one individual age 65 or older. The food insecurity analysis further includes
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a variable indicating whether the household has at least one employed adult. The key
object of interpretation is the coe cient  , the marginal e↵ect of which represents, for
Hypotheses 1 and 2, the change in the probability of a household being food insecure
and, for Hypothesis 3, for having an employed adult present after controlling for other
relevant factors.
Household Sample & Data
My source of household-level data is the Current Population Survey, particularly the
annual Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS). The CPS is a monthly survey of approxi-
mately 60,000 households collected by the U.S. Census Bureau on behalf of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. It o↵ers a nationally representative, multistage, stratified sample of
the non-institutionalized U.S. population. Detailed labor market and demographic data
are collected on all respondents age 15 years and older. Since 1995, CPS has also fielded
an annual supplement to assess the incidence of food security, defined as a household
having stable access to an adequate quantity and quality of food (United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture Economic Research Service, 2015). Household food security status is
assigned based on the number of food insecure conditions experienced by a household,
such as being unable to a↵ord balanced meals or cutting the size of meals because of too
little money for food (Coleman-Jensen, Rabbitt, Gregory, & Singh, 2015).
I use the CPS data to construct the dependent variables and to identify categories
of households. For the food security analyses, I create a binary variable coded 0 if the
household scores in the food secure range and 1 if the household scores in the low or very
low food security range. Employment analyses use a variable coded 1 if any adult member
of the household is currently employed. I identified three categories of households for
sub-group analysis—households in which the head is married, households headed by an
unmarried female with other adults present, and households headed by an unmarried
female with no other adults present.
113
Data from the CPS-FSS and the concurrent monthly core CPS were extracted from the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), a dataset produced by the Minnesota
Population Center harmonizing CPS files from the survey’s entire history (Flood et al.,
2015). The full sample (n=67,404) consists of households with children below 185% of
poverty in which the household head is below 65 years of age. The 185% of poverty
threshold is used because the FSS includes an indicator measure at this level. Income
data in the month of CPS-FSS administration is otherwise limited4. I restricted the sam-
ple to the December 2001 to December 2013 CPS-FSS cohorts. Prior to December 2001,
the month of FSS administration was inconsistent, creating both an additional source of
variation and overlapping reference frames across years for questions regarding experi-
ences in the past 12 months. All estimates are weighted using FSS probability weights
and standard errors are clustered by state to account for complex survey design. Descrip-
tive statistics for the distribution of household types are shown in Table 4.1 and for other
household-level data in Table 4.2.
Table 4.1: Distribution of households with children by composition in Current Popula-
tion Survey-Food Security Supplement sample.
Household Type Proportion
Married household head, children 0.493
Unmarried female head, children, other adults 0.164
Unmarried female head, children, no other adults 0.247
All other households with children 0.096
n 67,404
Data source: Current Population Survey-Food Security Supplement, 2001-2013.
Sample restricted to households with children below 185% of poverty with household head below age 65.
4Income data for the CPS-FSS sample is reported categorically, making for di cult comparisons across
time. Continuous income data is collected in the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), but
only a fraction of respondents participate in both CPS-FSS and ASEC.
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Table 4.2: Household-level descriptive statistics, Current Population Survey-Food Secu-
rity Supplement sample.
All households Married Unmarried female, Unmarried female,
with children other adults no other adults
Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion
Food insecure 0.346 0.287 0.395 0.434
Household composition
1 Child 0.343 0.263 0.431 0.396
2 Children 0.352 0.376 0.318 0.339
3+ Children 0.305 0.361 0.251 0.266
1+ Seniors (65+) 0.055 0.055 0.114 0.015
1+ Employed adults 0.813 0.915 0.814 0.611
Race (Household head)
White non-Hispanic 0.447 0.487 0.390 0.397
Black non-Hispanic 0.203 0.103 0.267 0.366
Hispanic 0.292 0.339 0.289 0.198
Other 0.059 0.071 0.053 0.039
Highest level of education
Less than high school 0.160 0.140 0.128 0.220
High school 0.360 0.336 0.382 0.369
Some college/2 year degree 0.352 0.347 0.399 0.342
Bachelor’s+ 0.127 0.177 0.091 0.069
Student
Household head is student 0.027 0.010 0.043 0.037
Age Mean(sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd)
Household head age 37.685 (0.051) 38.653 (0.066) 40.049 (0.154) 34.860 (0.091)
Data source: Current Population Survey-Food Security Supplement, 2001-2013.
Sample restricted to households with children below 185% of poverty with household head below age 65.
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State Variables
I merge the household-level data with state-level data, as the hypotheses are propo-
sitions about the relationship between state and household characteristics. The key in-
dependent variable is TANF coverage as represented by the TANF-to-poverty ratio, the
count of state-year cash benefit receiving families divided by the total number of families
with children below the poverty threshold. The count of welfare cases is drawn from state
administrative data, while the number of families with children below poverty is calcu-
lated from Current Population Survey data by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
(2015). To compensate for possible reliability issues, poverty in the varying denominator
TANF-to-poverty ratio is a rolling average of the estimated count of families in poverty
in state j for years t and t   1 (that is, 2005 values are an average of 2004 and 2005 data).
While the varying denominator TANF-to-poverty ratio reflects changes in both the sup-
ply of and potential demand for cash assistance, it cannot discriminate between trends
driven by changes in family poverty from trends driven by changes in the count of TANF
cases. I therefore create a second version of the TANF-to-poverty variable with a fixed
denominator calculated as the average count of families in poverty over the study period.
This version is used to check the validity of the models (i.e., to demonstrate they are pri-
marily reflecting changes in the count of TANF-receiving families rather than unrelated
fluctuations in family poverty). Unemployment rate is also included at the state level to
control for varying economic conditions specific to the state-year. Descriptive statistics
for the state variables are show in Table 4.3.
Results
Food Insecurity
Full model results are shown in Table 4.4. The coe cients in a non-linear model are
not easily directly interpreted, so I also present the key TANF coverage results as marginal
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Table 4.3: State-level independent variable descriptive statistics.
Mean SD













e↵ects. In Figure 4.1, the symbols represent the point estimates of the mean marginal
e↵ects (that is, within the data, the mean e↵ect of a one-unit change in the predictor on
the probability of the outcome) of the TANF coverage measure on the probability of a
household experiencing food insecurity within the given subgroup. The bars indicate
the 95% confidence intervals. The relationship is statistically significant at ↵ = 0.05 if the
relevant confidence interval does not cross the zero line. Figure 4.2 presents the predicted
e↵ects of TANF coverage at a range of values (zero coverage up to 70% coverage) on food
insecurity. For this analysis, the household head is set at 26 years of age, black, and not
a student. The household is set to two children, highest level of education to high school
graduate, no seniors present, and no employed adults.
The mean marginal e↵ects indicate that, on average, a ten percentage point increase
in TANF coverage is associated with an 0.01 reduction in the probability of a low-income
household of any configuration experiencing food insecurity. The relationship is approx-
imately similar for married households. There is no evidence that households headed
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by an unmarried female but with other adults present are a↵ected by the rate of TANF
coverage. The relationship between coverage and the probability of hardship is strongest,
however, for households headed by a single female with no other adults present. For these
households, the e↵ect of a change in TANF coverage is approximately twice as strong as
that for households generally—the same ten percentage point change in coverage is as-
sociated with a 0.02 reduction in the probability of experiencing hardship. These results
generally provide support for Hypothesis 1, that a decrease in coverage is associated with
an increased risk of food insecurity, and fail to support Hypothesis 2, which posited the
opposite. While the magnitude of the e↵ects may appear practically small, this analysis
does not examine the participation of individual households in cash assistance, but rather
the e↵ect of changes in the availability of cash assistance. It is also possible that the ef-
fects are concentrated in certain subtypes of households (e.g., in extremely low-income
























Unmarried female, other adults Unmarried female, no other adults
Subgroup
Mean Marginal Effect of TANF Coverage on Food Insecurity
Figure 4.1: Mean marginal e↵ects of TANF coverage on household food insecurity (sym-
bols represent point estimates, bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
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Table 4.4: Food insecurity logit model results (varying denominator TANF coverage).
All Married Unmarried, Unmarried,
other adults single
Household head characteristics
Age 0.040*** 0.011 0.085*** 0.072***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
Age2 -0.0005*** -0.0002* -0.0009*** -0.0007***
(0.00005) (0.00001) (0.00009) (0.00017)
Black non-Hispanic 0.275*** 0.316*** 0.118 0.033
(0.038) (0.057) (0.076) (0.048)
Hispanic 0.062* 0.157*** 0.028 -0.044
(0.038) (0.042) (0.063) (0.067)
Other non-white -0.031 0.053 -0.175 -0.050
(0.071) (0.078) (0.130) (0.124)
Student -0.043 -0.278** 0.081 0.030
(0.072) (0.134) (0.137) (0.109)
Highest education
High school -0.204*** -0.236*** -0.137* -0.196***
(0.024) (0.039) (0.079) (0.059)
Some college/2 yr degree -0.227*** -0.280*** -0.180* -0.126**
(0.028) (0.034) (0.097) (0.055)
Bachelor’s+ -0.712*** -0.713*** -0.537*** -0.587***
(0.047) (0.060) (0.082) (0.109)
Household composition
Two children -0.054* -0.060 0.046 0.093**
(0.028) (0.058) (0.063) (0.038)
3+ children 0.041* 0.118** 0.133*** 0.092**
(0.025) (0.047) (0.038) (0.042)
1+ seniors -0.200*** -0.145** -0.224*** -0.100
(0.045) (0.070) (0.081) (0.263)
1+ employed adults -0.617*** -0.731*** -0.511*** -0.336***
(0.041) (0.060) (0.066) (0.047)
State characteristics
TANF coverage -0.504*** -0.572** 0.009 -0.956***
(0.178) (0.287) (0.370) (0.296)
Unemployment 4.327*** 4.130** 5.873** 2.475
(1.341) (1.743) (2.882) (2.724)
n 67,404 34,330 10,653 16,157
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.044 0.047 0.037
Dependent variable is probability of household food insecurity.
Estimated using Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement, 2001-2013.
Sample restricted to households with children below 185% poverty.
Values are raw logit coe cients. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
State and year e↵ects estimated but not reported.
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TANF Coverage
Unmarried, no other adults
Predictions for two children, 26 year old black household head, high school graduate, no seniors,
not a student, no employed adult. All else held at mean.
Predicted Food Insecurity
Figure 4.2: Predicted probability of food insecurity as function of TANF coverage.
Employment
Across the food insecurity models, one of the strongest household predictors of hard-
ship is employment—households with at least one employed adult present are at consid-
erably lower risk for food insecurity than comparable households without an employed
adult. This finding highlights the importance of considering whether TANF coverage is
related to work. The complete household employment model results are presented in
Table 4.5. Mean marginal e↵ects are shown in Figure 4.3. TANF coverage is not a statis-
tically significant predictor of the probability of a household having an employed adult
present for any household configuration. The results fail to provide support for Hypoth-
esis 3, that increased accessibility of traditional cash benefits reduces the probability of a
household being attached to the labor market.
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Table 4.5: Employment logit model results (varying denominator coverage).
All Married Unmarried, Unmarried,
other adults single
Household head charactericstics
Age 0.051*** 0.046*** -0.040*** 0.137***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
Age2 -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0003* -0.0020***
(0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Black non-Hispanic -0.663*** -0.347*** -0.525*** -0.178**
(0.053) (0.075) (0.105) (0.074)
Hispanic 0.521*** 0.465*** 0.253 0.183
(0.156) (0.100) (0.156) (0.115)
Other non-white 0.020 0.060 -0.120 -0.215*
(0.105) (0.171) (0.127) (0.123)
Student -0.314*** -0.544** 0.015 -0.214**
(0.077) (0.256) (0.208) (0.103)
Highest education
High school 0.778*** 0.532*** 0.631*** 0.603***
(0.038) (0.072) (0.079) (0.065)
Some college/2 yr degree 1.085*** 0.795*** 1.019*** 0.851***
(0.047) (0.057) (0.086) (0.075)
Bachelor’s+ 1.664*** 1.230*** 1.377*** 1.235***
(0.065) (0.101) (0.114) (0.087)
Household composition
1+ seniors -0.014 -0.329*** -0.484*** 0.012
(0.101) (0.115) (0.153) (0.311)
Two children 0.296*** 0.338*** 0.221*** 0.002
(0.034) (0.070) (0.075) (0.045)
3+ children 0.244*** 0.264*** 0.148* -0.295***
(0.035) (0.058) (0.085) (0.056)
State characteristics
TANF coverage 0.342 -0.021 -0.235 0.320
(0.215) (0.370) (0.416) (0.414)
Unemployment -1.393 -6.441 -8.049*** 0.093
(1.416) (4.267) (2.332) (2.133)
n 67,404 34,330 10,653 16,157
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.072 0.065 0.061
Dependent variable is probability of employed adult in household.
Estimated using Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement, 2001-2013.
Sample restricted to households with children below 185% poverty.
Values are raw logit coe cients. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
State and year e↵ects estimated but not reported.























Unmarried female, other adults Unmarried female, no other adults
Subgroup
Mean Marginal Effect of TANF Coverage on Household Employment
Figure 4.3: Mean marginal e↵ects of TANF coverage on probability at least one employed
adult in household (symbols represent point estimates, bars represent 95%
confidence intervals).
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Exogeneity of TANF coverage
The analyses reflect a causal argument, that as TANF coverage declines the risk of
hardship for a low-income household increases (and, conversely, that an increase in TANF
coverage reduces the risk of hardship). The models include state fixed e↵ects (which
should remove the confounding influence of any unobserved, time-invariant state-level
factors) and year fixed e↵ects (which should address within-year common shocks)5. The
model is causally identified if—and only if—the condition of strict exogeneity is met.
There cannot be a third, unobserved factor that simultaneously increases the probability
of a household experiencing food insecurity and lowers TANF caseloads.
Intuitively, the strict exogeneity condition appears to be met. There are reasonable
scenarios in which an unobserved third factor increases hardship while increasing cash
assistance caseloads, such as an economic downturn or natural disaster. These conditions,
however, produce a relationship precisely opposite that found in the analyses. Any endo-
geneity arising from these conditions would likely reduce, not increase, the magnitude of
any observed e↵ects. Further, if there were some third, unobserved factor both increas-
ing the risk of food insecurity in low-income households and decreasing caseloads, then
TANF coverage should also be predictive of changes in food insecurity for households
meeting the income criteria but una↵ected by TANF cash benefits policy. Re-estimating
the food insecurity and employment models in a subsample drawn from the same CPS-
FSS samples but now only including households without children (household head still
restricted to under age 65 and income to less than 185% of poverty) provides no evidence
of a relationship between TANF coverage and either food insecurity or employment. The
evidence, then, tends to support the exogeneity of TANF coverage.
5The model is not a true "fixed e↵ects model" as is typically described in the context of panel data, as the
indicators control for group membership rather than within-individual variation (the CPS sample changes
continually). Nonetheless, such analyses are quite common, and there is little reason to believe the CPS
sample would change in a systematic way over time that, in turn, biases estimation.
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Validity Check
The key independent variable in this study, TANF coverage, has two components
(TANF cases and families in poverty) that vary longitudinally. The empirical models
therefore inherently contain a threat to validity, as they could be influenced by changes
in either value. As noted previously, I generated a second version of the TANF coverage
variable in which the denominator is the averaged count of families in poverty from 2001
to 2013. This version holds families in poverty constant, so only the number of TANF
cases changes across time. If the analyses presented previously are primarily a product
of changes in family poverty rather than changes in TANF coverage, using the fixed de-
nominator version of the variable should produce quite di↵erent results. Mean marginal
e↵ects for the food insecurity analysis, but this time using the fixed-denominator cover-
age measure, are presented in Figure 4.4. Parallel results for household employment are
shown in Figure 4.5.
Patterns of sign and significance are, in all but one case, identical to those in the coun-
terpart varying-denominator analyses. TANF coverage is significantly and negatively re-
lated to the probability of food insecurity for pooled households, married households,
and households headed by a single female with no other adults present (by magnitude,
once again the strongest relationship). No statistically significant relationship was found
to households headed by a single female with other adults present. Again paralleling
the varying-denominator results, no evidence of a relationship was found between TANF
coverage and employment in the pooled low-income households subsample, in house-
holds in which the head is married, and in households headed by an unmarried female
with no other adults present. Households headed by an unmarried female with other
adults present o↵ers the only result producing a di↵erent conclusion than the varying-
denominator analysis. Here, increases in TANF coverage are associated with a statistically
significant decrease in the probability of a household having an employed adult present.
This subgroup is, however, also the least a↵ected by changes to TANF coverage with re-
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spect to food insecurity, so there could be some unobserved aspect of these households
producing idiosyncratic results. The parallel findings for the other households are en-

















Unmarried female, other adults Unmarried female, no other adults
Subgroup
Mean Marginal Effect of TANF Coverage (Fixed Denominator) on Food Insecurity
Figure 4.4: Mean marginal e↵ect of TANF coverage (fixed denominator) on household
food insecurity (symbols represent point estimates, bars represent 95% confi-
dence intervals).
Discussion
The analyses provide support for Hypothesis 1, that less restrictive access to bene-
fits is associated with a reduced risk of hardship, and generally fail to provide support
for Hypothesis 2 and 3, that increased access to benefits is associated with an increased
risk of hardship and reduced probability of household employment, respectively. In con-
cert, these findings challenge the neoliberal view of poverty relief. Benefits access neither






















Unmarried female, other adults Unmarried female, no other adults
Subgroup
Mean Marginal Effect of TANF Coverage (Fixed Denominator)
on Household Employment
Figure 4.5: Mean marginal e↵ects of TANF coverage (fixed denominator) on probability
at least one employed adult in household (symbols represent point estimates,
bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
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erage is, however, associated with a lower risk of material hardship, indicating that tra-
ditional welfare can serve a safety net function. Welfare reform has, with respect to low-
income Americans, been generally successful in reducing dependence, but it has done so
by exposing vulnerable households to economic risk. Findings have implications for both
TANF specifically and the movement toward market-oriented social policy generally.
TANF Implications
The first implication with respect to TANF itself concerns the role of the low-wage
labor market in economic relief. The logic of reform suggests that work—any work—will
provide opportunities for disadvantaged families to advance economically, while receipt
of government support will hold them back. Market participation is superior to eco-
nomic relief, both morally and for improving wellbeing. The study’s findings challenge
the assumption of the ability of the labor market to su ciently meet economic needs.
It is true that work is superior to welfare in securing material wellbeing, and my own
household-level controls support this proposition. Households with an employed adult
have a significantly lower probability of experiencing food insecurity. In other research,
women who are able to secure stable employment after leaving welfare have increased
household income and a reduced chance of experiencing material hardship (S. Danziger,
Corcoran, Danziger, & Heflin, 2000). Adequate work hours and stable employment, even
in the low-wage labor market, are also associated with reduced maternal depression and
more positive parenting styles (Jackson, Bentler, & Franke, 2008).
Findings suggest, though, that tying poverty relief to work exposes vulnerable fami-
lies to risk. If market forces, accompanied by the imperative to participate in the labor
market, were su cient to alleviate hardship in the absence of a safety net, access to ben-
efits should not be related to material wellbeing. Wages should simply substitute for
benefits. I observe, however, a di↵erent pattern—as access to benefits decreases, hard-
ship increases. The relationship between access and hardship is particularly strong for
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single-mother headed families without other adults, the ostensible target of welfare and
the population reform was intended to a↵ect. Despite its success in reducing caseloads,
then, TANF has failed to provide an adequate financial backstop for particularly vulner-
able households.
Neoliberalism marketizes public policy, and in the case of reform ties poverty allevia-
tion to the low-wage labormarket. For amarket to operate e↵ectively, supply and demand
must work in concert. For potential workers, jobs are a good to be obtained; the market
fails if either the good is not actually demanded or if the supply of the good is inadequate
to meet demand. Reform began with the premise that the problem lies on the demand
side—individuals simply do not wish to work. Ethnographic and other qualitative stud-
ies, however, have found that adults in low-income families value work and participate
in the labor market to the degree they are able (Edin & Lein, 1997). This orientation
toward work continues to the present day, with the extremely poor interviewed by Edin
and Shaefer (2015) identifying themselves as part of the labor force. The punitive and
corrective orientation of reform may, then, be misplaced. Training in both vocational and
soft skills may benefit some, and perhaps even many, adults in low-income households,
but there is limited evidence that poverty is a failure of the work ethic that must, at risk
of punishment, be corrected. If adequate jobs for low-skilled workers are a product of the
market, the problem does not lie on the demand side—even disadvantaged individuals
have a strong desire to work. It may, instead, be on the supply side.
Clients that successfully exit TANF are inevitably funneled into low-wage employ-
ment (Collins & Mayer, 2010; Corcoran, Danziger, Kalil, & Seefeldt, 2000), at least in a
good economy when opportunities are available. Potential for advancement is limited in
many of these jobs, and they often lack benefits such as health insurance (Appelbaum &
Schmitt, 2009; Newman, 2006). Insecurity is also a hallmark of the contemporary low-
wage labor market; in addition to low wages, hours may be inadequate or inconsistent
and the term of employment may only be temporary (Alexander & Haley-Lock, 2015;
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Appelbaum & Schmitt, 2009; Lambert, 2008; Lambert et al., 2012). One may be attached
to the labor force yet unable to secure su cient employment. Simply requiring work
does not guarantee adequate economic resources, but the restriction of cash benefits pro-
vides no viable alternative to participation in the low-wage labor market. It is therefore
particularly notable that TANF coverage is not generally related to employment in the
analyses. Households are attracted to employment even in the presence of a more-robust
safety net.
Finally, findings suggest that caseload reduction is an inappropriate outcome measure
for determining the success or failure of safety net programs. By the caseload reduction
criterion, TANF is clearly a success. If caseload decline induces hardships such as food
insecurity, however, it may exacerbate rather than alleviate the challenges faced by the
most vulnerable households. Food insecure households are at risk for di culties such
as poor health and mental health outcomes, developmental risks in children, and child
welfare involvement (Lombe, Nebbitt, Sinha, & Reynolds, 2016; Rose-Jacobs et al., 2008;
Whitaker, Phillips, & Orzol, 2006; Yang, 2014). Caseload reduction as a policy objective
does not take into account these potential side e↵ects. Even if only a small number of
households are put at risk by caseload reduction, it merely amplifies the challenges ex-
perienced by those in the most di cult economic circumstances. Income poverty among
families with children or food security itself may be more appropriate metrics of success.
Federal policy could incentivize these outcomes in the states by changing the triggers for
block grant penalties and credits. Employment could still be an intermediate goal, and it
is reasonable to posit that reductions in income poverty and hardship would also reduce
demand for benefits and thus caseloads. Only adequate and stable employment, however,
would lead to meaningful changes in these alternative indicators. As it currently exists,
federal TANF policy provides states with no incentive to meet this objective.
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Macro Implications
While welfare is merely one policy field, welfare reform represents a much larger
movement in public policy. Risk is increasingly borne by the individual and public func-
tions marketized. In the case of welfare, the emphasis on work participation (and the
parallel rise of the EITC) ensures a ready pool of laborers who must work regardless of
conditions. Other elements of the safety net have become market-oriented in other ways,
such as the movement away from defined benefit pensions to tax-advantaged individual
investment accounts in retirement planning (Cobb, 2015; Poterba et al., 2007). Related
patterns can be seen in the liberalization not only of the social safety net, but other policy
fields. It is evident in education, for example, through the charter school movement and
emphasis on high-stakes testing in public schools (Hursh, 2007). In the realm of criminal
justice, an entire private industry devoted to the construction, maintenance, operation,
and management of prisons has arisen as governments have increasingly sought to con-
tract out these tasks (Price & Schwester, 2010; Selman & Leighton, 2010). In health care,
the A↵ordable Care Act requires many categories of individuals to participate in a market
and provides subsidies for that participation.
This study challenges the blanket assumption that markets and market-like institu-
tions are superior to other policy approaches, and that the purpose of public policy is
simply to establish and service markets. Other institutional forms may be appropriate
for some policy fields. Markets inevitably produce winners and losers, and inequality is
one of their defining features. In a market for a particular good, the most e cient price
is still higher than that preferred by some portion of consumers. In practice, markets
may also feature information asymmetries that provide advantages to some participants
over others. Further, some individuals may be better equipped to succeed in the given
market. In the case of TANF, work is preferable to benefit receipt, but not all individuals
are equally able to succeed in the low-wage labor market. Among those able to partic-
ipate, other concerns (e.g., child care, transportation) impose costs on some individuals
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but not others. Some individuals may be more skilled, and therefore able to advance and
exit the low-wage market, while others may either remain in or routinely fall back into
low-wage work (C. Campbell, 2012). The presence of barriers means some participants
are better able to compete in the market, and therefore are protected against hardship,
than others. Non-market alternatives may better meet the needs of such individuals and
families during challenging economic periods.
There have been recent proposals to model other welfare state programs, such as the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and Medicaid, on TANF, devolving control
to the states and implementing more stringent work requirements. Market-based reforms
have also been suggested for social insurance programs such as Medicare (through pri-
vatization and/or movement to a voucher-based system) and Social Security (through
conversion to investment accounts). Examination of TANF indicates that careful consid-
eration should be given to, first, whether the desired policy outcome can be e↵ectively
met by markets and, second, what groups among the target population are least able to
compete in the created market. For example, seniors with the greatest health needs could
be disadvantaged under a marketizedMedicare; the retirement security of less financially
sophisticated consumers might become unstable under a privatized system of Social Se-
curity. TANF-like reforms also provide states with particular sets of incentives, so the
behavior of government and its relationship to social protection must be considered. In
the case of TANF, its structure leads subnational governments to reduce caseloads and
use funds for purposes other than economic relief. It is now less adequate as a safety net.
Modeling SNAP on TANF could have parallel e↵ects.
Finally, the findings presented here suggest that a return to a more robust safety net
has desirable features. A leading rationale for welfare reform was that welfare served as
a poverty trap. Since work pays more than cash assistance, receiving welfare prevented
households from economically advancing. In essence, it increased, not decreased, the
probability of hardship (Ellwood, 1988). The analyses suggest a safety net and employ-
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ment can exist in concert without the need for punitive and restrictive policy approaches.
It would be disingenuous to suggest there are no labor disincentive e↵ects in the provision
of welfare (R. A. Mo tt, 2002), however, and these findings may apply only to TANF in
its current form. It is also possible that benefits coverage has other employment-related
e↵ects, such as reducing the number of hours a potential beneficiary engages in work or
allowing eligible households to be more selective about factors such as job location or
quality. If social and economic well-being are the desired outcomes of welfare policy,
however, potential side e↵ects must be balanced against the current state of the low-wage
job market and its attendant challenges. Present policy has failed to achieve an equilib-
rium between labor market incentives and protection from material harm for the most
vulnerable households.
Conclusion
The 1996 welfare reform law is often hailed as a success, and has been suggested as the
model for other changes to the American welfare state. It required labor market partici-
pation under any circumstances by limiting access to benefits and implemented punitive
policy tools to enforce it. Welfare reform is the signature element of a broader neoliberal
turn in U.S. governance, and market logics have been applied to policy fields as diverse
as education and criminal justice. State functions are increasingly provided by markets
or market-like institutions, and the purpose of the state is to service these markets. Wel-
fare reform provides an opportunity to empirically test neoliberal assumptions. Using
a set of quantitative models, I examine the relationship between hardship as indicated
by food insecurity in low-income households with children and state-level cash benefits
coverage from 2001 to 2013. I find that an increase in cash benefits coverage is associated
with reduced, not greater, material hardship, particularly for female-headed households
with no other adults present. Further, I also do not find a consistent relationship between
household employment and cash benefits coverage. Both of these findings challenge the
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assumptions of neoliberalism as applied to welfare policy.
Findings from these analyses have implications both for TANF and for social policy
more broadly. Specific to TANF, the low-wage labor market alone appears insu cient
for alleviating household hardship, and reducing the availability of an economic fall-
back has induced harm. Conversely, making benefits more accessible bears no or little
relationship to household engagement with employment. Together, these findings sug-
gest caseload reduction alone is an inappropriate target for welfare policy. More broadly,
since this assessment of TANF undermines key assumptions of neoliberalism, it calls into
question the broader movement toward market-oriented social policy. Programs for eco-
nomically disadvantaged populations, such as SNAP and Medicaid, are the most obvious
parallels, but proposed reforms to social insurance programs, as well as actual initiatives
in fields such as education, assume markets and market-like institutions produce supe-
rior outcomes to other institutional forms. These assumptions may not hold, and indeed
may further disadvantage those least able to compete in such markets. As demonstrated
by the success of the Earned Income Tax Credit with respect to returns from low-wage
work, market-based policies are desirable solutions to some social and economic prob-
lems. They are not universally applicable, however, and the blanket movement toward





This dissertation presented three papers on state implementation of Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families, the program typically referred to as "welfare" in the United
States. In the more than twenty years since the passage of welfare reform, the program
has changed immensely. It is typically viewed as a cash assistance program for low in-
come families di↵ering from its predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
in not featuring a categorical entitlement to benefits1. TANF includes time limits, work
and other behavioral requirements, and allowed states to sanction clients in violation of
those rules by docking or even permanently discontinuing benefits. Considering TANF as
only a cash assistance program, this description is correct. Cash assistance, however, now
accounts for approximately one quarter of all spending justified under TANF. Includ-
ing work supports, child care, and similar social services in addition to basic assistance
still includes only half of overall TANF expenditures. TANF is not, in reality, a cash as-
sistance program with time limits and behavioral requirements. Rather, it is a funding
stream states partially use for cash assistance and supports for cash assistance beneficia-
1AFDC and its own forerunner, Aid to Dependent Children, were also not initially entitlements. As
discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, AFDC took on entitlement status in the the late 1960s and early
1970s. State and local policies and administrative practices had, prior to that point, been quite discrimi-
natory and used to restrict participation by racial and ethnic minority families (Lieberman, 1998; Noble,
1997; Weaver, 2000).
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ries (Falk, 2013). The distinction is important, and treating TANF as a funding stream
has implications for research, for social work, and for social policy.
The dissertation papers considered three distinct but related aspects of TANF’s cur-
rent form. Chapters 2 and 3 examined state uses of TANF resources. Chapter 2 addressed
the puzzle of cash assistance within TANF-as-funding-stream. All states have incentives,
such as caseload reduction credits reducing work participation requirements and admin-
istrative burden, to de-emphasize cash assistance. Cross-sectionally, though, there is wide
state variation in the percentage of TANF funds devoted to basic assistance. Longitudi-
nally, states also vary in their degree of decline in cash assistance since welfare reform.
Chapter 2 used a set of growth curvemodels, a type ofmulti-level or hierarchical model in
which state-year observations are nested in states and time is treated continuously (Rau-
denbush & Bryk, 2002), to examine basic assistance expenditures and change in basic
assistance expenditures from 1998 to 2013. States also devote their remaining funds to a
wide variety of purposes, and Chapter 3 examined patterns in categorical TANF spending
from 2000 to 2013. Two analytic methods were used. For categories of spending in which
almost all states expended resources in almost all years, I estimated mulitilevel linear
models nesting state-year observations in states; common shocks were controlled for us-
ing year indicator variables. This procedure is not appropriate for categories of spending,
such as tax credits, with many observations of zero. For these categories, I estimated a
series of cross-sectional logit models of the probability of a state expending resources in
the category.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 paid particular attention to the role of race in the politics
of welfare policy implementation. There is a long-standing connection between race-
oriented politics and welfare in the United States, stretching from exclusionary rules and
practices in Progressive-era state mother’s pension programs (Ward, 2005) to state deci-
sions over cash assistance rules and requirements under TANF (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004;
Soss et al., 2011, 2001). I measured the salience of race to state welfare politics in Chapter
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2 and Chapter 3 di↵erently from most previous studies, however. Typically, quantitative
inquiries into state welfare policy design use the racial and ethnic demographics of ei-
ther the state population or the cash assistance caseload to operationalize the salience of
race. If the policy image associated with welfare is inherently racialized—that is, if the
presumed target population of cash assistance is assumed by observers to be from a racial
or ethnic minority group—then majority group racial attitudes are also relevant (Gilens,
1999; Hancock, 2004). Johnson (2001) demonstrated that both demographics and white
racial attitudes are relevant using data on AFDC benefits, accounting for the relationship
between demographics and attitudes using a structural equation model. I generate a vari-
able measuring the prevalence of extremely negative stereotyping of blacks by whites at
the state level using multi-level regression with post-stratification (Gelman & Hill, 2007;
Kastellec et al., 2010; Lax & Phillips, 2009b) and the 2008 National Annenberg Election
Survey dataset (Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2010). I include the proportion of the
state population identifying as black in the predictive model; as such, Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 update the general approach of Johnson (2001), applying it to TANF and using
di↵erent techniques.
Chapter 4 considered the implications of TANF’s changes over time for low-income
families. Since welfare reform, and as a product of the phenomena examined in the
policymaking chapters, state cash assistance caseloads have decline dramatically, if un-
evenly (Bentele & Nicoli, 2012). Conversely, employment among single mothers in-
creased (R. Blank, 2002; S. K. Danziger, 2010; Rodgers, 2006). An assumption underlying
welfare reform was that the ready accessibility of cash welfare induced disadvantageous
behaviors in economically vulnerable families, limiting work and economic advancement
and, in turn, exacerbating rather than truly relieving hardship. I test these assumptions,
closely related to the concept of neoliberalism, the application of market principles to
public functions, using models evaluating the relationship between state-year TANF cov-
erage (the ratio of cash benefits cases to families in poverty) and the experiences of eco-
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nomically vulnerable households. One model set relates TANF coverage to the probabil-
ity of a household experiencing food insecurity, a form of material hardship. The second
set of models considers the association between TANF coverage and the probability of a
household having an employed adult present.
In concert, the three empirical papers address some of the key processes underlying
TANF when treated as a funding stream and the consequences for economically vulnera-
ble families in the United States. In doing so, the dissertation makes scholarly contribu-
tions to social science (political science, sociology, and applied economics). It advances
understanding of the role of race in American state politics and policymaking, the impli-
cations of federalism for cash assistance, predictors of material well-being of low-income
households, and the work incentives of contemporary redistributive policy. From an ap-
plied perspective, the studies aid in the evaluation of TANF and, in turn, o↵er lessons
for the reform of other social welfare programs. Finally, these studies have implications
for social work. Most obviously, they serve as a needs assessment for policy practice.
They also, however, identify an important and under-addressed ethical issue produced
by TANF’s structure, as social service programs may be in direct competition with mon-
etary support for clients under the program’s mantle. This concluding chapter of the
dissertation, after briefly reviewing and unifying the findings from the three empirical
studies, considers each of these issues in turn.
Summary of Findings
Core Findings
The major finding of the policymaking chapters, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, is that race
still matters to welfare policy even when treating TANF as a funding stream rather than
purely a cash assistance program. In both papers, prevalence of negative racial views
among whites is inversely related to basic assistance spending—when negative stereo-
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types of blacks are fairly common among whites, the state devotes fewer resources to
traditional cash assistance. These results are consistent with previous theory and em-
pirical research, including social constructionist and related approaches that suggest the
image of the perceived target population of a policy is related to the policy solutions
applied to that population (Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider & Sidney, 2009). The
result is also consistent with Soss et al.’s (2011) Racial Classification Model. Chapter 2
also provides suggestive evidence of an interaction between government political ideol-
ogy and the salience of race, with racial salience acting as a constraint on the expected
influence of government liberalism on basic assistance spending. Previous state welfare
scholarship has treated partisan or ideological characteristics of government and racial
salience separately, but Chapter 2 indicates they could operate together in interesting
and important ways. The evidence is fairly weak, however, and should be taken as a call
for additional investigation only.
Interestingly, the rate of change over time in welfare policy was not found to be related
to racial salience in Chapter 2. As discussed in that chapter, the strongest explanation
for state decline in cash assistance is simply time itself. This is not to imply, however,
that race does not matter over time. It matters in two ways, one of which is implied in
Chapter 2 and one of which is likely based on other existing studies. First, the white racial
attitudes variable in Chapter 2 is explaining a portion of the state-specific intercept. In
a growth curve model, a time-invariant variable describes contributions to the starting
point (here, 1998) (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). All state behavior with respect to cash
assistance spending follows from that point, so it is to a degree path dependent (that is, a
regression in any given year will generally show a relationship between the white racial
a↵ect variable and basic assistance expenditures). Second, there could be some additional
influence of race-oriented politics in any given year that is not detectable in a quantitative
study. H. E. Brown (2013), for example, shows that external race-centered incidents in
state politics, such as controversy over display of Confederate symbols, can spill over
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into welfare policy and produce changes in a more stringent or punitive direction. Such
processes could also a↵ect basic assistance spending but, with no way to directly measure
them, become random error in a quantitative model.
In addition to providing an alternative means of analyzing state basic assistance ex-
penditures, Chapter 3 examines alternative uses of TANF funds. It reinforces the salience
of racial politics to basic assistance, with a larger proportion of whites in the state ex-
pressing negative views of blacks associated with reduced financial e↵ort devoted to tra-
ditional cash benefits. Evidence also indicates that states in which whites express more
negative racial views are more likely to use TANF funds in support of pregnancy preven-
tion and/or two-parent family formation initiatives. This finding is consistent with the
proposition that a racialized image of welfare influences policy implementation. Out-of-
wedlock births and excessive childbearing are, for instance, associated with the stereo-
typed, racialized image of the "welfare queen" overly reliant on government benefits
(Hancock, 2004). There is also weak evidence—a relationship was only found in one
of three examined years—for an association between white stereotyping of blacks and
an increased probability of a state using resources for refundable tax credits. While su-
perficially surprising, such a connection does follow logically from policy design theory
(Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider & Sidney, 2009). If "welfare users" are a nega-
tively perceived population, "low-wage workers," the beneficiaries of such tax credits, are
a more positively perceived counterpart. In reality, these are not distinct groups, but they
do carry di↵erent connotations and could be placed in opposition to one another. Many in
the mass public also do not perceive tax credits as government supports (Mettler, 2011).
In Chapter 4, I find that the decreasing availability of cash assistance has exposed vul-
nerable households to an increased risk of material hardship. Examining state cash assis-
tance coverage from 2001 to 2013, I find that decreases in coverage are associated with an
elevated probability of a household experiencing food insecurity, the inability to consis-
tently obtain an adequate quantity and quality of food. The finding is particularly strong
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for households headed by a single female with no other adults present, arguably the most
economically disadvantaged and at-risk household type. The decline of cash assistance
has made the most obvious safety net program for these families nearly inaccessible in
some states and limited in all, and it has causedmeasurable harm. At the household level,
one of the strongest predictors of food security is the presence of at least one employed
adult. A natural concern, then, is the potential for cash benefits coverage to reduce the
probability of employment, which would then exacerbate rather than alleviate hardship.
Changes in TANF coverage, at least after the year 2000, are generally unrelated to the
probability of a household having an employed adult present, however. The sole excep-
tion is for households headed by an unmarried female but with other adults present. The
e↵ect only appears in one version of the model (in which the denominator in the TANF
coverage variable is held constant over time), though.
Secondary Findings
Some ancillary findings of the dissertation are also worth mention. First, the analyses
in Chapter 2 indicate that fiscally stressed governments devote less e↵ort to cash assis-
tance. If correct, TANF’s ability to act as a cash safety net during economic downturns
is suspect—demand for cash assistance would be increasing precisely as states shift re-
sources away from basic economic support. The fiscal health finding was not duplicated
in the Chapter 3 basic assistance analyses, however, so based on the empirical chapters
it is di cult to draw sweeping conclusions. Nonetheless, the mere hint of a relationship
indicates further investigation could prove fruitful. Appendix D presents some prelimi-
nary analyses that begin to shed light on the conflicting results; fiscal stress appears to be
associated with basic assistance spending during some time periods and not associated
during others. The time-varying nature of the e↵ect may explain the inconsistent results
produced using di↵erent model types, as in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Chapter 3 does
find a relationship between fiscal stress and transfers to the Social Services Block Grant,
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a relationship not found by Lambright and Allard (2004). The contrast could be pro-
duced by di↵erent methods (the earlier study used a di↵erent model form and a di↵erent
measure of state fiscal health) or it could be a result of examining di↵erent years, with
the link between fiscal politics and SSBG transfers out of TANF having some unobserved
time-varying component.
There are surprisingly few predictors of state spending in alternative areas. Perhaps
most unusual is the seeming lack of a strong, consistent relationship between TANF ex-
penditure patterns and government political ideology. In an era of extreme partisan po-
larization, including at the state level (Shor & McCarty, 2011), di↵erences in the imple-
mentation of TANF as a funding stream based on partisan and ideological orientation
of state government follow logically. In early TANF implementation scholarship, Soss
et al. (2001) found government ideology was related the strength of state welfare sanc-
tion policies (e.g., whether a state docked some or all of the household benefit), with
more conservative governments adopting stricter policies. They did not find a relation-
ship between ideology and any other area of policy design, however, such as adoption of
stricter work requirements or shorter time limits. In later work, Soss et al. (2011) con-
clude government ideology has not played a strong role in TANF, racial politics being
the key predictor of welfare policy design decisions. Indeed, they similarly find few pre-
dictors of state cash assistance policy choices with the sole exception of caseload racial
demographics. The studies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggest a similar pattern in TANF
as a funding stream.
Chapter 4’s examination of employment in low-income households also raises inter-
esting additional questions. One of the key successes of welfare reform was an increase
in single-mother employment, yet changes in TANF coverage generally have no relation-
ship to employment in the analyses conducted here. Importantly, the data in Chapter
4 begin chronologically in 2001, the year in which administration of the Current Popu-
lation Survey Food Security Supplement was standardized. Coincidentally, 2001 is also
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approximately the tail end of the steepest declines in state cash assistance caseloads. It is
possible, then, that declines in coverage did have a positive e↵ect on employment prior to
the study period, but once TANF had matured the relationship weakened or ceased. For
example, the subpopulation of individuals moving from welfare into the labor market in
the late 1990s and early 2000s might be qualitatively di↵erent from individuals still re-
quiring support after this period. A further surprising finding from the Chapter 4 study
is the lack of a detectable relationship between state-year unemployment rate and the
probability of employment in low-income households. Only households headed by an
unmarried female with other adults present showed any sensitivity to prevailing unem-
ployment. If this finding is sustained after further scrutiny, it indicates the relationship
between disadvantaged households and the labor market is governed by a di↵erent set of
forces than those that influence the labor market behavior of other households.
Together, these findings provide a picture of contemporary welfare and the processes
that produced the current state of TANF. States in which race, particularly with respect to
blacks, is salient to politics have, since TANF’s inception, devoted less e↵ort to cash assis-
tance. As in many other aspects of welfare, basic assistance spending follows a racialized
pattern, both reflecting and reinforcing pre-existing social and economic disparities. The
incentives built into TANF’s structure incentivize movement away from cash assistance
regardless of need, but also encourage states to maintain a high level of spending jus-
tified under TANF. With fewer resources devoted to cash assistance, the safety net for
low-income families has become less durable. In turn, low-income households are at
elevated risk of material hardship. Indeed, those welfare reform was seemingly most de-
signed to a↵ect, single-mother headed families, have seen the greatest increase in risk.
While reform is considered a success by criteria such as the increase in single mother
employment and cash assistance caseload declines, by other criteria its accomplishments
are less laudatory. It continues to reflect and reinforce existing disparities and fails to
provide particularly vulnerable families with an adequate economic fallback.
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Limitations
A distinct concern in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, but most especially Chapter 3, is
the high degree of noise in the state expenditure data used to produce the dependent vari-
ables. The categories delineated by the federal government are not only poorly defined,
but accounting practices allow states to correct previous reports by simply including the
value of the correction in the current report. Reported values, then, do not map neatly
onto actual e↵ort, creating concerns regarding validity. Unfortunately, there is no other
source of information on TANF-funded activities comparable across states, and the noise
must be managed to the degree possible and clearly admitted. State accounting prac-
tices inevitably muddy empirical results, but there are no viable alternatives for studying
TANF-as-funding-stream. This limitation is also suggestive of a need for policy action
to improve data collection. Certainly, social science and public policy researchers have
an intrinsic professional interest in the collection and dissemination of data. Data can
also, however, aid policymakers in identifying e↵ective interventions, and thus be a tool
of policy learning.
The models used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are also not causally identified. Find-
ings with respect to race and politics are consistent with theory, however. It is di cult to
devise a scenario in which TANF expenditure patterns cause changes in white attitudes
toward blacks, so it is reasonable to rule out simultaneity bias. The models themselves
control for a number of relevant social, political, and economic factors to reduce the
chance of detecting a spurious relationship. Finally, in Appendix B, I repeat the analyses
with respect to basic assistance, but include additional potential confounders—an indi-
cator for southern region and indicators of state political culture (Elazar, 1966; Morgan
& Watson, 1991). The racial a↵ect/basic assistance relationship is generally durable in
both cases. The sole exception is a model including an indicator variable for the U.S.
south with a dependent variable expressed as the ratio of basic assistance expenditures to
households in poverty. With the inclusion of the south indicator, the coe cient on white
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attitudes with respect to blacks remains negatively signed and similar in magnitude. Un-
certainty, however, increases, resulting in a loss of statistical significance.
The major limitation of Chapter 4 is its reliance on a type of ecological inference.
Its underlying argument is that di↵erences in availability of cash assistance are related
to di↵erences in experiences of household hardship. The "treatment" is not whether an
individual household participated in TANF cash assistance, but rather the extent of cash
benefits coverage in the household’s state of residence. It is di cult to consider the results
a true measure of treatment e↵ect when factors such as the probability of household
uptake are unknown (that is, whether a household would even access benefits if they were
o↵ered). Nonetheless, the models do control for unobserved state and year confounders,
and the relationship between food insecurity and TANF coverage is opposite that which
would be expected if endogeneity were a serious problem (that is, if improvements in
family well-being caused caseload declines). Even if a precise relationship between TANF
and well-being is di cult to isolate in this model set-up, it o↵ers compelling evidence
that the increases in hardship observed since the passage of welfare reform (e.g., increases
in public school student homelessness (Ingram et al., 2016)) are at least partly a function
of the changing availability of cash benefits.
Contributions to Understanding Poverty in the U.S.
TANF & Social Stratification
A major contribution of the studies in this dissertation is identifying ways in which
TANF reflects and reinforces rather than aids in overcoming pre-existing social and eco-
nomic disparities, most obviously with respect to race. Social theorists such as Massey
(2007) and Tilly (1998) describe enduring social inequities as products of group classi-
fications and, in turn, institutionalization of those classifications in ways that allow a
dominant group to extract resources from a paired but less dominant group. Racial and
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ethnic minorities are disproportionately represented among the economically disadvan-
taged compared to the population as a whole (DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2015). Similarly,
they are disproportionately represented on the cash assistance rolls (Administration for
Children and Families, 2015). Most obviously, TANF has nationally de-emphasized cash
benefits, a↵ecting poor families of all backgrounds and in all states. Given TANF’s de-
volved structure, however, through geography this trend especially a↵ects families of
color, particularly blacks. States with larger proportions of blacks devote a smaller por-
tion of their TANF resources to traditional cash assistance. Even this analysis, however,
overlooks a further, more subtle way in which TANF sustains social stratification.
A key stated purpose of TANF is to end dependence on cash benefits by increasing
work, and the implied logic behind restricted cash benefits is to build reliance on work
over public support. For those able to attain adequate employment, work increases ma-
terial resources, as the employed are economically better o↵ than those receiving cash
benefits (S. Danziger et al., 2002). However, the emphasis on work-over-welfare is itself a
vehicle for social stratification. Black and Latino job seekers face extensive discrimination
in the low-wage labor market; field experiments demonstrate, for example, that a black
or Latino individual with no criminal record is treated roughly equivalently to a white
individual recently released from prison by potential employers (Pager, Bonikowski, &
Western, 2009). Blacks are also less likely to exit low-wage work and, if they do, are more
likely to eventually return to low-wage work than their peers (C. Campbell, 2012). There
is, then, a double-bind of stratification in the context of contemporary, work-oriented
welfare. The cash assistance system that does remain is structured such that black clients
are particularly disadvantaged, being more likely to live in a state with restrictive rules
and punitive procedures (Soss et al., 2011). It is intended to move clients into a second
institution—the low-wage labor market—that similarly reinforces disadvantage and lim-
its opportunity (Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001). The already disadvantaged are, through
social policy, placed in a position that only emphasizes rather than addresses the struc-
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tural conditions that expose some groups to greater degrees of economic adversity than
others.
The link between welfare and race has long been acknowledged, and its further inter-
action with the low-wage labor market is an important additional mechanism by which
social policy emphasizes race-based social and economic stratification. TANF as consti-
tuted further stratifies by class. Considering TANF priorities outside basic assistance, for
instance, educational activities o↵ered as work supports are intended to move the ben-
eficiary into the labor market as quickly as possible. Support of higher education as an
allowable work activity is limited2. The orientation of TANF toward education has been
associated with an increase in high school completion by girls but a substantial decrease
in secondary education and high school enrollment among adult females at risk of welfare
participation (Dave, Corman, & Reichman, 2012). Advanced education, however, is one
of the strongest predictors of long-term economic success and social mobility, including
exit from the low-wage labor market (C. Campbell, 2012; Pandey & Kim, 2008). A pro-
gram in the state of Maine supporting higher education for welfare-receiving families
also produced many positive benefits, including improved material well-being through
higher earnings (Butler, Deprez, & Smith, 2004). By broadly discouraging higher edu-
cation, then, TANF appears designed to limit rather than facilitate mobility by keeping
low-wage workers in low-wage jobs rather than providing tools for advancement.
Geography & Disparity
The role of geography in economic disadvantage has long been of interest to poverty
researchers. Under TANF, geography is most evident in racially patterned state di↵er-
ences in policy. A family enrolled in TANF cash assistance in, for example, Maine is in a
qualitatively quite di↵erent program than a family in Louisiana. Chapter 2 and Chapter
3, as well as previous research (Bentele & Nicoli, 2012), also indicate wide geographic
2Some states have experimented with secondary education supports for TANF beneficiaries, but these
initiatives are not widespread (Lower-Basch, 2007).
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di↵erences, again racially patterned, in accessibility of TANF, while Chapter 4 provides
evidence that such di↵erences have material consequences for low-income families. Un-
der TANF as a funding stream, though, geography and disparity are related in other
ways. TANF emphasizes services over cash assistance, and as a flexible funding stream
most of its resources are now directed to a wide variety of services. Some of these—such
as childcare—are directly related to assisting families in finding and maintaining work.
As described by Allard (2009), however, the shift to services over cash benefits, even if
those services are properly targeted (that is, setting aside initiatives such as pregnancy
prevention unrelated to poverty relief but justifiable under TANF, or questionably tar-
geted programs such as Michigan’s provision of scholarships to middle-income families
(Wilkinson, 2016)), creates disparities based on geography that then reinforce racial dis-
advantage.
Service providers, some of which might receive grants or contracts justified under
TANF to o↵er supports to low-income families, are often not located in the most disad-
vantaged communities, communities heavily populated by families of color. The burden
is on the individual client to seek these services, but that contains its own costs given that
the potential client must travel outside the neighborhood (assuming he or she is even able
to identify both that services are available and seek the appropriate providers) (Allard,
2009). Concentrated urban poverty of the form described by W. J. Wilson (1997, 2009) is
both a particularly deep and intractable form of economic adversity, and is again one that
overlaps with the racial geography of urban areas. Using TANF to fund a safety net based
on services, then, once again merely reflects rather than addresses underlying issues in
the structure of American poverty. A further aspect of the geography of poverty TANF-
as-funding-stream potentially exacerbates is the suburbanization of poverty. While ur-
ban poverty is well-studied, scholars have documented a rise in poverty in the American
suburbs, albeit one that still reflects patterns of racial inequality (Howell & Timberlake,
2014). Suburbs, however, tend to be service-poor compared to cities, with fewer orga-
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nizations serving the economically disadvantaged (Murphy & Wallace, 2010). If TANF-
as-funding-stream shifts economic relief from direct cash benefits provided by the gov-
ernment to services o↵ered by third-party providers, then it is also poorly equipped to
address suburban poverty.
Policy Implications
The studies in this dissertation also provide insight into policy structure, in particular
federalized policy. Devolution of policymaking to state and local government has a num-
ber of desirable features, including the ability of these lower-level units to address unique
local problems and to act as conduits of policy learning. Volden (2006), for instance, doc-
uments a process of interstate policy learning in the Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP) that led to the adoption of practices successful in reducing the rate of uninsurance
among children. In the case of cash benefits policy, federalizing social welfare has long
been thought to lead to a race-to-the-bottom e↵ect, wherein benefits become ever more
meager as states seek to avoid attracting high-need migrants. First articulated by Tiebout
(1956), the evidence of the "race" under AFDC and TANF is actually mixed (Allard &
Danziger, 2000; Bailey, 2007; Brueckner, 2000; Peterson & Rom, 1989; Rom, Peterson, &
Scheve, 1998; Volden, 2002).
This study and others before it, however, demonstrate other concerns with devolved
welfare policy. Most obviously, devolved policy can lead to the incorporation of local
biases and, in turn, reinforce existing social and economic disparities. In the case of eco-
nomic relief for low-income families, such disparities have been present from its incep-
tion. Di↵erential treatment of black families was formal policy during the state mother’s
pension era and continued under Aid to Dependent Children and Aid to Families with
Dependent Children in numerous guises (Lieberman, 1998; Ward, 2005). While overtly
discriminatory practices were ended in the latter years of AFDC, benefit levels continued
to follow a race-based geographic pattern (Orr, 1976; Soss et al., 2011; Tropman & Gor-
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don, 1978). With the implementation of TANF, rules again were racially patterned—a
black potential client is more likely to live in a state with more punitive and restric-
tive cash assistance rules than her white peers (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2011,
2001). Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 demonstrate that these states also direct fewer resources
to traditional cash assistance and more to alternative priorities.
The finding with respect to fiscal health and basic assistance spending in Chapter
2 (see also Appendix D for further analysis, including a preliminary attempt to rectify
the inconsistent findings of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) raises questions about within-state
behavior with respect to a flexible funding stream like TANF. Welfare scholarship has
tended to focus on, via concern over the "race to the bottom," interstate economic pres-
sure, but the fiscal health finding indicates intrastate economic pressure is an equally
valid issue. TANF allows states to fund myriad priorities, and maintenance-of-e↵ort con-
tributions do not need to come from new programming. The state can consider existing,
allowable activities MOE in support of its TANF targets and, given credits for reductions
in work activity targets, has an incentive to keep MOE spending relatively high. States
in fiscal distress, then, can use resources to support other priorities and/or count exist-
ing programs as TANF e↵ort, either of which reduces the pool of resources that could be
used on cash benefits. This relationship has been the subject of speculation (Lambright
& Allard, 2004; Schott et al., 2015), but the study in Chapter 2 is the first to provide
empirical evidence supporting its existence. The potential for a retrenchment in cash
assistance availability precisely as demand increases, such as during an economic down-
turn, indicates that TANF is not truly a "safety net" program, a designation that implies
countercyclical responsiveness.
A related issue raised by the dissertation studies, in particular Chapter 4, concerns the
policy goals underlying TANF.With respect to cash assistance, the primary goal—reflected
in the incentives provided to states, such as caseload reduction credits for work activity
targets—is to limit participation in cash assistance. By this metric, TANF is quite success-
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ful, and the flexible funding structure aids in its achievement. If the purpose of TANF is
to provide an economic safety net, however, it is far less successful. Outside of caseload
reduction, its most vaunted outcome has been an increase in work among households that
previously would have used cash benefits. Not coincidentally, these goals also strongly
influenced a generation of poverty research. As stated by Pimpare (2013), "analysts have,
even if unwittingly, allowed antiwelfare reformers to frame their research agenda, em-
phasizing caseloads and work e↵ort at the expense of other indicators (p. 57)." Quan-
titative studies on the material well-being of vulnerable families post-reform have been
surprisingly scarce, and so it is somewhat di cult to judge whether TANF is successful
by other metrics.
It is known that welfare-leaving families often still remain in economic distress, even
with employment (Lein & Schexnayder, 2007). Further, many households are discon-
nected from both public supports and employment (Cancian, Han, &Noyes, 2014; Fusaro,
2015). Cash benefits under contemporary TANF are inaccessible to many whomight need
a temporary salve for economic distress (Edin & Shaefer, 2015). Finally, Chapter 4 indi-
cates that the declining accessibility of cash benefits is associated with increased hardship
in vulnerable households. Other research suggests cash benefits receipt reduces the in-
cidence of risky behaviors, such as drug use or participating in the sex trade, among
extremely poor individuals (Riley, 2005). Caseload reductions and work activities alone,
then, may be inappropriate metrics of success if long-termwell-being in low-income fam-
ilies is the desired outcome. Certainly, these may be intermediate indicators of success,
but if they expose vulnerable families to harm and don’t provide a springboard to greater
prosperity, are they truly stand-alone indicators of policy achievement? Perhaps targets
other than caseload reduction, such as reductions in the child poverty rate or stability
of employment among at-risk families, are more appropriate measures. Re-working the
incentive structure of TANF to reward states for advances in these areas might result in
renewed policy innovation.
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TANF embodies larger trends in American social welfare policy, including the em-
phasis on services over direct assistance, the use of punitive policy tools, the reliance
on markets and market-like institutions, and the devolution of policy design and im-
plementation. There remain elements of the social safety net somewhat untouched by
these movements. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, for instance, pro-
vides states some control over implementation details (e.g., setting the length of the re-
certification period or whether to require fingerprinting for applicants) but is much more
uniform nationally compared to TANF. The public health insurance program Medicaid
varies across states, particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius3 but remains a federal partial match of state
expenditures and does not feature work requirements. Recent proposals, however, sug-
gest reforming both SNAP and Medicaid to frameworks modeled on TANF. The disserta-
tion studies identify several potential concerns with respect to such policy designs. First,
federalism has many appealing features, but can also reinforce disparities and, in a de-
sign such as TANF’s, o↵er perverse incentives, particularly during periods of fiscal stress.
Related, the criteria for "success" built into such programs influence not only individual
client behavior, but also state behavior. Whether employment and caseload reduction are
su cient and appropriate outcomes is questionable. Finally, the conduct of the disser-
tation studies identified severe limitations to current data collection procedures which
could, in turn, inhibit productive policy learning.
3The case considered the legality of key provisions of the Patient Protection and A↵ordable Care Act.
Most notably, it upheld the mandate that individuals obtain health insurance coverage. It also declared
measures to nationally expandMedicaid coverage to previously uncovered groups were excessively coercive
to the states and unconstitutional. States have therefore expanded eligibility criteria and coverage unevenly.
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Implications for Social Work
Practice Implications
The studies in the dissertation serve as a type of needs assessment for guiding social
work practice. According to Berrick (2009), "social work practitioners, policy makers, and
researchers must continue to follow the e↵ects of PRWORA on low-income children and
families and to press for policy changes that move families out of poverty and into op-
portunity (p. 344)." Social workers have largely not recognized that TANF is now more a
funding stream than a cash assistance program, however. The dissertation demonstrates
that TANF-as-funding stream reflects and reinforces racial and class inequalities. It there-
fore falls within the purview of social workers who, according to the Code of Ethics of the
National Association of Social Workers (2008), are obliged to challenge social injustice,
exploitation, and discrimination. TANF is also directly related to the Grand Challenges
for Social Work articulated by the American Academy of Social Work & Social Welfare
(2017) as issues of particular importance for social work in the 21st century, including
reducing extreme economic inequality and promoting equal opportunity. As discussed
by Padilla and Fong (2016), addressing these challenges requires engagement with the
policy process in addition to the development of improved direct service interventions.
The dissertation studies identify a number of needs for social workers addressing the
Grand Challenges from a policy perspective.
The dissertation studies suggest social workers, as with many other policy profession-
als and commentators, have mischaracterized TANF. Introductory social welfare policy
texts, for example, describe TANF as "public assistance, which used to be the AFDC pro-
gram (Popple & Leighninger, 2011, p. 199)" or "monthly cash assistance for low-income
families with children under 18 who qualify (Chapin, 2014, p. 353)." Popple and Leigh-
ninger (2011) do mention that TANF funds may be used for many purposes, but only in
passing and do not consider its implications. From an advocacy perspective, considering
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TANF as a funding stream with extensive state discretion provides both opportunities
and challenges for social workers. Social workers can serve as sources of information for
state decision makers (Jackson-Elmoore, 2005). State government is certainly more acces-
sible to most human services professionals than the federal government, and it is also eas-
ier to organize e↵ective coalitions around innovative policy ideas at the subnational level
(Sherraden, Slosar, & Sherraden, 2002). Conversely, however, strategies for action require
consideration of the characteristics of the individual state—there is no single model for
intervention at the state level (Hoefer, 2005). Additionally, TANF as a funding stream
is a much more amorphous concept than TANF as a cash assistance program. It may be
easier to organize, for example, around the notion of easing restrictions of cash bene-
fits participation than to organize around a fiscal issue such as ensuring TANF resources
are well-targeted rather than merely used to plug budget holes. Finally, as discussed in
the forthcoming section, advocating with respect to changes in the distribution of TANF
resources also creates an ethical dilemma for some social workers.
Ethical Implications of TANF-as-Funding-Stream
The structure of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families places social services or-
ganizations and the social workers they employ into a heretofore unrecognized ethical
dilemma—they are competing with their own clients for limited resources. As states
move away from cash assistance, the now-freed resources are directed toward services
(and it has been argued that the U.S. is increasingly moving to a service-based rather than
a cash-based safety net (Allard, 2009)). At least some of the programs and agencies sup-
ported out of TANF-justified funds employ social workers and, while many undoubtedly
provide valuable services to some families, it is ethically problematic if it comes at the ex-
pense of material resources for vulnerable families. The ethical challenge is particularly
acute for agency administrators who are undoubtedly operating with stretched budgets.
They may even be unaware that state grants and contracts received by the agency might
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fall under the umbrella of TANF. There is, then, a conflict of interest, as advocacy to im-
prove access to cash benefits threatens monetary support for some agencies. At the very
least, this tension provides a reason for social workers to support de-coupling of funding
for cash assistance from funding for services.
Conclusion
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families is a funding stream, not a cash assistance
program, yet both the public and academic discussions of TANF tend to focus on cash
assistance and the rules and requirements for cash assistance receipt. The three studies
in this dissertation examined di↵erent aspects of TANF as a funding stream and the im-
plications of the decline of traditional "welfare" under TANF. The first and second studies
examined state TANF expenditures. Their chief finding is that TANF follows a pattern
long evident in state welfare policy implementation; states in which race is a salient as-
pect of politics devote fewer resources justified under TANF to traditional cash assis-
tance. The first study also indicates state fiscal health is an important aspect of TANF
implementation, with states in fiscal distress shifting resources to other areas (though
the finding was not duplicated in the second study, which used slightly di↵erent meth-
ods). The Chapter 3 study examined not only basic assistance, but also correlates of state
spending on alternative priorities. In addition to corroborating Chapter 2’s finding with
regard to racial politics and basic assistance emphasis under TANF, it also finds a con-
nection between racial politics and the use of TANF resources to address out-of-wedlock
pregnancy prevention and two-parent family formation. While Chapter 3 failed to du-
plicate the fiscal health/basic assistance finding, it did find states under fiscal stress are
more likely to transfer TANF resources to the Social Services Block Grant. There were
few other patterns to state expenditures, however. Finally, Chapter 4 demonstrated that
the decline in the accessibility of cash assistance under TANF has increased the risk of
material hardship for low-income families, particularly those headed by a single mother
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with no other adults present. TANF coverage changes are generally not, though, related
to employment in those households.
Welfare reform is often heralded as a success, but the studies contained in this dis-
sertation bring pause to sweeping generalizations. Its initial phases did coincide with,
and at least partly contributed to, increases in employment among low-income families.
Cash assistance caseloads dropped dramatically. With twenty years of reflection, a pe-
riod that included the largest economic downturn since the Great Depression, there has
been ample opportunity to consider TANF’s strengths and challenges. The dissertation
studies indicate that TANF as a funding stream continues, as welfare has since its in-
ception in the U.S., to reflect a racialized politics. With state flexibility, the decisions of
subnational governments reflect and reinforce existing patterns of racial disparity. Other
research suggests spillover e↵ects that even further reinforce racial inequality, such as
discrimination in the labor market and inaccessibility of services for already disadvan-
taged communities, in the transition away from cash benefits. TANF as a funding stream
also contains incentives for states to use resources for other purposes even during times of
economic stress. Whether, then, it is able to act as a true "safety net" is questionable. That
these trends appear to have exposed economically vulnerable families to greater risk of
material harm indicates these issues are worthy of further attention from policy analysts,
policymakers, social workers, and other interested parties. While a return to an AFDC-
style system is both unlikely and undesirable, adjustments to policy could be made to






Local Racial Attitudes & State Welfare Policy:
Measurement Issues
Previous quantitative studies of racial politics and state welfare policy, beginning with
the initial research under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the 1970s
and continuing to the most recent investigations of Temporary Assistance for Needy Fam-
ilies (TANF), generally operationalize racial salience using the demographics of either the
state population or the cash assistance caseload (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Orr, 1976; Soss
et al., 2011, 2001; Tropman & Gordon, 1978). This dissertation, for salience of blacks
to welfare politics, approaches measurement di↵erently. As described in Chapters 2 and
3, prevalence of negative stereotypes of blacks among whites within the state is used to
incorporate the salience of blacks to state welfare politics. Essentially, the "policy image"
associated with welfare tends to be constructed such that clients are perceived as black
(Dyck & Hussey, 2008; Gilens, 1999; Hancock, 2004; Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001). If the
typical welfare client is perceived as black, then prevailing attitudes among whites with
respect to blacks is a plausible measure of racial salience1. The only previous study to
1Soss et al.’s (2011) Racial Classification Model suggests that racial salience increases as racial/ethnic
minorities make up an increasing portion of the target population. The authors further maintain, however,
that the depth with which racial stereotypes are held influences the degree to which policy follows a race-
based pattern. They empirically operationalize the former through caseload demographics, whereas I am
more directly measuring the latter.
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incorporate a state-level attitudinal measure was Johnson’s (2001) examination of AFDC
benefits, indicating that use of such a measure to examine contemporary welfare politics
is a potentially fruitful research avenue. There is no widely accepted and easily accessi-
ble source of data, however, on subnational white racial attitudes. Surveys such as the
General Social Survey (GSS) and American National Elections Studies (ANES) surveys
routinely include such measures, but are inappropriate in raw form for producing state
estimates.
This Appendix provides technical background on the estimation of an aggregate white
racial attitudes measure at the state level for subsequent use in models of state welfare
policy. First, I consider the challenges posed by subnational estimation of the preva-
lence of attitudes and opinions given existing data. Two potential solutions are avail-
able—disaggregation of survey data and multi-level regression with post-stratification
(MRP). After discussing the strengths and challenges of each approach, I implement the
MRP procedure using the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (Annenberg Public
Policy Center, 2010). I estimate a number of potential predictive models of the proba-
bility of a white individual holding extremely negative stereotypes of blacks based on
individual characteristics (gender, age, and education), state of residence, and state char-
acteristics (region and a set of state variables).
In general, the demographic, state, and region e↵ects behave as expected—males,
older individuals, less educated individuals, and respondents in the regional south are
more likely to hold negative views of blacks. The set of state-level predictors, however,
present some interesting results that guide model selection. First, two proposed pre-
dictors of white racial a↵ect, the shift in vote share from John Kerry in the 2004 and
Barack Obama in the 2008 Presidential elections and Democratic vote share in the 2008
Presidential election, are not strong predictors of individual-level a↵ect2. Second, the
proportion of the state population identifying as black is a strong predictor of stereotyp-
2These findings do not suggest racial attitudes are unrelated to voting preferences; rather, they indicate
that raw vote data is noisy and relationships that may exist are likely masked by other factors.
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ing of blacks by whites. This finding suggests that, when modeling state policy in the
dissertation, it is not possible to include both target population demographics and white
racial attitudes as predictors due to collinearity. Racial context, then, enters the study
through the MRP procedure and is not directly included in the policy models in Chap-
ters 2 and 3. Finally, I compare the MRP results to disaggregation estimates. I find that
the two procedures produce roughly similar patterns, but the MRP estimates are slightly
preferred.
The Problem of Subnational Opinion Estimation
There is no readily available source of data on state-level aggregate racial attitudes.
The problem is primarily one of sampling—few social surveys are conducted using ap-
propriate samples at the state level—and is not limited to racial attitudes alone. Surveys
conducted by government agencies (e.g., the decennial Census, the Current Population
Survey, the American Community Survey) often have massive samples with procedures
to ensure samples are representative within each state but do not contain questions mea-
suring racial attitudes. Measures of racial a↵ect are included in routinely administered
academic social surveys such as the American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys
and the General Social Survey (GSS). Both of those surveys, however, are limited in their
utility for producing subnational estimates due to the sampling issue. Each uses a strat-
ified sampling scheme. With weighting to account for variation in the probability of
selection, these surveys are nationally representative. Stratification, however, means that
samples within a given state are not necessarily representative of that state. Addition-
ally, sample sizes are relatively small. The GSS usually surveys between 1500 and 4500
respondents per year (Roper Center, 2016). The ANES sample size also varies, generally
ranging from 1500 to 2500 respondents3 (American National Election Studies, 2016).
3Some years, particularly early in the history of the ANES, have many fewer respondents while others,
most notably 2012, include many more. At no point, however, has sample size exceeded 6000 respondents
nationally.
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Within any given state, then, the subsample could be quite small, particularly in less-
populated states. Given both stratified sampling design and small sample size, the most
obvious sources for estimates of racial a↵ect are likely to provide misleading subnational
estimates, if estimation is possible at all. Some other approach is needed. Two procedures
have been previously used to generate state estimates of public attitudes—disaggregation
and multi-level regression with post-stratification (MRP).
Disaggregation vs. MRP
Disaggregation is simply the use of survey data to directly produce subnational opin-
ion estimates (i.e., percentages within each state of some binary opinion indicator). Un-
fortunately, as noted previously, most survey data lacks appropriate sampling procedures
for use of this technique. Studies that use disaggregation for subnational estimation, then,
often pool several samples into a single harmonized dataset. The multiple samples can be
drawn from separate surveys so long as the relevant questions are reasonably compara-
ble. This approach was most notably used by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) in their
investigation of the general responsiveness of state governments to public opinion. El-
mendorf and Spencer (2014) produced state estimates of aggregate white racial a↵ect by
disaggregating a dataset constructed using the 2008 National Annenberg Election Sur-
vey and a Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project survey4. Other studies have pooled
multiple years of data from surveys such as the GSS (Brace, Sims-Butler, & Arceneaux,
2002; Johnson, 2001; Percival, 2009). Importantly for the current inquiry, the only previ-
ous study of the relationship between racial attitudes and welfare policy, Johnson (2001),
pooled several years of GSS data to produce subnational measures of white racial a↵ect.
The second option for producing subnational estimates using national survey data is
multi-level regression with post-stratification (MRP). MRP is based on the assumption
that public opinion and attitudes are functions of both individual-level demographic fac-
4Elmendorf and Spencer (2014) subsequently use MRP to produce opinion estimates in counties.
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tors and group-level geographic factors. The procedure begins with estimation of a multi-
level model5, using national survey data, of the opinion/attitude of interest. Individuals
are nested within geographic units, such as states or counties. Individual-level predic-
tors are coded categorically (e.g., rather than numerical age, age range is indicated with a
dummy variable), and group-level predictors may also be included to improve the predic-
tive abilities of the model (Gelman & Hill, 2007). Census data is used to produce a count
of each potential demographic-geographic "type" of individual (e.g., white males ages 18
to 25 with a bachelor’s degree residing in Michigan). The probability of each type hold-
ing the given opinion is estimated using predictions from the model. Predictions are then
weighted by the Census counts, with the overall proportion holding a given opinion in
each state calculated from the weighted predictions. While the technique has existed for
some time, increases in computing power and technical sophistication of researchers have
led to a rapid growth in use of MRP. Topics examined include the relationship between
state opinion and LGBT rights policy (Lax & Phillips, 2009a), income inequality and so-
cial trust (Fairbrother & Martin, 2013), and attitudes toward health care reform (Gelman,
Lee, & Ghitza, 2010). It has even been used to examine opinion in still smaller geographic
units, such as counties or electoral districts (Elmendorf & Spencer, 2014; Grimmer, 2013;
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2013).
Both disaggregation and MRP have strengths and shortcomings. The most obvious
advantage of disaggregation is its ease of implementation when su cient data are avail-
able. Disaggregation is little more than a large cross-tabulation of a dichotomous vari-
able by geographic unit, a simple procedure with even the most basic statistical soft-
ware. Its conceptual simplicity is a further positive, particularly in communication with
general audiences. It requires no knowledge of statistical methods to understand. As
noted by Elmendorf and Spencer (2014), lay audiences are also likely more trusting of
disaggregation-based estimation than model-based estimation. Disaggregation, however,
5Multilevel models are also called, depending on academic discipline, random e↵ects models, hierar-
chical models, error components models, or nested models.
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requires extremely large representative samples to produce valid subnational estimates,
particularly in small units (e.g., a small-population state). Pooling of data sets, whether
from multiple surveys or multiple years of the same survey, aids in disaggregation, but
raises its own issues. Harmonizing di↵erent survey questions to treat them identically,
for example, leads to validity and reliability concerns. Pooling multiple years of surveys
like the GSS or ANES ignores their cluster-sampled designs; the sub-sample in a state
may be useful for producing national estimates, but is not necessarily representative of
the state as a whole. Even with pooling, if the sampling frame does not change or if the
same procedure is repeatedly used to select sampling units, this issue is magnified rather
than alleviated. Pooling several years of data also assumes that the attitude or opinion
in question is relatively stable. Aggregate opinion and attitudes do periodically undergo
rapid shifts, as in the case of opinion regarding same-sex marriage (Baunach, 2012)6.
The major strength of MRP is its reduced reliance on sample size compared to dis-
aggregation. It allows estimation of subnational opinion prevalence in samples much
smaller than needed for disaggregation. When large samples are available, MRP gener-
ally performs as well as disaggregation in large units and outperforms it in small units
(Lax & Phillips, 2009b). It can even produce estimates for units in which data are not
available (e.g., if survey data are only available for the continental United States, the
model can still generate estimates for Alaska and Hawaii). Compared to disaggregation,
however, MRP requires a high degree of technical and subject-matter expertise. A body of
recent methodological scholarship examines the performance of MRP under various con-
ditions. In particular, Buttice and Highton (2013) and unpublished work by Stollwerk
(2013) suggest that MRPmay not adequately alleviate the cluster-sample and sample size
issues plaguing disaggregation. Common surveys such as the GSS and ANES, then, may
still not be appropriate for use with MRP. The construction and operationalization of the
opinion variable is also critical, particularly if using multiple data sources that must be
6The MRP procedures implemented in this dissertation are from a single year, still requiring the as-
sumption of semi-stable attitudes.
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harmonized. W. D. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (2015), for example, find sub-
stantial problems with the validity of a general state "policy mood" measure constructed
by Enns and Koch (2013). The variable, which draws from 73 separate questions in sur-
veys from 1956 to 2010, many of which conflict in wording across the years, may simply
draw from too many disparate sources to be meaningful. While it is possible to produce
MRP estimates using such data, the method does nothing to correct for problems in the
source and handling of the data used in model construction. With su cient sample size
and reasonable source data, however, the strengths of MRP make it an intriguing option
for estimating subnational opinion.
Note that both MRP and disaggregation produce estimates of subnational opinion. In
the abstract, MRP is neither better nor worse than disaggregation (assuming the disag-
gregated sample is su ciently large and opinion is stable over time if pooling multiple
years of data). Both MRP and disaggregation rely on assumptions, with disaggregation
making assumptions about the representativeness of the survey sample and MRP about
the representativeness of the model. Both are prone to error resulting from the uncer-
tainty around these assumptions. The following section provides detail on the estimation
of MRP models of aggregate state-level white racial a↵ect. Procedures for implementing
MRP are drawn from Kastellec et al. (2010) and Gelman and Hill (2007). Models were
estimated using the lme4 package in R.
MRP Implementation
Models
The MRP process begins by estimating a multilevel model of an individual-level opin-
ion. Predictor variables at the individual level are demographic factors, such as age and
gender. To properly implement the final post-stratification step, the individual-level in-
dependent variables must be coded categorically and be available in Census data. This
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requirement excludes some variables, such as party identification, that might be predic-
tive at the individual level, though many of these are also themselves strongly correlated
with demographics (that is, the demographic covariates likely pick up a great deal of the
variation that would otherwise be explained by these missing factors). The opinion de-
pendent variable is expressed as a binary indicator. Individual respondents are stratified
by the geographic unit of interest, in this case the state, using a discrete choice random
intercept model7 (e.g., a random intercept logit model).
For the MRP models in this study, the outcome of interest is racial a↵ect—an indi-
vidual’s attitudes toward a di↵erent racial group (here, whites’ attitudes toward blacks).
This construct is expressed as a binary variable coded 1 if the individual holds partic-
ularly negative stereotypes of blacks (I discuss the specific construction of this variable
under "Individual Data"). At the individual level, the demographic variables are gender,
age, and education, all expressed categorically. Race/ethnicity would generally also be
included in such a model, but since the population of interest is whites the data used in
estimation are already restricted in this regard. Given that the demographic variables
are categorical, they can themselves be expressed as random e↵ects when there are more
than two groups (Kastellec et al., 2010). Finally, the predictive power of the model can
be improved by explicitly modeling factors that lead to group-level variation. In this
case, then, a vector of state variables can be included. Formally, the population model for
individual i in state s is expressed as:
p(y
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The coe cients on age and education are modeled as "random e↵ects" drawn from a
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7Random slope models, which allow the coe cients on the individual-level variables to vary by geo-
graphic unit, can also be estimated.
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State e↵ects are modeled as a function of geographic region (defined under "State
Data") and a vector of state predictors X. As described under "State Data," I experiment
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Individual Data
The next step of MRP requires locating an appropriate data source and constructing a
binary variable indicating racial a↵ect. Racial attitudes measures are routinely included
in the GSS and ANES. As noted previously, even with MRP surveys such as these may
produce unreliable estimates (though researchers have used these sources for MRP pur-
poses (Fairbrother & Martin, 2013)). Fortunately, there is a reasonable alternative data
source. Prior to the 2008 presidential election, due to the salience of race with Barack
Obama’s candidacy, the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) included a six ques-
tion battery of racial stereotypingmeasures (Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2010). Each
question is a scale scored 0 to 100, with 100 indicating perfect agreement with a state-
ment and 0 perfect disagreement. White and Latino respondents are each asked, first,
about the degree to which they feel their own racial group is hardworking, intelligent,
and trustworthy; the next three questions ask whether the respondent agrees with these
statements when applied to blacks8. The NAES has a relatively simple sampling scheme.
There is some oversampling of blacks and Latinos but otherwise the recruitment process
is fairly random. While large sample sizes are not necessary for MRP, they are help-
ful. The NAES has a very large sample, approximately 20,000 respondents to the ques-
8For black respondents, whites are the reference group for the outgroup attitudes questions.
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tions used here9. Finally, the racial attitudes questions were administered by web survey,
which elicits more honest responses to sensitive topics than other modes of administra-
tion (Kreuter, Presser, & Tourangeau, 2008).
Despite its strengths, the NAES has two important limitations. First, it only contains
questions (asked of white and Latino respondents) regarding a↵ect with respect to blacks.
The analysis is therefore constrained to examining only attitudes toward blacks, not other
groups—a concern given the growing proportion of the national population composed of
Latinos. Attitudes toward Latinos among non-Hispanic whites is more weakly related
to welfare opinion than attitudes toward blacks, however, and there is a less distinct
relationship between proportion of the caseload or population identifying as Latino and
welfare policy design compared to the proportion identifying as black (Fellowes & Rowe,
2004; Fox, 2004; Hussey & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2012; Soss et al., 2001). Second, the racial
attitudes questions were only asked in the 2008 online module. The variable produced
by MRP, however, will be used as a predictor for a range of years from 1998 to 2013.
It is plausible that there is temporal variation in aggregate racial attitudes, being over-
all more negative at some times and neutral or more positive at others (e.g., response to
racial considerations among whites might be di↵erent in the immediate aftermath of the
Black Lives Matter protests compared to other times). In the context of welfare policy,
H. E. Brown (2013) proposes that timing explains some of the variation observed in state
welfare policy—some precipitating political event, such as a controversy over display of
Confederate symbols, activates negative racial attitudes that then influence welfare pol-
icy design. While worth considering in interpretation and noting as a shortcoming of
the present study, using data from a single year as a measure of the typical prevailing
white racial a↵ect in a state is reasonable (that is, in any given year, there is likely to be
some deviation from the 2008 value, but the 2008 value remains an acceptable approx-
9This sample size refers to the online sample. The NAES also has a telephone survey with an even larger
sample, approximately 60,000 respondents. It does not, however, include the racial attitudes questions.
The sample size used in model estimation is smaller because it is restricted to white respondents only.
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imation of aggregate tendencies). White racial attitudes nationally have generally been
stable since the late twentieth century (Hutchings, 2009; Tuch & Hughes, 2011). There
is some evidence of an uptick in "old-fashioned racism" during the Obama presidency
(Tesler, 2012)10, but that would then make the NAES-based estimates an undercount of
whites holding prejudicial views of blacks. In sum, then, while a limitation, only having
data for 2008 is not su cient to dismiss the use of the NAES dataset for subnational es-
timation across a range of years, and its properties relative to other datasets containing
a similar battery of questions overpower the noise induced by using a 2008 measure in
models of other years. After restricting to white respondents only, final sample size is
15,372 observations. Sample descriptive statistics are presented in Table A.1.
State Data
Individuals are nested within states for the MRP procedure, implemented through
inclusion of state random e↵ects. The predictive performance of the model can be en-
hanced, however, by including additional group-level predictors (Gelman & Hill, 2007).
In specifying the MRP predictive models, I experimented with several state-level inde-
pendent variables. Three variables, proportion of the state population identifying as
black, proportion of the working age population (age 25 and older) with a bachelor’s de-
gree, and an index measuring racial segregation in the population are included to reflect
existing research on the environmental correlates of white racial attitudes. Two others,
shift in state vote share from John Kerry to Barack Obama and 2008 Democratic vote
share, are also tested as proxy measures of group-level racial a↵ect. Finally, also at the
state level, geographic region is included as a random e↵ect. The region variable is based
on categories used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2016) dividing the nation into
eight geographic areas: New England, Mideast, Great Lakes, Plains, Southeast, South-
west, Rocky Mountain, and Far West. I slightly modify this scheme by also including a
10Note, however, that Goldman (2012) suggests the Obama presidency has actually reduced racial preju-
dice among whites by providing a high-profile positive image of blacks.
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Less than high school 0.042 (652)
High school 0.225 (3453)
Some college/2 yr. degree 0.332 (5109)
Bachelor’s+ 0.401 (6158)
Values are unweighted.
Sample restricted to white respondents only.




ninth region containing Alaska and Hawaii, both of which are otherwise categorized in
the Far West.
One theory of environmental determinants of white racial attitudes, the racial threat
hypothesis, posits that greater proportions of a racial minority group in an area produces
negative racial a↵ect among whites. Under this framework, individuals in the racial ma-
jority increasingly perceive members of the outgroup as a threat as they make up a larger
proportion of the local population1112 (Avery & Fine, 2012; Giles & Buckner, 1993; Key,
1949). Including racial context in the MRP predictive models is straightforward—simply
incorporate local racial demographics as a covariate. Note that racial context-based the-
ories of racial attitudes suggest that white racial attitudes and traditional measures of
racial salience in welfare scholarship, such as population or caseload racial demograph-
ics, are closely related. Racial context, then, still enters the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3
of this dissertation, but it does so through the MRP predictive model13.
A second possible group-level predictor is aggregate state educational attainment.
Whites in higher socioeconomic status (SES) areas tend to have a lower degree of neg-
ative racial a↵ect (Branton & Jones, 2005; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000) and prevailing
educational attainment is a reasonable indicator of aggregate SES. While individual-level
educational attainment will be accounted for in the estimated models, at the state level it
follows that the population as a whole is less likely to hold negative racial views as over-
all educational attainment increases. Aggregate educational attainment is operational-
ized using proportion of the state population holding a bachelor’s degree or higher (age
25 and over) calculated from the 2006-2008 American Community Survey via American
11It is interesting to note that the racial threat hypothesis directly contradicts a separate theory of inter-
racial relations, the contact hypothesis, which holds that increased interaction between majority and mi-
nority individuals will counter previously-held stereotypes.
12There is evidence that the racial threat e↵ect is conditioned on socioeconomic environment, with racial
animus emerging more readily in low socioeconomic status communities with a large minority presence
and support for racial issues increasing in high socioeconomic status but diverse communities (Branton &
Jones, 2005; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000).
13Inclusion of bothwhite racial attitudes and demographic variables in models of state policy is problem-
atic because of the relationship between the two constructs. This limitation is true, if racial context theories
of prejudice are correct, even if racial demographics are left out of the MRP model.
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FactFinder (United States Census Bureau, 2016b). Despite its emergence in multiple stud-
ies, the relationship between educational attainment, racial attitudes, and policy opinion
is nuanced and not strictly linear. More educated individuals are more likely to connect
political attitudes to policy preferences. Those with higher educational attainment and
more negative racial attitudes, then, are actually more likely to oppose welfare than other
individuals (Federico, 2004). While important for understanding the dynamics of racial
attitudes at the individual level, for the purpose of building models to estimate a state-
level variable the interest is primarily in aggregate trends. Simply using an indicator
of educational attainment, in this case proportion of the working-age population with a
bachelor’s degree, is su cient.
A dissimilarity index operationalizes the degree of black segregation in the state. Seg-
regation might be a predictor of white racial attitudes through at least two mechanisms.
First, segregation could be a product of white racial attitudes, with more racially antag-
onistic whites less likely to live near blacks (and possibly using informal mechanisms
to keep blacks from residing in communities perceived to be "white neighborhoods").
Second, segregation could also operationalize the contact hypothesis, the notion that fre-
quent interactions between racial groups will counter negative stereotypes. In relatively
integrated areas, frequent contact between whites and blacks is more likely. While these
two possibilities each have a di↵erent causal direction—one is a↵ected by racial attitudes,
the other a↵ects racial attitudes—either suggests a measure of segregation at the state
level should be related to white racial attitudes. The dissimilarity index used here is a
measure of the distribution of two groups, in this case whites and blacks, in a geographic
area. It is coded 0 to 100, with zero indicating perfect integration—no geographic dif-
ferences in the distribution of whites and blacks—and 100 indicating perfect segregation
of blacks and whites; I re-scale this variable to the [0,1] interval for better comparability
with the other state-level variables. The index is produced using data from the Ameri-
can Community Survey (2005 to 2009) by the University of Michigan Population Studies
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Center (2016).
Another candidate variable, the shift in state vote share from John Kerry in the 2004
to Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential elections, could serve as a proxy for racial atti-
tudes. Analysis of American National Election Studies data indicates that whites holding
more prejudicial racial views were less likely to vote for Obama, a pattern not found
for recent previous Democratic presidential candidates (Hutchings, 2009; Piston, 2010).
Similar evidence was found using relatively subtle measures of negative racial a↵ect, such
as attitude toward a rmative action, list experiments embedded in surveys, and Implicit
Association Test results (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2009; Scha↵ner,
2011). The relationship between support for Obama and racial attitudes among whites
has even been demonstrated using exit poll data (Highton, 2011). Finally, given other rel-
evant conditions, such as the state of the economy and approval of the incumbent party,
some observers suggest that, absent racial animus, Obama would have been elected in
a landslide rather than in a relatively close popular vote (Lewis-Beck, Tien, & Nadeau,
2010). Even though Barack Obama outperformed John Kerry in the vast majority of
states, negative racial a↵ect among whites appears central to the ultimate results of the
2008 presidential election14. It therefore follows that states in which negative views of
blacks are more common among whites would have smaller shifts to Obama, if any, while
states where such views are less prevalent would have larger shifts to Obama. This ap-
proach is used by Ansolabehere, Persily, and Steward (2010) in considering the impli-
cations of changes to the implementation of the Voting Rights Act. Finally, Democratic
vote share in the 2008 presidential race is considered as an alternative electoral variable.
Descriptive statistics for the state predictors are shown in Table A.2.
14See Mas and Moretti (2009) for an alternative view, however. In that study, which used General Social
Survey data disaggregated by state, no relationship was found between aggregate white racial a↵ect and
Obama vote share. Disaggregation as a tool for estimating subnational opinion, however, is subject to a
host of limitations discussed elsewhere in this Appendix.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics, state variables used in predictive models of individual-
level racial attitudes among whites.
Variable Mean (SD)
Population proportion black 0.105 (0.095)
Population proportion w/ bachelor’s (25-65) 0.267 (0.047)
2004-2008 Democratic vote shift 0.048 (0.037)
2008 Democratic vote share 0.505 (0.095)
Black segregation index 0.611 (0.083)
n=50
Model Selection
A number of models were fit, then compared using Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) statistics and likelihood ratio tests. AIC statistics examine the improvement, if any,
gained by using a di↵erent model specification, with improvement represented as the dif-
ference in the likelihood while accounting for di↵erences in degrees of freedom between
specifications (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Smaller AIC values indicate the "better" fitting
model, and a general rule-of-thumb suggests that a di↵erence of 2 between the AIC values
represents a meaningful di↵erence in the performance of the models. An advantage of
AIC is that it allows comparison of non-nested models; a disadvantage, however, is that
it is not possible to formally statistically test AIC values against one another. Likelihood
ratio tests, in contrast, do not allow comparison of non-nested models but do allow for
statistical tests.
All models included the full suite of individual-level predictors (gender, age, and
education), the state random e↵ect, and the region random e↵ect. The primary model se-
lection task was identification of the strongest package of group (state)-level predictors.
Coe cients, AIC values, and likelihood ratio tests for candidate model specifications us-
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ing these variables are shown in Table A.3 and Table A.4. Table A.3 presents the stepwise
exclusion of each of the variables eventually kept in the final model—black population
proportion, proportion of the working-age population with a bachelor’s degree or greater,
and the segregation index. As judged by AIC, the preferred model (Model 1) includes all
three variables; each variable is also statistically significant at ↵ = 0.10 when all three are
present. Interestingly, the significance of group educational attainment and segregation
are influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of the population proportion identifying as
black.
Table A.4 presents the primary candidate model (Model 1) compared to models con-
taining the Obama-Kerry vote shift (Model 4) and 2008 Democratic vote share (Model
5) variables, respectively. Neither electoral variable achieves statistical significance, and
the likelihood ratio tests and AIC statistics indicate that inclusion of either provides no
improvement in model fit compared to Model 1. Given the extensive research indicating
a link between support for Obama and white racial a↵ect (Greenwald et al., 2009; High-
ton, 2011; Hutchings, 2009; Lewis-Beck et al., 2010; Piston, 2010; Scha↵ner, 2011), these
results are somewhat surprising. It is possible that a relationship does exist but is not
detectable in the present study. Both election-based variables are appropriately signed,
they merely fail to reach statistical significance. Regardless, for the purpose of producing
state-level estimates, there are no gains from inclusion of either electoral variable in the
predictive model. Model 1 is therefore used for prediction and post-stratification.
MRP Estimates
Estimates of the percentage of whites holding negative views of blacks, as defined
previously, within each state are shown in Table A.5. For comparison, both the MRP
and disaggregation estimates are presented. The MRP estimates are weighted using year
2000 U.S. Census data while the disaggregation estimates use the 2008 National Annen-
berg Election Survey probability weights. As expected, there are di↵erences between
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Table A.3: Parameters of potential multilevel models for predicting state-level prevalence
of negative stereotypes of blacks among whites.
In Top Quartile Negative A↵ect Measure
Fixed Component
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female  0.321⇤⇤⇤  0.323⇤⇤⇤  0.321⇤⇤⇤  0.321⇤⇤⇤
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Prop. black 2.543⇤⇤⇤ 2.391⇤⇤⇤ 2.470⇤⇤⇤
(0.431) (0.497) (0.461)
Prop. bachelor’s  1.707⇤⇤  0.684  1.622⇤⇤
(0.712) (0.854) (0.727)
Segregation 0.787⇤ 0.489 0.796⇤
(0.402) (0.555) (0.459)
Constant  1.198⇤⇤⇤  1.078⇤⇤  1.670⇤⇤⇤  0.723⇤⇤
(0.384) (0.489) (0.366) (0.295)
Random Component
Variance
State 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.011
Region 0.008 0.064 0.018 0.013
Age 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
Education 0.150 0.153 0.153 0.151
Observations 15,372 15,372 15,372 15,372
Log Likelihood  8,174.359  8,187.699  8,176.956  8,176.116
LR  2 v. Model 1 26.680*** 5.194** 3.514*
Akaike Inf. Crit. 16,366.720 16,391.400 16,369.910 16,368.230
Fixed components are raw multilevel logit coe cients. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Individual-level data drawn from 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey online sample.
Analyses conducted without included sample probability weights.
174
Table A.4: Parameters of potential multilevel models for predicting state-level prevalence
of negative stereotypes of blacks among whites.
In Top Quartile Negative A↵ect Measure
Fixed Component
(1) (4) (5)
Female  0.321⇤⇤⇤  0.321⇤⇤⇤  0.321⇤⇤⇤
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Prop.black 2.543⇤⇤⇤ 2.540⇤⇤⇤ 2.583⇤⇤⇤
(0.431) (0.406) (0.423)
Prop. bachelor’s  1.707⇤⇤  1.478⇤⇤  1.240
(0.712) (0.720) (0.890)
Segregation 0.787⇤ 0.741⇤ 0.928⇤⇤
(0.402) (0.391) (0.425)
04-08 Dem. vote shift  1.362
(1.014)
08 Dem. vote share  0.494
(0.572)




State 0.010 0.009 0.009
Region 0.008 0.006 0.006
Age 0.029 0.029 0.029
Education 0.150 0.150 0.150
Observations 15,372 15,372 15,372
Log Likelihood  8,174.359  8,173.461  8,173.994
LR  2 1.800 0.729
Akaike Inf. Crit. 16,366.720 16,366.920 16,367.990
Fixed components are raw multilevel logit coe cients. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Individual-level data drawn from 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey online sample.
Analyses conducted without included sample probability weights.
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estimates produced with the two methods, particularly in small-population states (e.g.,
Alaska, Montana, Wyoming). For many states, however, the estimates produced using
the two methods are very similar. There is no way to "prove" that one approach is more
accurate than the other, and the comparatively large sample size of the NAES makes it
more appropriate for straightforward disaggregation than surveys such as the ANES or
GSS. Large sample size, though, can also improve the performance of MRP. The MRP es-
timates are preferred and are the values used as independent variables in the analyses
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 for two reasons. First, MRP’s strength in producing more
accurate estimates in small-population units is appealing. Second, the ability to bring
racial context into analyses via the predictive model allows incorporation of the de facto
standard measure of racial salience in welfare policy studies. Using the MRP estimates,
then, not only has possible empirical advantages, it also makes these two dissertation
chapters the first studies since Johnson’s (2001) investigation of AFDC benefits to em-
pirically include racial context, racial attitudes, and their relationship to one another in
analysis of state welfare policy. It provides a valuable update to an under-addressed as-
pect of state welfare politics research.
Comparison with Alternative Measures
Prevalence of negative racial views among whites based on the MRP estimates is gen-
erally highest in the south, weaker in the midwest, and weakest in the west and northeast.
The measure therefore has a high degree of face validity. A further test of its properties
is its relationship to other measures of racial salience in state politics. Table A.6 shows
the correlation of the MRP estimates of negative stereotypes of blacks among whites with
other possible measures. These alternatives include disaggregated estimates of negative
views of blacks among whites using the 2008 NAES, a measure created by Brace et al.
(2002) using pooled General Social Survey data from 1974 to 1998 disaggregated by state,
Elmendorf and Spencer’s (2014) measure using pooled NAES and Cooperative Campaign
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Table A.5: MRP & disaggregation estimates of prevalence of extremely negative stereo-
types of blacks among whites by state.
State MRP % Disag. % State MRP % Disag. %
AL 38.68 41.52 MT 21.20 35.90
AK 20.63 5.39 NE 27.23 24.54
AZ 21.55 21.91 NV 23.75 17.89
AR 34.07 35.98 NH 19.38 24.56
CA 21.41 22.31 NJ 28.42 30.29
CO 18.26 12.99 NM 20.71 21.41
CT 23.83 22.63 NY 21.12 30.07
DE 32.96 11.24 NC 30.38 27.98
FL 32.07 29.25 ND 24.95 27.37
GA 34.77 34.13 OH 30.60 31.50
HI 18.95 9.52 OK 27.94 42.36
ID 20.11 17.20 OR 20.23 18.55
IL 29.50 34.58 PA 30.87 35.25
IN 28.91 32.14 RI 23.98 31.25
IA 27.93 19.92 SC 35.97 44.56
KS 25.17 22.57 SD 25.99 36.20
KY 29.63 31.81 TN 33.69 30.11
LA 42.96 54.14 TX 27.68 26.84
ME 22.32 21.09 UT 18.61 14.30
MD 30.85 30.37 VT 19.37 24.09
MA 21.86 31.89 VA 26.65 36.70
MI 29.36 23.63 WA 18.05 20.12
MN 26.14 24.54 WV 27.82 23.83
MS 43.79 48.22 WI 29.40 34.06
MO 31.41 27.99 WY 22.00 11.69
Calculations from 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey.
MRP estimates weighted with year 2000 U.S. Census data.
Disaggregation estimates produced with NAES survey weights.
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Analysis Project data disaggregated by state, the percentage of the state cash assistance
caseload identifying as black in 1998 (Administration for Children and Families, 2015),
the percentage of the state cash assistance caseload identifying as black in 2010 (Admin-
istration for Children and Families, 2015), and the proportion of the state population
identifying as black in 2010 (United States Census Bureau, 2016a). With the exception of
the Brace et al. (2002) measure, the MRP variable correlates highly, though not perfectly,
with all other measures. It also produces a rank ordering fairly close to Highton (2011),
who estimated prejudice among whites in the states using disaggregated data from the
Pew Research Center Values Study.
Table A.6: Correlation of MRP estimates of prevalence of white stereotyping of blacks
with other indicators of salience of race to state welfare politics.





Brace et. al -0.517 -0.436 1.000
Elmendorf 0.861 0.655 -0.480 1.000
TANF % (1998) 0.858 0.593 -0.337 0.712 1.000
TANF % (2010) 0.856 0.589 -0.306 0.701 0.987 1.000
Pop. % (2010) 0.859 0.594 -0.288 0.708 0.920 0.930 1.000
MRP estimates calculated from 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey data
using multi-level regression and post-stratification.
Disaggregation estimates calculated from 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey data
using included sampling weights.
Other attitudinal measures from Brace et al. (2002) and Elmendorf and Spencer (2014).
TANF and population variables are percentages of the cash assistance caseload
and the state population identifying as black, respectively.
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APPENDIX B
Supplementary Information & Analyses for Chapter 2
Varying Denominator E↵ort-to-Need Models
The models in Table B.1 are identical to those presented in Chapter 2 analyzing the re-
lationship between state characteristics and basic assistance spending expressed as fixed
denominator e↵ort-to-need. Here, e↵ort-to-need is calculated with a varying denomina-
tor. Instead of an average of families in poverty from 1998-2013, the denominator in
the outcome variable here is the estimated count of families in poverty in each state-year
based on Current Population Survey data1. Though point estimates di↵er, inferences are
largely identical. The major exception is fiscal stress, which was statistically significant
and negatively signed in the models presented in Chapter 2 but is not significant here.
Potential Confounders
There are two major factors which could be seen as confounding the key results in
Chapter 2. Several of the main variables—e.g., white racial attitudes, government ide-
ology—have values that cluster in the American south. The white racial attitudes/basic
1The count for any given state-year is actually the average of the estimated count at time t and time t-1
to address small-sample problems in some states.
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Table B.1: Basic assistance e↵ort-to-need growth curve model results with time-varying
family poverty denominator.




Years -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.080***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Hispanic caseload % 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Gov’t liberalism 0.022* 0.022* 0.023*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Cit. liberalism -0.018 -0.019 -0.018
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Fiscal stress -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Unemployment 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Unmarried births -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Time invariant
White stereotyping of blacks -0.051** -0.047* -0.050**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Hispanic caseload % mean -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Gov’t liberalism mean 0.029 0.029 0.028
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
Citizen liberalism mean 0.312*** 0.313*** 0.310***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
Fiscal stress mean 0.782 0.786 0.751
(1.303) (1.303) (1.314)
Unemployment rate mean -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091)





Gov’t liberalism* attitudes -0.001
(0.002)
Random component
Variance(Years) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Variance(Cons.) 0.240 0.240 0.238
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Covariance(Years,Cons) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
AR(1) Residual
⇢ 0.405 0.406 0.407
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Variance 0.084 0.084 0.084
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log likelihood -183.360 -183.028 -183.184
BIC 500.363 506.381 506.693
N=798 (50 states in 16 years. Two observations treated as missing.)
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable log transformed.
+p < 0.01,⇤p < 0.05 ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01 ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.001
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assistance finding could, then, simply be a product of geography. Second, political cul-
ture di↵ers across the states and is closely related to variation in state policy (Lowery &
Sigelman, 1982; Morgan &Watson, 1991). Mead (2004) considers political culture central
to the implementation of welfare reform in the states. There could be covariance in the
key independent variables and TANF basic assistance expenditures driven by a simulta-
neous relationship with political culture. I revisit the basic assistance models, with no
interactions, for both the fixed denominator e↵ort-to-need outcome variable and the per-
centage outcome variable. In Table B.2 I include an indicator for south, while in Table B.3
I include two measures of political culture. The first variable operationalizes Elazar’s
(1966) original typology. The three categories of culture are moralistic, in which govern-
ment focuses on the public good, individualistic, in which citizens are focused on their
own concerns, and traditionalistic, in which government focuses on the power of elites
and elite interests. The second pair of political culture models uses a revised version of
this typology (Morgan & Watson, 1991). Note that the sample is smaller for the politi-
cal culture analyses than for either the south models or the models in Chapter 2 proper;
Alaska and Hawaii were not classified in either the original or updated scheme.
Results from these alternative models generally support the conclusions from Chapter
2, with one notable exception. In the e↵ort-to-need model including the south indicator
compared to its Chapter 2 counterpart, the white stereotyping of blacks variable loses sta-
tistical significance while the south indicator is significant at ↵ = 0.001. The percentage
model, though, presents exactly the opposite pattern—the south isn’t statistically signif-
icant while the white attitudes variable is significant at ↵ = 0.001. It is likely that these
two variables are so closely related (geographic region was used in the construction of
the MRP estimates of white attitudes toward blacks) that it is impossible for the models
to di↵erentiate between them. Prevalence of stereotyping of blacks by whites remains
statistically significant at ↵ = 0.10 or less in each of the political culture models. The
results from Chapter 2, then, are generally durable to these potential confounding influ-
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ences, but the close relationship between white stereotyping of blacks and the American
south does make it di cult to peel apart geographic e↵ects from the e↵ects of white racial
attitudes.
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Hispanic caseload % 0.006 -0.042
(0.007) (0.175)
Gov’t liberalism 0.018+ 0.177
(0.010) (0.282)
Cit. liberalism -0.014 0.058
(0.014) (0.410)
Fiscal stress -0.018* -0.501***
(0.007) (0.124)
Unemployment rate 0.045*** 0.750***
(0.008) (0.211)





White stereotyping of blacks -0.027 -1.230***
(0.019) (0.257)
Hispanic caseload % (state mean) -0.009 -0.057
(0.009) (0.202)
Gov’t liberalism (state mean) 0.034 0.731
(0.043) (0.760)
Cit. liberalism (state mean) 0.279*** 0.481
(0.053) (1.300)
Fiscal stress (state mean) 0.960 16.035
(1.237) (18.834)
Unemployment (state mean) -0.047 -1.659
(0.086) (1.201)
Poverty (state mean) -0.329+
(0.574)
















Log likelihood -147.931 -2679.753
BIC 436.186 5519.877
N=798 (50 states in 16 years. Two observations treated as missing.)
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
E↵ort-to-need dependent variable log transformed.
+p < 0.01,⇤p < 0.05 ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01 ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.001
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Table B.3: Basic assistance growth curve model results with state political culture in-
cluded as a covariate.
Elazar Morgan et. al
E↵ort-to-need Percent E↵ort-to-need Percent
Fixed component
Time varying
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Years -0.066*** -5.169*** -0.066*** -5.172***
(0.009) (0.450) (0.009) (0.452)
Years2 0.181*** 0.182***
(0.022) (0.022)
Hispanic caseload % 0.006 -0.057 0.006 -0.064
(0.007) (0.175) (0.007) (0.177)
Gov’t liberalism 0.017+ 0.177 0.017+ 0.177
(0.010) (0.286) (0.010) (0.286)
Cit. liberalism -0.012 0.077 -0.012 0.073
(0.015) (0.444) (0.015) (0.443)
Fiscal stress -0.018* -0.447*** -0.018* -0.448***
(0.008) (0.123) (0.008) (0.123)
Unemployment rate 0.046*** 0.740*** 0.045*** 0.745***
(0.008) (0.219) (0.008) (0.218)
Unmarried births -0.008 0.739** -0.008 0.743**
(0.011) (0.266) (0.011) (0.267)
Poverty rate 0.334* 0.333*
(0.155) (0.155)
Time invariant
White stereotyping of blacks -0.031+ -1.063*** -0.028+ -1.101***
(0.016) (0.290) (0.015) (0.252)
Hispanic caseload % (state mean) -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 0.003
(0.009) (0.203) (0.009) (0.199)
Gov’t liberalism (state mean) 0.066 0.786 0.054 0.551
(0.045) (0.747) (0.039) (0.650)
Cit. liberalism (state mean) 0.196** 0.369 0.203*** 0.621
(0.064) (1.255) (0.056) (1.192)
Fiscal stress (state mean) 2.633** 24.871 2.628** 22.945
(0.952) (20.445) (1.017) (19.789)
Unemployment (state mean) -0.134* -2.342 -0.059 -2.010
(0.067) (1.283) (0.066) (1.203)
Poverty (state mean) 0.090 -0.089
(0.613) (0.543)
Unmarried births (state mean) 0.018 -0.005 -0.019 -0.184
(0.018) (0.457) (0.021) (0.479)
Individualistic 0.068 -0.043 0.930+ 6.559
(0.187) (3.758) (0.562) (9.934)
Traditionalistic -0.577** -3.113 0.444 6.889
(0.212) (3.762) (0.576) (10.046)
Random component
Variance(Years) 0.001 0.231 0.001 0.231
(0.0003) (0.296) (0.0003) (0.296)
Variance(Constant) 0.173 14.816 0.183 13.056
(0.051) (28.517) (0.039) (26.839)
Covariance(Years, cons) -0.005 -0.034 -0.005 0.171
(0.003) (2.274) (0.003) (2.250)
AR(1) Residual
⇢ 0.329 0.690 0.328 0.691
(0.096) (0.093) (0.096) (0.093)
Variance 0.072 81.227 0.072 81.299
(0.013) (24.354) (0.012) (24.323)
Log likelihood -145.314 -2564.460 -146.423 -2564.344
BIC 436.734 5294.95 438.952 5294.717
N=766 (48 states in 16 years. Two observations treated as missing.)
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
E↵ort-to-need dependent variable log transformed.
+p < 0.01,⇤p < 0.05 ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01 ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.001
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APPENDIX C
Supplementary Information & Analyses for Chapter 3
State-year Categorical Spending
Chapter 3 presented descriptive statistics for state-year TANF spending as the propor-
tion of all state-years in the sample (n=700) in which any spending in a given category
was observed. Table C.1 presents a more detailed version of this data expressed as counts
of years within each state with spending in the given category. As can be seen, there
are some categories (e.g., basic assistance, work/services/childcare) in which almost all
states spend in almost all years. There are other categories, however, where spending is
much more varied, creating analytical complications addressed with alternative methods
of analysis.
Alternative Analytical Approach: Fractional Outcome Models
As noted in several places in this dissertation, percentage data is bounded and can
follow an unusual distribution, violating linear regression assumptions. There are classes
of models specifically for this kind of data, however. In Tables C.2 through C.9, I present
models of the proportion of total TANF resources devoted to each expenditure area for
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Table C.1: Count of years in which each state used funds in each expenditure category,
2000-2013.
State Basic Work, services, Tax credits Short-term Pregnancy/ SSBG transfers Misc. Admin.
assistance childcare benefits 2 parent
Alabama 14 14 0 6 14 14 14 14
Alaska 14 14 0 14 14 14 8 14
Arizona 13 14 0 8 14 10 14 13
Arkansas 14 14 0 4 5 14 14 13
California 14 14 0 13 13 14 14 14
Colorado 14 14 12 14 13 12 14 12
Connecticut 14 14 0 13 14 14 14 14
Delaware 14 14 0 8 10 7 5 14
Florida 14 14 0 14 14 14 14 14
Georgia 14 14 0 7 9 13 13 13
Hawaii 14 14 0 5 14 5 6 14
Idaho 14 14 0 13 14 12 14 14
Illinois 14 14 10 3 14 8 14 14
Indiana 14 14 14 1 11 11 14 14
Iowa 14 14 6 14 14 14 12 14
Kansas 14 14 13 4 14 3 14 14
Kentucky 14 14 0 0 2 3 14 14
Louisiana 14 14 4 2 12 14 14 14
Maine 14 14 4 14 12 1 7 14
Maryland 14 14 11 11 14 14 8 12
Massachusetts 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Michigan 14 14 8 11 14 14 14 14
Minnesota 14 14 14 14 13 10 14 14
Mississippi 14 14 0 2 14 14 14 14
Missouri 14 14 0 7 14 8 14 14
Montana 14 14 0 9 14 10 14 14
Nebraska 14 14 7 1 1 8 8 14
Nevada 14 14 0 9 12 3 14 11
New Hampshire 14 14 0 7 10 14 14 14
New Jersey 14 14 13 12 14 14 12 14
New Mexico 14 14 8 0 4 9 14 14
New York 14 14 14 13 14 13 14 14
North Carolina 14 14 5 14 14 13 14 14
North Dakota 14 14 0 8 0 13 14 14
Ohio 14 14 1 14 14 14 13 14
Oklahoma 14 14 0 13 14 13 13 14
Oregon 14 14 10 0 0 6 14 14
Pennsylvania 14 14 0 14 13 14 14 14
Rhode Island 14 14 7 14 12 0 14 14
South Carolina 14 14 0 0 10 14 14 14
South Dakota 14 14 0 2 14 6 14 14
Tennessee 14 14 0 0 7 3 13 14
Texas 14 14 0 14 13 14 14 14
Utah 14 14 0 14 14 14 12 13
Vermont 14 14 14 14 14 0 5 14
Virginia 14 14 0 14 14 14 14 14
Washington 14 14 0 14 14 10 14 14
West Virginia 14 14 0 13 14 12 14 14
Wisconsin 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 14
Wyoming 14 14 0 1 10 0 14 13
Source: author’s calculation based on Center on Budget and Policy Priorities data.
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2001, 2006, and 2013 using fractional logit models. The fractional logit model is identical
to the traditional logit model but, rather than analyzing a 0/1 binary outcome, analyzes
data distributed in the [0,1] interval (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). Zeroes are treated as
actual reports of zero rather than as a discrete choice. Results of these models generally
support findings from Chapter 3. The major di↵erence concerns fiscal stress and Social
Services Block Grant transfers; in these models, fiscal stress is not related to the amount
of TANF funds transferred to SSBG. Chapter 3 suggests, however, that it is related to the
decision to transfer from one block grant to the other.
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Table C.2: Basic cash assistance proportion model mean marginal e↵ects.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks -0.00732⇤ -0.00953⇤⇤ -0.00862⇤⇤
(0.00336) (0.00333) (0.00332)
Evangelical % -0.00256 0.0000379 0.00163
(0.00231) (0.00199) (0.00232)
Hispanic caseload % -0.000815 0.000193 -0.000869
(0.00112) (0.00124) (0.00146)
Gov’t liberalism 0.0261⇤⇤⇤ -0.000826 -0.00556
(0.00607) (0.00669) (0.00877)
Cit. liberalism -0.00643 0.00297 0.0201
(0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0165)
Unemployment -0.0377⇤ -0.00634 0.0113
(0.0177) (0.0110) (0.0113)
Foster care ratio 0.0125⇤ 0.0106 0.00472
(0.00602) (0.0102) (0.00617)
Fiscal stress 0.0941 0.154 0.0912
(0.127) (0.196) (0.213)
Poverty 0.00790 0.00153 -0.00534
(0.00609) (0.00673) (0.00672)
n 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.016 0.015
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table C.3: Work/services/childcare proportion model mean marginal e↵ects.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks 0.00708⇤ -0.00244 0.00109
(0.00287) (0.00497) (0.00549)
Evangelical % 0.000963 -0.00172 -0.000662
(0.00123) (0.00264) (0.00360)
Hispanic caseload % -0.00120 -0.00277⇤⇤ -0.00356⇤
(0.000981) (0.00101) (0.00138)
Gov’t liberalism -0.00390 0.0269⇤⇤ 0.0143
(0.00627) (0.00975) (0.0110)
Cit. liberalism 0.00586 -0.0253 -0.0129
(0.00986) (0.0155) (0.0196)
Unemployment 0.0223 0.00978 -0.0124
(0.0166) (0.0191) (0.0146)
Foster care ratio -0.00396 -0.0114 -0.00213
(0.00562) (0.00727) (0.00968)
Fiscal stress 0.327⇤ 0.00922 -0.0257
(0.145) (0.234) (0.276)
Poverty 0.00118 0.00641 0.00628
(0.00546) (0.00832) (0.0105)
n 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.018 0.018
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table C.4: Administration proportion model mean marginal e↵ects.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks -0.000247 -0.000718 -0.00218⇤
(0.000938) (0.00118) (0.00109)
Evangelical % -0.000824 0.000802 0.0000790
(0.000728) (0.000784) (0.000540)
Hispanic caseload % -0.000522 -0.000143 -0.000426
(0.000401) (0.000476) (0.000331)
Gov’t liberalism -0.00101 -0.000616 -0.00227
(0.00269) (0.00302) (0.00195)
Cit. liberalism 0.00338 0.00556 -0.00122
(0.00627) (0.00472) (0.00359)
Unemployment -0.00257 -0.00865⇤ -0.0000757
(0.00958) (0.00359) (0.00214)
Foster care ratio -0.00763⇤ -0.000544 -0.000720
(0.00376) (0.00197) (0.00243)
Fiscal stress -0.0813⇤ -0.0539 -0.0405
(0.0412) (0.106) (0.0547)
Poverty -0.000917 0.00123 0.000950
(0.00268) (0.00317) (0.00156)
n 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.002 0.005
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table C.5: APL/other proportion model mean marginal e↵ects.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks 0.000684 0.00395 -0.00675
(0.00293) (0.00517) (0.00485)
Evangelical % 0.00372+ 0.00559⇤ 0.00598⇤
(0.00205) (0.00258) (0.00301)
Hispanic caseload % 0.00330⇤⇤ 0.00313⇤ 0.00290
(0.00103) (0.00138) (0.00181)
Gov’t liberalism -0.0209⇤⇤ -0.0262⇤ -0.0175
(0.00674) (0.0102) (0.0112)
Cit. liberalism -0.00847 0.0143 0.0125
(0.0145) (0.0175) (0.0191)
Unemployment 0.0426⇤ 0.00919 0.0343⇤
(0.0202) (0.0211) (0.0162)
Foster care ratio 0.00276 0.000189 -0.00934
(0.00672) (0.00866) (0.0107)
Fiscal stress -0.332⇤ -0.277 -0.355
(0.141) (0.243) (0.406)
Poverty -0.0116+ -0.0101 -0.00684
(0.00623) (0.0101) (0.0112)
n 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.053 0.051
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table C.6: SSBG transfers proportion model mean marginal e↵ects.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks 0.000725 0.000514 0.000319
(0.000850) (0.000856) (0.000923)
Evangelical % -0.000174 -0.000269 -0.00117⇤
(0.000597) (0.000487) (0.000514)
Hispanic caseload % 0.00000785 -0.000265 -0.000261
(0.000315) (0.000323) (0.000347)
Gov’t liberalism -0.000441 -0.00161 -0.00135
(0.00188) (0.00181) (0.00172)
Cit. liberalism -0.00269 0.000212 -0.00119
(0.00377) (0.00351) (0.00380)
Unemployment -0.00843 -0.00443 -0.00185
(0.00589) (0.00390) (0.00271)
Foster care ratio -0.00111 0.00169 0.00412+
(0.00208) (0.00189) (0.00240)
Fiscal stress 0.0180 0.112 0.00297
(0.0283) (0.0733) (0.0470)
Poverty -0.000773 0.00226 0.00229
(0.00174) (0.00209) (0.00155)
n 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.010 0.014
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table C.7: Tax credits proportion model mean marginal e↵ects.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks 0.00145 0.00208 0.00575⇤
(0.000954) (0.00282) (0.00233)
Evangelical % -0.00134+ -0.00217+ -0.00300+
(0.000810) (0.00113) (0.00178)
Hispanic caseload % 0.0000712 -0.000449 0.00169⇤
(0.000303) (0.000432) (0.000732)
Gov’t liberalism -0.00315+ -0.00784⇤ -0.00524
(0.00173) (0.00351) (0.00727)
Cit. liberalism 0.00295 0.00976 0.0142
(0.00308) (0.00916) (0.0128)
Unemployment -0.00113 0.00233 -0.0151⇤
(0.00353) (0.00675) (0.00747)
Foster care ratio 0.0000953 0.00173 0.0107+
(0.00172) (0.00492) (0.00553)
Fiscal stress 0.0650⇤ 0.0477 0.149
(0.0329) (0.265) (0.165)
Poverty -0.00206 -0.00107 -0.00271
(0.00208) (0.00629) (0.00429)
n 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.117 0.103
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table C.8: Short-term benefits proportion model mean marginal e↵ects.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks -0.000682 -0.000160 0.000457
(0.000491) (0.000458) (0.00101)
Evangelical % 0.000268 -0.000262 0.000383
(0.000252) (0.000207) (0.000858)
Hispanic caseload % -0.0000531 -0.000286+ 0.000152
(0.000136) (0.000153) (0.000263)
Gov’t liberalism -0.000781 -0.000759 -0.000161
(0.00119) (0.000971) (0.00268)
Cit. liberalism 0.0000226 0.00389+ 0.00402
(0.00181) (0.00232) (0.00526)
Unemployment -0.00341 0.000307 -0.00313
(0.00330) (0.00189) (0.00222)
Foster care ratio -0.000302 -0.00359⇤ -0.00410+
(0.000794) (0.00169) (0.00245)
Fiscal stress -0.00333 -0.0732+ -0.0152
(0.0200) (0.0397) (0.0510)
Poverty -0.000130 -0.000314 -0.00148
(0.000804) (0.00113) (0.00199)
n 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.050 0.031
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table C.9: Pregnancy prevention/two-parent family proportionmodel meanmarginal ef-
fects.
2001 2006 2012
White stereotyping of blacks 0.000524 0.00579⇤⇤ 0.00895⇤
(0.00129) (0.00189) (0.00420)
Evangelical % -0.000384 -0.00176⇤ -0.00158
(0.000592) (0.000698) (0.00168)
Hispanic caseload % -0.000598 0.000789 0.000463
(0.000450) (0.000664) (0.00140)
Gov’t liberalism -0.00243 0.00444 0.0131
(0.00247) (0.00280) (0.00963)
Cit. liberalism 0.00973 -0.00759 -0.0369+
(0.00809) (0.00583) (0.0192)
Unemployment 0.00242 0.00676 -0.00301
(0.00828) (0.00620) (0.0132)
Foster care ratio -0.00509 0.00250 -0.00510
(0.00400) (0.00274) (0.00800)
Fiscal stress -0.0662 0.0591 0.263
(0.0559) (0.0875) (0.253)
Poverty 0.00345+ -0.00513 -0.00507
(0.00190) (0.00357) (0.00761)
n 50 50 50
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.124 0.114
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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APPENDIX D
Addressing the Fiscal Stress Paradox
The conflicting findings regarding the role of fiscal stress in basic assistance spending
between Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are unexpected. A possible explanation is that the
role of fiscal stress changes over time and is, in turn, detected di↵erently in the models
treating time continuously (Chapter 2) and categorically (Chapter 3). Table D.1 provides
some evidence for this proposition. It splits the e↵ort-to-need and percentage models
presented in Chapter 2 by time, prior to 2007 and 2007 and later. Fiscal stress is not
statistically significant with either dependent variable in the early years of TANF, but
is statistically significant for both from 2007 on. Strikingly, that period also includes
the "Great Recession," precisely when demand for cash benefits might be expected to
increase. These analyses are a preliminary attempt at resolving the conflicting findings,
however, and more examination is warranted before drawing further conclusions.
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Table D.1: Basic assistance growth curve model parameters, sample split by time (pre-
2007 and 2007+).
E↵ort-to-need Percentage
Pre-2007 2007+ Pre-2007 2007+
Fixed component
Time varying
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Years -0.072*** -0.065*** -7.998*** -4.850
(0.019) (0.011) (0.829) (3.857)
Years2 0.687*** 0.161
(0.103) (0.156)
Hispanic caseload % 0.007 0.007 0.133 0.167
(0.008) (0.009) (0.221) (0.168)
Gov’t liberalism 0.022 0.010 0.414 -0.012
(0.017) (0.012) (0.399) (0.246)
Cit. liberalism 0.032 -0.044** 0.347 -0.996*
(0.027) (0.016) (0.545) (0.481)
Fiscal stress -0.018 -0.018*** -0.445 -0.366**
(0.018) (0.005) (0.268) (0.119)
Unemployment rate 0.033 0.046*** 2.162*** 0.439
(0.019) (0.009) (0.479) (0.256)
Unmarried births 0.012 0.006 -0.333 0.830*
(0.020) (0.018) (0.430) (0.408)
Poverty rate 0.583* -0.166
(0.242) (0.189)
Time invariant
White stereotyping of blacks -0.050** -0.061** -1.292*** -1.505***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.260) (0.282)
Hispanic caseload % (state mean) -0.011 -0.012 -0.196 -0.302
(0.011) (0.011) (0.243) (0.201)
Gov’t liberalism (state mean) 0.024 0.057 0.539 0.726
(0.050) (0.062) (0.856) (1.020)
Cit. liberalism (state mean) 0.271*** 0.298*** 0.332 0.238
(0.065) (0.078) (1.500) (1.555)
Fiscal stress (state mean) 0.962 0.739 29.002 10.871
(1.269) (1.545) (20.881) (16.010)
Unemployment (state mean) -0.058 -0.036 -3.328* -0.113
(0.094) (0.094) (1.432) (1.309)
Poverty (state mean) -0.861 0.102
(0.619) (0.554)
Unmarried births (state mean) -0.015 -0.013 1.270* -0.010
(0.026) (0.026) (0.601) (0.536)
Random component
Variance(Years) 0.001 0.0001 0.071 0.361
(0.0009) (0.00009) (0.261) (0.209)
Variance(Constant) 0.260 0.262 22.013 42.244
(0.078) (0.062) (16.757) (13.920)
Covariance(Years, cons) -0.006 0.005 1.253 3.907
(0.005) (0.003) . (0.991)
AR(1) Residual
⇢ 0.217 0.501 0.586 0.531
(0.082) (0.158) (0.101) (0.118)
Variance 0.080 0.057 76.149 30.195
(0.024) (0.016) (15.107) (7.125)
Log likelihood -145.928 -21.694 -1547.642 -1091.389
BIC 413.995 160.490 3229.638 2317.444
N=449 pre-2007 (50 states in 9 years. One observation treated as missing.)
N=349 2007+ (50 states in 7 years. One observation treated as missing.)
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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